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Introduction
On February 3, 2015, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered judgment in the case between Croatia and
Serbia.1 Croatia had instituted proceedings on July 2, 1999 and claimed that during the armed conflict which erupted
in 1991, Serbia had violated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention). In its counter-claim, Serbia alleged that rather Croatia had violated the Convention, particularly during
Operation Storm in 1995. This Serbian counter-claim was unanimously rejected. Croatia’s claim was also rejected,
but with Judge Canc¸ado Trindade and Judge ad hoc Vukas dissenting. The most vigorous disagreement between
the judges did not concern the merits though, but rather focused on one remaining jurisdictional issue.
In tandem with the winding down process at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
this Croatia/Serbia judgment also concludes Yugoslavia-related litigation at the ICJ. Other cases concerning the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s that came before the ICJ were the Legality of Use of Force cases
and the Bosnia v. Serbia case. The emanating case law from all these cases was at times contradictory in particular
on questions regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)/Serbia’s membership to the UN and more gen-
erally regarding the international legal obligations and responsibilities of FRY/Serbia as a successor or continuator
state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).2 In the words of Judge Skotnikov, the Croatia/Serbia
judgment therefore “constitutes the concluding chapter in this strange and somewhat strained tale of curious juris-
dictional constructions.”3
Jurisdiction and Article IX of the Genocide Convention
While most issues of jurisdiction and admissibility had been decided in the 2008 preliminary judgment, one objec-
tion by Serbia was transposed to the merits phase. This concerned the question of whether the Court had jurisdiction
pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention over events alleged to have occurred before April 27, 1992, the
date on which the FRY was proclaimed as a state. Croatia relied, inter alia, on the theory of succession to respon-
sibility and argued that when the FRY succeeded to the treaty obligations of the SFRY in 1992, it also succeeded
to the responsibility already incurred by the SFRY for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. Rather than
explicitly engaging with this argument that the FRY could be held responsible for acts committed before it even
came into existence as a state, the Court assumed full jurisdiction and held that the argument on succession to respon-
sibility could be addressed subsequent to dealing with the merits, to the extent still necessary at that point.4 Six
judges dissented from this finding, arguing that the Court had no jurisdiction under Article IX and should thus not
have proceeded to the merits.5
The Law on Genocide
Since Article IX constituted the sole jurisdictional basis, the Court could only rule on questions of genocide and
not on violations of other international rules protecting humanitarian values.6 Despite this limited jurisdiction, the
Court explicitly indicated that it would take account of violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law if these proved relevant for a finding on an alleged breach of the Genocide Convention. A perhaps more complex
question regarding the interplay between genocide law and international humanitarian law was whether acts that
are lawful under international humanitarian law can nonetheless qualify as genocidal acts. The Court noted in this
respect that the Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law are distinct bodies of rules pursuing dif-
ferent aims. While it refrained from making any further abstract observations regarding their interplay,7 it did pro-
nounce an articulate vision on interplay in the specific context of the Krajina shelling. In relation to this attack, the
ICJ followed the ICTY’s finding that it had not been indiscriminate, that there had thus not been an intent to cause
civilian casualties, and hence international humanitarian law had not been violated.8 On the basis of this finding,
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the Court subsequently concluded that the civilian casualties could also not be qualified as killing in the sense of
Article II(a) of the Genocide Convention given the overall lack of intent.9
The Court’s further pronouncements on the law of genocide consolidated prevalent interpretations of the ad hoc
Tribunals and were in line with the 2007 Bosnia judgment.10 In this respect, the Court reaffirmed that genocide
concerned physical and biological destruction only.11 The determination of what constitutes a group in part was
assessed both by quantitative criteria as well as geographic location and prominence of the allegedly targeted part
of the group.12 Perhaps most importantly in the context of the ethnic cleansing, which characterized the conflicts
in the former Yugoslavia, the Court reiterated its 2007 findings that forced displacement and deportation were not
genocidal acts per se, but that acts of ethnic cleansing could be indicative of a specific intent to commit genocide,
depending on the circumstances in which those acts effectively took place.13 A few months after the Croatia/Serbia
judgment, the ICTY Appeals Chamber further detailed circumstances in which forcible transfer can constitute or
contribute to genocide.14
A novel question for the ICJ was whether enforced disappearance could also amount to a genocidal act, and more
concretely whether the psychological suffering caused to surviving relatives could constitute serious mental harm
in the sense of Article II(b) of the Genocide Convention.15 In the Court’s view, a persistent refusal of the competent
authorities to provide information could indeed be capable of causing psychological suffering, however, in order
to fall within the scope of Article II(b), this suffering had to be such to contribute to the destruction of the group,16
quod non in the underlying case.17
Questions of Proof and the Relevance of ICTY Findings
Both parties referred to facts established during ICTY proceedings and in ICTY judgments to sustain their claims
in the ICJ case. In this respect the parties agreed with the approach followed by the Court in the 2007 judgment
regarding the evidential weight to be attached to ICTY findings.18 They did not agree, however, on whether infer-
ences can be made from the ICTY prosecutorial strategy.19 Indeed, this part of the 2007 judgment has not remained
without criticism20 but the Court nonetheless adhered to its precedent and noted that the persons charged at the ICTY
included very senior political and military leaders and the allegations against them regarded their overall strategy,
hence the absence of genocide charges was a factor to be taken into consideration according to the ICJ. The Court
also observed that the indictment against former President Miloševic´ included charges of genocide in relation to
Bosnia and Herzegovina only.21 Beyond questions of proof, the Court did reaffirm that a prior conviction of an
individual for genocide is no legal prerequisite for a finding on state responsibility.22 Another new issue raised was
whether ICTY Appeals Chamber findings should indeed prevail over those of the ICTY Trial Chamber, an important
question since the ICTY Appeals Chamber had reversed findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber relating to Krajina
in the Gotovina case. Serbia argued that members of the Appeals Chamber were appointed at random and vary from
one case to the other, having no greater experience or authority than those of the Trial Chamber. Concretely, in
relation to the Gotovina judgment, Serbia indicated that the Trial Chamber judgment had been unanimous by three
judges, while on appeal two judges had dissented, hence there was in fact an overall majority upholding the Trial
Chamber’s findings. Although Serbia’s argument finds resonance even with ICTY judges,23 the ICJ rejected it since
the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decisions represent the ICTY’s final word and should thus be accorded greater
weight.24
State Responsibility and Individual Criminal Responsibility: The Separate Opinion of Judge Gaja
In his opinion, Judge Gaja questioned the propriety of using the same legal framework for questions of state
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility as the ICJ did in 2007 and again in this judgment. His
observations concerned both the definition of genocide as well as the standard of proof. Judge Gaja acknowl-
edged that the definition of genocide in the statutes of international criminal tribunals mirrored the definition
of the Convention, but he pointed out that specific rules of interpretation governing criminal proceedings might
still lead to different interpretive outcomes. In this respect, Judge Gaja also noted that the jurisdiction of inter-
national criminal courts and tribunals is extended to other international crimes, such as crimes against humanity
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and war crimes, which may influence prosecutorial strategies and ultimately perhaps also questions of inter-
pretation.25 In a similar vein, Judge Gaja questioned the higher standard of proof to establish state responsibility
for international crimes. Citing the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Judge Gaja argued that the estab-
lishment of state responsibility should not be rendered more difficult when international crimes are involved,
but should rather be governed by the normal principles of state responsibility. Even if such lower responsibility
would not have changed the outcome in this case, Judge Gaja’s opinion is still noteworthy and his observations
merit further reflection.
Conclusion
The judgment overall does not stand out for its outcome, which was fully unsurprising, nor for its legal analysis,
which largely followed precedent. Its greatest contribution is perhaps non-legal. The Croatia/Serbia judgment has
merit for putting on record crimes and atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The majority
decision to address the merits prior to the issue of jurisdiction enabled the Court to address those acts that ultimately
did not constitute genocide. Even more importantly perhaps, as also underlined by Judge Keith, during the pro-
ceedings Serbia and Croatia acknowledged the crimes committed and expressed their regret.26 Ultimately, such
statements may also contribute to reconciliation processes. Hence, the Court may have dodged questions regarding
state succession, but by doing so it might still have paved the way towards final settlement and closure of the dispute.
The reversed approach of addressing the merits prior to all jurisdiction-related questions is therefore not without
advantage. After all, settling disputes remains the Court’s primary purpose.
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BiH Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
CHC Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HV Hrvatska vojska (Croatian Army)
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ILC International Law Commission
JNA Jugoslovenska narodna armija (Yugoslav People’s Army)
MUP Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova (Ministry of Interior)
RSK Republika Srpska Krajina (Republic of Serb Krajina)
SAO Srpska autonomna oblast (Serb Autonomous Region)
SAO SBWS Serb Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem
SDG Srpska dobrovoljacˇka garda (Serbian Volunteer Guard)
SDS Srpska demokratska stranka (Serb Democratic Party)
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNB Služba nacionalne bezbednosti (National Security Service)
SRS Srpska radikalna stranka (Serbian Radical Party)
TO Teritorijalna odbrana (Territorial Defence)
UNPA United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
VJ Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VP Vojna policija (Military Police)
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Historical and factual background.
Break-up of the SFRY and emergence of new States — Situation in Croatia — Establishment of Serb autonomous
regions — Armed conflict from summer 1991 — Vance plan and deployment of United Nations Protection Force
— Operations “Flash” and “Storm” in 1995.
*
Jurisdiction and admissibility.
Croatia’s claim — Jurisdiction ratione temporis regarding events before 27 April 1992 (date the FRY became
Party to the Genocide Convention) — Article IX of the Convention — Disputes “relating to the interpretation, appli-
cation or fulfilment” of the Convention — Convention not retroactive — Question of applicability of Article 10 (2)
of ILC Articles on State responsibility — Question of succession to responsibility — Dispute exists concerning
whether prior acts could engage responsibility of Serbia — Court has jurisdiction over entirety of Croatia’s claim.
Admissibility of claim — Admissibility of claim for acts before 27 April 1992 involves questions of attribution
— Acts prior to 8 October 1991 (date Croatia became Party to the Convention) pertinent to evaluation of alleged
violations after that date — Not necessary to rule on these two admissibility questions until the Court has assessed
the merits of the claim.
Serbia’s counter-claim — Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court as adopted on 14 April 1978 — Counter-
claim is within the jurisdiction of the Court — Counter-claim is directly connected to claim in fact and law —
Counter-claim admissible.
*
Genocide Convention as applicable law — Definition of genocide in Article II of the Convention.
Dolus specialis — Meaning and scope of “destruction” of group — Convention limited to physical or biological
destruction — Evidence must establish an intent to destroy group in whole or in part — Meaning of destruction
of group “in part” — Inference of dolus specialis through pattern of conduct.
Actus reus — Meaning and scope of acts listed in Article II of the Convention — Equivalence of terms “killing”
and “meurtre” in Article II (a) — Requirement that serious bodily or mental harm in Article II (b) be such as to
contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the group, in whole or in part — Forced displacement as
actus reus of genocide under Article II (c) — Rape and other acts of sexual violence as actus reus of genocide under
Article II (d).
*
Burden of proof — For party alleging a fact to demonstrate its existence — Principle not an absolute one —
Other party required to co-operate in provision of evidence in its possession — Reversal of burden of proof not
appropriate in present case.
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Standard of proof — Evidence must be “fully conclusive” — Court must be “fully convinced” that acts have
been committed.
Methods of proof — ICTY findings of fact accepted as “highly persuasive” — Absence of charges of genocide
in ICTY Indictments — Probative value of various types of reports adduced in evidence — Evidential weight of
individual statements annexed to written pleadings.
*
Principal claim.
Actus reus of genocide.
Article II (a) of the Convention — Established that a large number of killings carried out by JNA and Serb forces
in localities in Eastern Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia — Large majority of victims were
members of protected group — Actus reus established.
Article II (b) — Established that acts of ill-treatment, torture, sexual violence and rape perpetrated in localities
in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Dalmatia — Acts caused serious bodily or mental harm such as to
contribute to the physical or biological destruction of protected group — Actus reus established.
Article II (c) — Acts of rape not on scale as to amount to infliction on the group of conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part — Deprivation of food and medical care not of systematic
or general nature — Expulsion, forced displacement and restrictions on movement not calculated to result in phys-
ical destruction of group in whole or in part — Forced wearing of insignia of ethnicity cannot fall within scope
of Article II (c) — Looting of Croat property not calculated to result in physical destruction of group in whole or
in part — Destruction and looting of cultural heritage cannot fall within scope of Article II (c) — Forced labour
not calculated to result in physical destruction of group in whole or in part — Actus reus not established.
Article II (d) — Rape and acts of sexual violence committed — Not established that perpetrated to prevent births
within group — Actus reus not established.
Genocidal intent (dolus specialis) — Part allegedly targeted — Croats living in identified regions formed sub-
stantial part of group — Pattern of conduct existed consisting in widespread attacks on localities with Croat pop-
ulations from August 1991 — Requirement that intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, must be only rea-
sonable conclusion to be inferred from pattern of conduct — Context in which acts committed does not make it
possible to infer such intent — Not established that perpetrators availed themselves of opportunities to destroy
substantial part of protected group — Other factors invoked insufficient to show genocidal intent — Dolus specialis
not established.
No violation of the Convention established — Principal claim cannot be upheld — Court not required to pro-
nounce on admissibility of principal claim for acts prior to 8 October 1991 — Court need not consider whether
acts prior to 27 April 1992 attributable to SFRY — Court need not consider succession to responsibility.
*
Counter-claim.
Actus reus of genocide.
Question whether there was killing of civilians as a result of the shelling of Krajina towns — Analysis of Gotovina
case before ICTY — Indiscriminate shelling not established — No evidence of intentional killing of Serb civilians
through shelling — Actus reus under Article II (a) of the Convention not established.
Displacement of the Krajina Serb population — Displacement not calculated to bring about physical destruction,
in whole or in part, of targeted group — Actus reus under Article II (c) not established.
Killing of Serbs fleeing in columns — Established that such killings took place — Actus reus under Article II
(a) established.
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Killing of Serbs remaining in United Nations protected areas — Factual findings of ICTY Trial Chamber must
be accepted as “highly persuasive” — Established that such killings took place — Actus reus under Article II (a)
established.
Ill-treatment of Serbs during and after Operation “Storm” — Analysis of Gotovina case before ICTY — Estab-
lished that acts causing serious bodily or mental harm took place — Actus reus under Article II (b) established.
Large-scale destruction and looting after Operation “Storm” — Not calculated to bring about physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part, of targeted group — Actus reus under Article II (c) not established.
Genocidal intent (dolus specialis) — Brioni transcript does not establish genocidal intent — Pattern of conduct
— Distinction between ethnic cleansing and genocide — Acts not committed on a scale that could only reasonably
point to existence of genocidal intent — Dolus specialis not established.
No violation of the Convention established — Counter-claim cannot be upheld.
JUDGMENT
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dari; Judges ad hoc Vukas, Krec´a; Registrar Couvreur.
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Ms Blinne Nı´ Ghra´laigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
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Mr. Luka Misˇetic´, Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Luka Misetic, Chicago,
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Ms Zrinka Salaj, Ministry of Justice,
Mr. Tomislav Borsˇic´, Ministry of Justice,
Mr. Albert Graho, Ministry of Justice,
Mr. Nikica Baric´, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb,
Ms Maja Kovacˇ, Head of Service, Ministry of Justice,
Ms Katherine O’Byrne, Doughty Street Chambers, London,
Mr. Rowan Nicholson, Associate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge,
as Assistants;
Ms Victoria Taylor, International Mapping, Maryland,
as Technical Assistant,
and
the Republic of Serbia,
represented by
Mr. Sasˇa Obradovic´, First Counsellor of the Embassy of the Republic of Serbia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, former Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
Mr. William Schabas, O.C., M.R.I.A., Professor of International Law, Middlesex University and Professor of
International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Leiden University,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, University of Potsdam, Director
of the Potsdam Center of Human Rights, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., Ph.D. (Cambridge), Professor of International Law, University of Glasgow,
Mr. Wayne Jordash, Q.C., Barrister at Law, Doughty Street Chambers (London), Partner at Global Rights Com-
pliance,
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H.E. Mr. Petar Vico, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Veljko Odalovic´, Secretary-General of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, President of the Com-
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as Members of the Delegation;
Ms Tatiana Bachvarova, LL.M. (London School of Economics and Political Science), LL.M. (St. Kliment Ohrid-
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Mr. Svetislav Rabrenovic´, LL.M. (Michigan), Senior Adviser at the Office of the Prosecutor for War Crimes of
the Republic of Serbia,
Mr. Igor Olujic´, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
Mr. Marko Brkic´, First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Relja Radovic´, LL.M. (Novi Sad), LL.M. (Leiden (candidate)),
Mr. Georgios Andriotis, LL.M. (Leiden),
as Advisers,
The Court;
composed as above,
after deliberation,
delivers the following Judgment:
Institution of proceedings, notifications, preliminary objections and filing of written pleadings on the merits
1. The Court recalls that the procedural history of the case, from the date of its introduction on 2 July 1999 until
30 May 2008, was set out in detail in the Court’s Judgment of 18 November 2008 on the preliminary objections
raised by the Respondent (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008 (hereinafter the “2008 Judgment”),
pp. 415–417, paras. 1–19). These details will not be reproduced in full in the present Judgment, but will be sum-
marized in the following paragraphs.
2. On 2 July 1999, the Government of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter “Croatia”) filed an Application against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter “the FRY”) in respect of a dispute concerning alleged violations
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the “Genocide Con-
vention” or the “Convention”). The Convention was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
9 December 1948 and entered into force on 12 January 1951. The Application invoked Article IX of the Genocide
Convention as the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court.
3. Under Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, the Registrar immediately communicated a certified
copy of the Application to the Government of the FRY; and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, all
other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
4. Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to
States parties to the Genocide Convention the notification provided for in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute.
The Registrar also sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the notification provided for in Article 34,
paragraph 3, of the Statute and subsequently transmitted to him copies of the written proceedings.
5. By an Order dated 14 September 1999, the Court fixed the time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by Croatia
and a Counter-Memorial by the FRY. By Orders of 10 March 2000 and 27 June 2000, these time-limits, at the request
of Croatia, were successively extended. The Memorial of Croatia was filed on 1 March 2001, within the time-limit
finally prescribed.
6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the Parties, each of them exercised
its right under Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: Croatia chose Mr.
Budislav Vukas and the FRY chose Mr. Milenko Krec´a.
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7. On 11 September 2002, within the time-limit provided for in Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court
as adopted on 14 April 1978 and applicable to this case, the FRY raised preliminary objections relating to the Court’s
jurisdiction to entertain the case and to the admissibility of the Application. On 25 April 2003, within the time-limit
fixed by the Court by Order of 14 November 2002, Croatia filed a statement of its observations and submissions
on those preliminary objections.
8. By a letter dated 5 February 2003, the FRY informed the Court that, following the adoption and promulgation
of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro by the Assembly of the FRY on 4 February 2003, the name
of the State had been changed from the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” to “Serbia and Montenegro”. Following
the announcement of the result of a referendum held in Montenegro on 21 May 2006 (as contemplated in the Con-
stitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro), the National Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro adopted a
declaration of independence on 3 June 2006, following which the “Republic of Serbia” (hereinafter “Serbia”)
remained the sole Respondent in the case (2008 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 421–423, paras. 23–34).
9. Public hearings were held on the preliminary objections from 26 to 30 May 2008. By its 2008 Judgment,
the Court rejected the first and third preliminary objections raised by Serbia. It found that the second objection —
that claims based on acts or omissions which took place before 27 April 1992, i.e. the date on which the FRY came
into existence as a separate State, lay beyond its jurisdiction and were inadmissible — did not, in the circumstances
of the case, possess an exclusively preliminary character and should therefore be considered in the merits phase.
Subject to that conclusion, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain Croatia’s Application (I.C.J. Reports
2008, pp. 466–467, para. 146).
10. By an Order dated 20 January 2009, the Court fixed 22 March 2010 as the time-limit for the filing of the
Counter-Memorial of Serbia. The Counter-Memorial, filed on 4 January 2010, contained a counter-claim.
11. At a meeting held by the President of the Court with the representatives of the Parties on 3 February 2010,
the Co-Agent of Croatia indicated that her Government did not intend to raise objections to the admissibility of
Serbia’s counter-claim as such, but wished to be able to respond to the substance of it in a Reply. The Co-Agent
of Serbia stated that, in that case, his Government wished to file a Rejoinder.
12. By an Order dated 4 February 2010, the Court directed the submission of a Reply by Croatia and a Rejoinder
by Serbia, concerning the claims presented by the Parties, and fixed 20 December 2010 and 4 November 2011 as
the respective time-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The Court also instructed the Registrar to inform third
States entitled to appear before the Court of Serbia’s counter-claim, which was done by letters dated 23 February
2010. The Reply and the Rejoinder were filed within the time-limits thus fixed.
13. By a letter of 30 July 2010, Croatia asked the Court to request Serbia, pursuant to Article 49 of the Statute
and Article 62, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, to produce certain documents. Between September 2010 and
May 2011, Serbia furnished approximately 200 of the documents requested by Croatia.
By a letter dated 22 June 2011, Serbia, in turn, asked Croatia to provide it with certain documents. Following
further exchanges of correspondence between the Parties, Serbia, by a letter of 22 May 2012, communicated to the
Court a copy of a letter addressed to Croatia, in which it made various observations concerning the request by each
Party for the other to produce documents. In particular, Serbia expressed concern that it had not yet received the
documents requested from Croatia, whereas it had transferred, as soon as possible and without requiring a justi-
fication, all requested documents that could be found in its State archives; Serbia thus asked that Croatia fulfil its
request for documents on the basis of reciprocity.
The Court subsequently received no further correspondence from the Parties regarding the documents that they
requested from each other.
14. On 16 January 2012, at a meeting held by the President of the Court with the Agents of the Parties, the
Co-Agent of Croatia stated that her Government wished to express its views on Serbia’s counter-claim in writing
a second time, in an additional pleading.
15. By an Order dated 23 January 2012, the Court authorized Croatia to submit such an additional pleading,
and fixed 30 August 2012 as the time-limit for its filing. Croatia filed that pleading within the time-limit thus fixed,
and the case was ready for hearing.
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16. By a letter dated 14 March 2012, the Registrar, acting pursuant to Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of
Court, asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to inform him whether the Organization wished to submit
written observations under that provision. By a letter dated 4 April 2012, the Secretary-General stated that the Orga-
nization did not intend to submit any such observations.
Organization of the oral proceedings and accessibility to the public of the pleadings and transcripts
17. By letters dated 30 August 2012, the Registrar requested the Parties to submit their views on the length of
the hearings, and asked them to inform him whether they wished to call witnesses and/or experts. By a letter dated
19 September 2012, Serbia, inter alia, informed the Court that it was planning to call eight witnesses and witness-
experts; for its part, Croatia, by a letter of 31 October 2012, inter alia, informed the Court that it was planning to
call twelve witnesses and witness-experts.
18. By a letter dated 11 September 2012, Serbia informed the Court that the Croatian authorities had contacted
at least two of the persons whose statements had been appended to its Rejoinder; those two individuals had sub-
sequently gone back on their previous statements. By a letter dated 16 October 2012, the Registrar informed the
Parties that the Court directed them to refrain from making contact with persons whose statements were appended
to the pleadings of the other Party. Furthermore, in order to enable the Court to assess the consequences that it might
have to draw from the contacts made by Croatian authorities, Croatia was requested to inform it of the total number
of witnesses contacted, and of how the Croatian police had contacted them; Croatia was further requested to provide
the Court with a full list of those persons, with their names and addresses. In case the Serbian authorities had also
been in touch with persons whose statements had been appended to one of Croatia’s pleadings, the Court sent a
similar request to Serbia. By a letter dated 2 November 2012, Croatia explained that the Croatian police had been
in contact with five of the persons whose statements had been appended to Serbia’s Rejoinder; it provided their
names and addresses, as well as a brief description of the manner in which they had been questioned. By a letter
dated 26 November 2012, Serbia informed the Court that the Serbian authorities had never been in contact with
persons whose statements had been appended to Croatia’s pleadings.
19. On 23 November 2012 the President of the Court held a meeting with the representatives of the Parties to
discuss the organization of the oral proceedings. At that meeting the Parties were encouraged to reach agreement
on the procedure for the examination of witnesses and witness-experts.
20. By a letter dated 16 April 2013, Croatia informed the Court that the Parties had concluded an agreement
on the method of examining witnesses and witness-experts, and Serbia confirmed this in a letter of 19 April 2013.
That agreement provided, inter alia, that each Party would submit to the Court, not later than 15 July 2013, a list
of witnesses and witness-experts that it wished to call, together with their authentic written statements, if such state-
ments had not been annexed to the written pleadings. Each Party would then communicate to the Court, not later
than 15 October 2013, the name of any witness or witness-expert called by the other Party that it did not wish to
cross-examine. It was further agreed that a Party wishing to call a witness or witness-expert would submit a summary
of the witness’ testimony or the witness-expert’s statement, which would then replace the examination-in-chief.
21. By a letter dated 10 July 2013, Croatia informed the Court that it wished to propose changes to the agreement
between the Parties referred to in the previous paragraph. In particular, it proposed the extension, from 15 July to
1 October 2013, of the time-limit for the communication, under Article 57 of the Rules of Court, of information
regarding witnesses and witness-experts. By a letter dated 16 July 2013, Serbia informed the Court that it accepted
Croatia’s proposals. By letters of 17 July 2013, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had decided to
extend to 1 October 2013 the time-limit for the communication under Article 57 of the Rules of Court of information
regarding witnesses and witness-experts, and to extend to 15 November 2013 that relating to the communication
by either Party of the names of any witnesses or witness-experts that it did not wish to cross-examine.
22. By a letter dated 8 August 2013, Serbia informed the Court that it wished to produce a new document pur-
suant to Article 56, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court. Serbia also supplied the Court with an English translation
of extracts from two documents which it described as being readily available (Article 56, paragraph 4, of the Rules
of Court) in the original Serbian version. By a letter dated 10 September 2013, Croatia informed the Court that it
did not object to the production of these three documents. By letters dated 20 September 2013, the Registrar informed
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the Parties that the Court had authorized Serbia to produce the new document that it wished to submit under Article
56, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, and that Serbia could refer to that document at the hearings; with respect
to the other two documents, as they were “readily available”, these had been added to the case file.
23. On 1 October 2013 the Parties communicated to the Court information concerning the persons whom they
intended to call at the hearings, as well the written testimony and statements which had not been appended to their
pleadings. Croatia stated that it wished to call nine witnesses and three witness-experts in support of its claim. For
its part, Serbia announced that it was planning to call seven witnesses and one witness-expert in support of its coun-
ter-claim.
24. By a letter dated 14 November 2013, Croatia drew the Court’s attention to the fact that, between 12 and
14 November 2013, the Serbian press had published three articles that might have implications for the witnesses
and witness-experts called to testify in the proceedings. By letters of 21 November 2013, the Registrar informed
the Parties of the Court’s concerns, and reminded them of their obligation to maintain confidentiality in respect of
the information contained in correspondence with the Court, in particular as regards the identity of potential wit-
nesses and witness-experts.
25. By a letter dated 15 November 2013, Croatia informed the Court that it did not wish to cross-examine the
witnesses and witness-expert of Serbia, on the understanding that they would not be called to testify before the Court,
and that their evidence to the Court would be in the form of their written testimony or statements. Croatia added
that, if this understanding was not correct, or if the Court itself wished to cross-examine Serbia’s witnesses or wit-
ness-expert, it reserved the right to cross-examine them. By a letter of the same date, Serbia, for its part, informed
the Court of the names of the five witnesses and one witness-expert of Croatia that it did not wish to cross-examine,
thus implying that it did wish to cross-examine the four other witnesses and two other witness-experts announced
by Croatia on 1 October 2013.
26. On 22 November 2013 the President of the Court held a meeting with the Agents of the Parties in order
to discuss further the organization of the oral proceedings. At that meeting the Parties agreed that it was unnecessary
to have witnesses and witness-experts whom they did not intend to cross-examine come to the Court only to confirm
their written testimony or statement unless the Court itself decided to put questions to them.
27. By a letter dated 13 December 2013, Serbia informed the Court of the approximate amount of time that it
felt it would need in order to cross-examine the four witnesses and two witness-experts called by Croatia who were
due to testify in court.
28. By a letter of that same date, Croatia informed the Court that the witnesses and witness-experts who would
testify would all speak in Croatian, with the exception of one, who would speak in Serbian.
29. By letters dated 16 December 2013, the Registrar informed the Parties that, at this stage of the proceedings,
the Court did not wish to question the witnesses and witness-experts that the Parties were not intending to cross-
examine. At the same time, he further informed them that the Court wished to receive from them, by 20 January
2014, certain additional documents concerning their witnesses and witness-experts, and that, with respect to a doc-
ument the production of which had been requested of Croatia, Serbia would have until 14 February 2014 to file
any written observations that it wished to make on this document. By a letter dated 14 January 2014, Serbia provided
the Court with the documents requested. By a letter of 22 January 2014, Croatia informed the Court that it would
be transmitting the requested document slightly late. That document reached the Court on 31 January 2014. The
original time-limit for any written observations on that document by Serbia was extended accordingly. By a letter
dated 11 February 2014, Serbia indicated that it did not wish to present any such observations.
30. By a letter dated 30 December 2013, Croatia made certain observations on the procedure for the hearing
of its witnesses and witness-experts, in particular with respect to the allocation of time for the said hearings and
the order of presentation of the witnesses and witness-experts. By a letter dated 10 January 2014, Serbia presented
its own observations on the matter.
31. By a letter dated 17 January 2014, the Registrar asked Croatia to state what arrangements it planned to make,
pursuant to Article 70, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, for the interpretation into one of the Court’s official
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languages of the evidence of witnesses and witness-experts who would be testifying in Croatian or Serbian. By a
letter of the same date, Croatia informed the Registry of its arrangements in that regard; in that same letter Croatia
asked the Court to take certain protective measures for two of its witnesses, consisting in particular of hearing their
evidence in closed session and referring to them by pseudonyms.
32. Under Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar requested the Parties, by letters dated
17 January 2014, to indicate their respective views on the question of making accessible to the public the written
pleadings and documents annexed. By a letter dated 24 January 2014, Serbia informed the Court that, with certain
exceptions, it consented to copies of its written pleadings and documents annexed being made accessible to the
public on the opening of the oral proceedings. Croatia did not make its position known until later (see below, para-
graphs 35 and following).
33. By letters dated 7 February 2014, the Registrar informed the Parties of all the decisions taken by the Court
concerning the precise details of the procedure for examining the four witnesses and two witness-experts called by
Croatia who were due to testify in court (see paragraphs 25–31 above).
The Parties were thus advised that, after making the solemn declaration provided for in Article 64 of the Rules
of Court, the witness or witness-expert would be asked to confirm his or her written testimony or statement, which
would serve as the examination-in-chief. Serbia would then be given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness
or witness-expert, after which Croatia could conduct a re-examination. Finally, there would be an opportunity for
Members of the Court to put questions to the witness or witness-expert.
With regard to the protective measures requested for two of the witnesses, the Parties were informed that the
Court had agreed to the use of pseudonyms when addressing these witnesses or referring to them; it had also agreed
that these witnesses would be heard in closed session, with only Registry staff and members of the official del-
egations permitted to be present during their examination, and that two separate sets of documents would be pro-
duced (one reserved for confidential use by the Court and the Parties, and the other to be made public, with any
information that might lead to the identification of the protected witnesses having been deleted).
The Parties were further informed that the Court had decided to prescribe the following measures to ensure the
integrity of the testimony and statements of the witnesses and witness-experts: (i) the witnesses and witness-experts
would have to remain out of court both before and after their testimony/statements; (ii) the written testimony/state-
ments of witnesses and witness-experts announced by the Parties on 1 October 2013 (whether or not they appear
at the hearings), as well as the verbatim records of the hearings at which the witnesses and witness-experts were
examined, would be published only after the closure of the oral proceedings (in redacted form in the case of protected
witnesses); (iii) the Parties would have to ensure that the witnesses and witness-experts did not have access to the
evidence given by other witnesses and witness-experts before the closure of the oral proceedings; (iv) the Parties
would further have to ensure that the witnesses and witness-experts would not be otherwise informed of the tes-
timony/statements of other witnesses and witness-experts and that they would have no contact which could com-
promise their independence or breach the terms of their solemn declaration; (v) if the Court were to decide that,
in general, the annexes to the main pleadings (containing a number of written testimonies on disputed events in
the case) should be made available to the public, they would only be published after the closure of the oral pro-
ceedings; and (vi) the public could attend the examinations (except the closed sittings), but would be requested not
to divulge the content of the testimony/statements until the oral proceedings had closed; the same would apply to
the media, who would have to subscribe to a code of conduct under the terms of which they would be allowed to
take photographs and make sound recordings, on the express condition that they did not make public the content
of the testimony/statements before the oral proceedings had closed.
On the question of the broadcasting of the hearings, the Parties were notified, in the same letters, that the Court
had decided that the examinations of the witnesses and witness-experts, whether or not protected, would not be
broadcast on the Internet.
Lastly, since Croatia had still not indicated its position regarding the accessibility to the public of the pleadings
and documents annexed thereto (see paragraph 32 above), it was again invited to make known its views on that
matter.
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34. By a letter dated 14 February 2014, Serbia communicated to the Court a list of audio-visual and photographic
materials that it intended to present during its oral arguments, as well as electronic versions of those documents.
By letter dated 17 February 2014, Croatia transmitted to the Court electronic versions of the audio-visual materials
on which it intended to rely during its oral arguments. By letter of 21 February 2014, Serbia asked Croatia to specify
the source of some of the audio-visual materials transmitted; that information was provided by Croatia in a letter
dated 26 February 2014. By letters dated 27 February 2014, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had
decided that, during their oral presentations, they would be allowed to use the audio-visual and photographic mate-
rials that had been communicated to it.
35. By a letter dated 14 February 2014, Croatia indicated to the Court that it consented to the publication of
its pleadings and documents annexed, provided they were published in redacted form and without a number of
annexes, in order to ensure the anonymity of the victims and the individuals who provided it with written testimonies.
Croatia suggested that the names of those persons appearing in its pleadings be replaced by their initials, and that
their written testimonies and the lists of prisoners annexed to the said pleadings be withheld from publication. It
added that Serbia should also be asked to redact its own pleadings in the same manner, in so far as they referred
to those individuals. Finally, Croatia requested that those individuals should be referred to at the public hearings
by their initials or the annex number where their written testimony appeared.
36. By letters dated 17 February 2014, the Registrar asked Serbia to indicate to the Court its views on the mea-
sures proposed by Croatia, adding that the final decision on these matters would rest with the Court. He also informed
the Parties that, in principle, they were responsible for the production of redacted documents to be made accessible
to the public. Croatia was finally asked to provide the redacted versions of its pleadings and documents annexed
as it would like them to be published. In response to this request, Croatia, by a letter dated 18 February 2014, com-
municated to the Court redacted versions of its pleadings and annexes, in which (i) the names of victims and indi-
viduals who had provided it with written testimonies were replaced by initials, and (ii) the said written testimonies
and the lists of prisoners were removed.
37. By letters of 18 and 25 February 2014, Serbia objected to Croatia’s requests, made by the latter in its above-
mentioned letter of 14 February 2014 (see paragraph 35 above) and repeated in a letter dated 20 February 2014,
to redact the written pleadings and to refer to certain individuals in the public hearings by their initials or the annex
number of their written testimony. In its letter dated 25 February 2014, Serbia argued that Croatia had not sufficiently
explained why its pleadings and documents annexed had to be redacted in the manner proposed.
38. Regarding the publication of the written testimonies/statements of those witnesses and witness-experts
announced on 1 October 2013 but who would not be appearing at the hearings (see paragraph 33 above), Croatia,
in a letter dated 24 February 2014, stated that: (i) one of the witnesses had asked that his written testimony be
published under a pseudonym and in redacted form; (ii) two witnesses had objected to the publication of their written
testimonies; and (iii) one of the witnesses had passed away on 19 January 2014. In its letter of 25 February 2014,
Serbia stated that it did not object to the written testimony of the witness referred to in point (i) being published
under a pseudonym and in redacted form, or to the written testimonies of the two witnesses referred to in point
(ii) not being published, on the understanding that it would be for the Court to decide whether those written tes-
timonies would remain in the case file. Lastly, Serbia indicated that it did not object to the publication of the written
testimony of the deceased witness (point (iii)).
39. Following these various exchanges on the publication of the written pleadings, the Registrar, by letters dated
27 February 2014, informed the Parties of the latest decisions of the Court in this regard. The Parties were thus
advised that the said pleadings would not be published on the opening of the oral proceedings, as more information
was required by the Court before deciding exactly which documents should be redacted (and to what extent) or
withheld from publication altogether. Furthermore, (i) if the pleadings and documents annexed were to be made
accessible to the public, five annexes of Serbia’s Rejoinder would be withheld from publication and the parts of
Croatia’s Additional Pleading referring to those annexes would be redacted accordingly; (ii) the lists of prisoners
contained in the annexes to Croatia’s pleadings would be redacted to delete the names of the individuals concerned,
but those annexes would not be withheld from publication entirely; and (iii) the written testimonies of witnesses
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annexed to Croatia’s pleadings would be made accessible to the public, unless compelling reasons required oth-
erwise (for example, protection of the witnesses in question or national security issues). As regards the written
testimonies of some witnesses announced by Croatia on 1 October 2013 but who would not be appearing at the
hearings: (i) the written testimony of one of the witnesses would be published under a pseudonym and in redacted
form; (ii) the written testimonies of two witnesses would be discarded if the individuals concerned continued to
object to their publication even under a pseudonym and in redacted form; and (iii) the written testimony of the
witness who had passed away would be published.
Croatia was further invited to specify the names of the individuals for whom publication of the unredacted plead-
ings and annexes thereto would pose a genuine security risk, and to identify the risk in question and the specific
parts of its pleadings and annexes that should in its view be redacted. Once that information had been provided,
the Court would decide which redactions were justified and which annexes should not be published.
40. In a letter dated 28 February 2014, Croatia commented on the decisions taken by the Court regarding the
accessibility to the public of various documents and the conduct of the oral proceedings. In particular, it asked the
Court to grant it additional time to redact in the manner prescribed the lists of prisoners contained in its annexes.
It further indicated that it accepted the Court’s decision to remove from the case file the evidence of the two witnesses
who objected to their written testimony being published. However, it did not specify the names of the individuals
for whom publication of the unredacted pleadings and documents annexed would pose a genuine security risk, iden-
tify the risk in question or the specific parts of its pleadings and annexes that it wished to be redacted.
41. By letters dated 3 March 2014, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had decided to grant
Croatia’s request for additional time to redact the lists of prisoners contained in its annexes and to specify the names
of the individuals for whom publication of the unredacted pleadings and documents annexed would pose a genuine
security risk. The Parties were also told that, pending the receipt of that information, any individuals whose written
testimonies were annexed to Croatia’s pleadings were to be referred to at the public sittings only by the annex number
of these written testimonies.
42. By a letter dated 14 March 2014, Croatia provided the Court with redacted versions of the above-
mentioned lists of prisoners. Referring to the recent decisions taken by the Court, Croatia also addressed the
question of the publication of the Parties’ written pleadings and documents annexed thereto. It stated in this
respect that it did not have the resources to contact each and every one of the individuals named in the written
testimonies annexed to its pleadings, in order to ascertain whether the publication of the testimony in which
they were named would pose a genuine security risk for them, and on what basis. It therefore proposed the
non-publication of the annexes, the publication of redacted versions of the pleadings, and making the full and
unredacted pleadings available to the public only at the seat of the Court. By a letter dated 17 March 2014,
Serbia objected to Croatia’s proposals.
43. By letters dated 18 March 2014, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had decided that Cro-
atia’s pleadings and their annexes, as well as Serbia’s pleadings, would be published in redacted form, to ensure
the anonymity of the persons identified by Croatia (victims and individuals whose written testimonies were annexed
to Croatia’s pleadings). It was specified in the Registrar’s letters that these redactions were to be limited to replacing
full names by initials, and, exceptionally, when necessary to ensure the protection of the individuals concerned, to
deleting other identifying information; with respect to Serbia’s pleadings, it would fall on Croatia to identify very
precisely the parts it deemed had to be redacted.
44. In a letter dated 24 March 2014, Croatia identified the parts of Serbia’s pleadings which in its view had
to be redacted. Croatia’s letter was communicated to Serbia, which was asked to indicate whether it agreed to the
suggested redactions and, if so, to provide electronic versions of its pleadings redacted pursuant to Croatia’s sug-
gestions. By a letter dated 27 March 2014, Serbia furnished such electronic versions of its pleadings. By a letter
dated 28 March 2014, Croatia provided redacted versions of its pleadings and documents annexed thereto in elec-
tronic form.
45. Public hearings were held from 3 March to 1 April 2014, at which the Court heard the oral arguments
and replies of:
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For Croatia: Ms Vesna Crnic´-Grotic´,
Ms Andreja Metelko-Zgombic´,
Ms Helen Law,
Mr. James Crawford,
Mr. Philippe Sands,
Sir Keir Starmer,
Ms Jana Špero,
Ms Blinne Nı´ Ghra´laigh,
Ms Maja Sersˇic´,
Mr. Davorin Lapaš,
Ms Anjolie Singh.
For Serbia: Mr. Saša Obradovic´,
Mr. William Schabas,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann,
Mr. Christian Tams,
Mr. Novak Lukic´,
Mr. Dusˇan Ignjatovic´,
Mr. Wayne Jordash.
46. The following witnesses and witness-experts were called by Croatia and heard at two public hearings and
one closed hearing, held on 4, 5 and 6 March 2014: as witnesses, Mr. Franjo Kožul, Ms Marija Katic´, Ms Paula
Milic´ (pseudonym) and Mr. Ivan Krylo (pseudonym); and as witness-experts, Ms Sonja Biserko and Mr. Ivan Grujic´.
They were cross-examined by counsel for Serbia and re-examined by counsel for Croatia. Several judges put ques-
tions to the witnesses and witness-experts, who replied orally.
47. At the hearings, questions were put to the Parties by Members of the Court and replies given orally, in
accordance with Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.
48. In accordance with the decisions of the Court (see paragraphs 33, 39 and 43 above), the following documents
were made public at the close of the oral proceedings: redacted versions of the pleadings and their annexes; written
testimonies of the witnesses (in redacted form for the protected witnesses) and written statements of the witness-
experts; and verbatim records of the hearings at which the witnesses and witness-experts were examined (in non-
redacted form, since neither the Parties nor the protected witnesses requested the Court to redact portions of the
verbatim records of the hearing of protected witnesses).
*
Claims made in the Application and submissions presented by the Parties
49. In its Application, the following claims were made by Croatia:
“While reserving the right to revise, supplement or amend this Application, and, subject to the
presentation to the Court of the relevant evidence and legal arguments, Croatia requests the Court
to adjudge and declare as follows:
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(a) that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has breached its legal obligations toward the people
and Republic of Croatia under Articles I, II (a), II (b), II (c), II (d), III (a), III (b), III (c), III
(d), III (e), IV and V of the Genocide Convention;
(b) that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has an obligation to pay to the Republic of Croatia,
in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, reparations for damages to persons and
property, as well as to the Croatian economy and environment caused by the foregoing vio-
lations of international law in a sum to be determined by the Court. The Republic of Croatia
reserves the right to introduce to the Court at a future date a precise evaluation of the damages
caused by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”
50. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Croatia,
in the Memorial:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in this Memorial, the Applicant, the Republic
of Croatia, respectfully requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
1. That the Respondent, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is responsible for violations of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
(a) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible committed genocide on the territory of the
Republic of Croatia, including in particular against members of the Croat national or ethnical
group on that territory, by
— killing members of the group;
— causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
— imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,
with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part, contrary to Article II of the Convention;
(b) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible conspired to commit the acts of genocide referred
to in paragraph (a), were complicit in respect of those acts, attempted to commit further such acts
of genocide and incited others to commit such acts, contrary to Article III of the Convention;
(c) in that, aware that the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a) were being or would be com-
mitted, it failed to take any steps to prevent those acts, contrary to Article I of the Convention;
(d) in that it has failed to bring to trial persons within its jurisdiction who are suspected on probable
grounds of involvement in the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a), or in the other acts
referred to in paragraph (b), and is thus in continuing breach of Articles I and IV of the Convention.
2. That as a consequence of its responsibility for these breaches of the Convention, the Respon-
dent, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is under the following obligations:
(a) to take immediate and effective steps to submit to trial before the appropriate judicial authority, those
citizens or other persons within its jurisdiction who are suspected on probable grounds of having
committed acts of genocide as referred to in paragraph (1) (a), or any of the other acts referred to
in paragraph (1) (b), in particular Slobodan Milosˇevic´, the former President of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and to ensure that those persons, if convicted, are duly punished for their crimes;
(b) to provide forthwith to the Applicant all information within its possession or control as to the where-
abouts of Croatian citizens who are missing as a result of the genocidal acts for which it is respon-
sible, and generally to cooperate with the authorities of the Republic of Croatia to jointly ascertain
the whereabouts of the said missing persons or their remains;
(c) forthwith to return to the Applicant any items of cultural property within its jurisdiction or control
which were seized in the course of the genocidal acts for which it is responsible; and
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(d) to make reparation to the Applicant, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, for all
damage and other loss or harm to person or property or to the economy of Croatia caused by the
foregoing violations of international law, in a sum to be determined by the Court in a subsequent
phase of the proceedings in this case. The Republic of Croatia reserves the right to introduce to the
Court a precise evaluation of the damages caused by the acts for which the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is held responsible.
The Republic of Croatia reserves the right to supplement or amend these submissions as nec-
essary.”
in the Reply:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in its Memorial and in this Reply, the Appli-
cant respectfully requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
1. That it rejects in its entirety the first submission of the Respondent, as to the inadmissibility
of certain claims raised by the Applicant.
2. That the Respondent is responsible for violations of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
(a) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible committed genocide on the territory of the Repub-
lic of Croatia against members of the Croat national or ethnical group on that territory, by
— killing members of the group;
— causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
— imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,
with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part, contrary to Article II of the Convention;
(b) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible conspired to commit the acts of genocide referred
to in paragraph (a), were complicit in respect of those acts, attempted to commit further such acts
of genocide and incited others to commit such acts, contrary to Article III of the Convention;
(c) in that, aware that the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a) were being or would be com-
mitted, it failed to take any steps to prevent those acts, contrary to Article I of the Convention;
(d) in that it has failed to bring to trial persons within its jurisdiction who are suspected on probable
grounds of involvement in the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a), or in the other acts
referred to in paragraph (b), and is thus in continuing breach of Articles I and IV of the Convention.
3. That as a consequence of its responsibility for these breaches of the Convention, the Respon-
dent is under the following obligations:
(a) to take immediate and effective steps to submit to trial before the appropriate judicial authority, those
citizens or other persons within its jurisdiction who are suspected on probable grounds of having
committed acts of genocide as referred to in paragraph (1) (a), or any of the other acts referred to
in paragraph (1) (b), and to ensure that those persons, if convicted, are duly punished for their crimes;
(b) to provide forthwith to the Applicant all information within its possession or control as to the where-
abouts of Croatian citizens who are missing as a result of the genocidal acts for which it is respon-
sible, and generally to cooperate with the authorities of the Applicant to jointly ascertain the where-
abouts of the said missing persons or their remains;
(c) forthwith to return to the Applicant any items of cultural property within its jurisdiction or control
which were seized in the course of the genocidal acts for which it is responsible; and
(d) to make reparation to the Applicant, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, for all
damage and other loss or harm to person or property or to the economy of Croatia caused by the
foregoing violations of international law, in a sum to be determined by the Court in a subsequent
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phase of the proceedings in this case. The Applicant reserves the right to introduce to the Court a
precise evaluation of the damages caused by the acts for which the Respondent is held responsible.
4. That, in relation to the counter-claims put forward in the Counter-Memorial it rejects in their
entirety the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh submissions of the Respondent on the grounds that they
are not founded in fact or law.
The Applicant reserves the right to supplement or amend these submissions as necessary.”
in the Additional Pleading filed on 30 August 2012:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in its Memorial, its Reply and in this
Additional Pleading, the Applicant respectfully requests the International Court of Justice to
adjudge and declare:
1. That, in relation to the counter-claims put forward in the Rejoinder, it rejects in their entirety
the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth submissions of the Respondent on the grounds that they
are not founded in fact or law.
The Applicant reserves the right to supplement or amend these submissions as necessary.”
On behalf of the Government of Serbia,
in the Counter-Memorial:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in this Counter-Memorial, the Republic
of Serbia respectfully requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
I
1. That the requests in paragraphs 1 (a), 1 (b), 1 (c), 1 (d), 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c) and 2 (d) of the
Submissions of the Republic of Croatia as far as they relate to acts and omissions, whatever their legal
qualification, that took place before 27 April 1992, i.e., prior to the date when Serbia came into existence
as a State, or alternatively, before 8 October 1991, when neither the Republic of Croatia nor the Republic
of Serbia existed as independent States, are inadmissible.
2. That the requests in paragraphs 1 (a), 1 (b), 1 (c), 1 (d), 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c) and 2 (d), of the
Submissions of the Republic of Croatia relating to the alleged violations of the obligations under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide after 27 April 1992 (alter-
natively, 8 October 1991) be rejected as lacking any basis either in law or in fact.
3. Alternatively, should the Court find that the requests relating to acts and omissions that took
place before 27 April 1992 (alternatively, 8 October 1991) are admissible, that the requests in paragraphs
1 (a), 1 (b), 1 (c), 1 (d), 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c) and 2 (d), of the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia be
rejected in their entirety as lacking any basis either in law or in fact.
II
4. That the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by committing, during and after the operation Storm in
August 1995, the following acts with intent to destroy as such the part of the Serb national and ethnical
group living in the Krajina Region (UN Protected Areas North and South) in Croatia:
— killing members of the group,
— causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, and
— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its partial
physical destruction.
5. Alternatively, that the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by conspiring to commit genocide
against the part of the Serb national and ethnical group living in the Krajina Region (UN Protected
Areas North and South) in Croatia.
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6. As a subsidiary finding, that the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by having failed and by still failing
to punish acts of genocide that have been committed against the part of the Serb national and ethnical
group living in the Krajina Region (UN Protected Areas North and South) in Croatia.
7. That the violations of international law set out in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above constitute
wrongful acts attributable to the Republic of Croatia which entail its international responsibility,
and, accordingly,
(1) that the Republic of Croatia shall immediately take effective steps to ensure full compliance
with its obligation to punish acts of genocide as defined by Article II of the Convention, or
any other acts proscribed by Article III of the Convention committed on its territory before,
during and after operation Storm;
(2) that the Republic of Croatia shall redress the consequences of its international wrongful acts,
that is, in particular:
(a) pay full compensation to the members of the Serb national and ethnic group from the
Republic of Croatia for all damages and losses caused by the acts of genocide;
(b) establish all necessary legal conditions and secure environment for the safe and free return
of the members of the Serb national and ethnical group to their homes in the Republic
of Croatia, and to ensure conditions of their peaceful and normal life including full respect
for their national and human rights;
(c) amend its Law on Public Holidays, Remembrance Days and Non-Working Days, by way
of removing the “Day of Victory and Homeland Gratitude” and the “Day of Croatian
Defenders”, celebrated on the 5th of August, as a day of triumph in the genocidal operation
Storm, from its list of public holidays.
The Republic of Serbia reserves its right to supplement or amend these submissions in the light of further pleadings.”
in the Rejoinder:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in the Counter-Memorial and this Rejoin-
der, the Republic of Serbia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
I
1. That the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d), 3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (c) and 3 (d) of the
Submissions of the Republic of Croatia as far as they relate to acts and omissions, whatever their
legal qualification, that took place before 27 April 1992, i.e., prior to the date when Serbia came
into existence as a State, are inadmissible.
2. That the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d), 3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (c) and 3 (d) of the
Submissions of the Republic of Croatia relating to the alleged violations of the obligations under
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide after 27 April 1992
be rejected as lacking any basis either in law or in fact.
3. Alternatively, should the Court find that the requests relating to acts and omissions that
took place before 27 April 1992 are admissible, that the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d),
3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (c) and 3 (d) of the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia be rejected in their entirety
as lacking any basis either in law or in fact.
II
4. That the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by committing, during and after Operation Storm in 1995,
the following acts with intent to destroy the Serb national and ethnical group in Croatia, in its substantial
part living in the Krajina Region (UN Protected Areas North and South), as such:
— killing members of the group,
— causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, and
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— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction.
5. Alternatively, that the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by conspiring to commit genocide against the Serb
national and ethnical group in Croatia, in its substantial part living in the Krajina Region, as such.
6. As a subsidiary finding, that the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by having failed and by still failing
to punish acts of genocide that have been committed against the Serb national and ethnical group in
Croatia, in its substantial part living in the Krajina Region, as such.
7. That the violations of international law set out in paras. 4, 5 and 6 above constitute wrong-
ful acts attributable to the Republic of Croatia which entail its international responsibility, and,
accordingly,
(1) that the Republic of Croatia shall immediately take effective steps to ensure full compliance
with its obligation to punish acts of genocide as defined by Article II of the Convention, or
any other acts proscribed by Article III of the Convention committed on its territory during
and after Operation Storm; and
(2) that the Republic of Croatia shall redress the consequences of its international wrongful acts,
that is, in particular:
(a) pay full compensation to the members of the Serb national and ethnical group from the
Republic of Croatia for all damages and losses caused by the acts of genocide;
(b) establish all necessary legal conditions and secure environment for the safe and free return
of the members of the Serb national and ethnical group to their homes in the Republic
of Croatia, and to ensure conditions of their peaceful and normal life including full respect
for their national and human rights;
(c) amend its Law on Public Holidays, Remembrance Days and Non-Working Days, by way
of removing the “Day of Victory and Homeland Gratitude” and the “Day of Croatian
Defenders”, celebrated on the 5th of August, as a day of triumph in the genocidal Oper-
ation Storm, from its list of public holidays.
III
8. That the requests in paras. 1 and 4 of the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia concerning
the objections to the counter-claim be rejected as lacking any basis either in law or in fact.
The Republic of Serbia reserves its right to supplement or amend these submissions in the further
proceedings.”
51. At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Croatia,
at the hearing of 21 March 2014, at 10 a.m., with respect to Croatia’s claim:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented by the Applicant, it respectfully requests
the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
1. That it has jurisdiction over all the claims raised by the Applicant, and there exists no bar to
admissibility in respect of any of them.
2. That the Respondent is responsible for violations of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
(a) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible committed genocide on the territory of the
Republic of Croatia against members of the Croat ethnic group on that territory, by:
— killing members of the group;
— causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
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— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
— imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, with the intent to destroy
that group in whole or in part, contrary to Article II of the Convention;
(b) in that persons for whose conduct it is responsible conspired to commit the acts of genocide referred
to in paragraph (a), were complicit in respect of those acts, attempted to commit further such acts
of genocide and incited others to commit such acts, contrary to Article III of the Convention;
(c) in that, aware that the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a) were being or would be com-
mitted, it failed to take any steps to prevent those acts, contrary to Article I of the Convention;
(d) in that it has failed to bring to trial persons within its jurisdiction who are suspected on probable
grounds of involvement in the acts of genocide referred to in paragraph (a), or in the other acts
referred to in paragraph (b), and is thus in continuing breach of Articles I and IV of the Convention;
(e) in that it has failed to conduct an effective investigation into the fate of Croatian citizens who
are missing as a result of the genocidal acts referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b), and is thus
in continuing breach of Articles I and IV of the Convention.
3. That as a consequence of its responsibility for these breaches of the Convention, the Respon-
dent is under the following obligations:
(a) to take immediate and effective steps to submit to trial before the appropriate judicial authority, those
citizens or other persons within its jurisdiction including but not limited to the leadership of the JNA
during the relevant time period who are suspected on probable grounds of having committed acts
of genocide as referred to in paragraph (2) (a), or any of the other acts referred to in paragraph (2)
(b), and to ensure that those persons, if convicted, are duly punished for their crimes;
(b) to provide forthwith to the Applicant all information within its possession or control as to the
whereabouts of Croatian citizens who are missing as a result of the genocidal acts for which
it is responsible, to investigate and generally to co-operate with the authorities of the Applicant
to jointly ascertain the whereabouts of the said missing persons or their remains;
(c) forthwith to return to the Applicant all remaining items of cultural property within its jurisdiction
or control which were seized in the course of the genocidal acts for which it is responsible; and
(d) to make reparation to the Applicant, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, for all
damage and other loss or harm to person or property or to the economy of Croatia caused by the
foregoing violations of international law, in a sum to be determined by the Court in a subsequent
phase of the proceedings in this case. The Applicant reserves the right to introduce to the Court a
precise evaluation of the damages caused by the acts for which the Respondent is held responsible.”
at the hearing of 1 April 2014, at 10 a.m., in respect of Serbia’s counter-claim:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented by the Applicant, it respectfully requests
the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
That, in relation to the counter-claims put forward in the Counter-Memorial, the Rejoinder and during
these proceedings, it rejects in their entirety the sixth, the seventh, the eighth and the ninth submissions
of the Respondent on the grounds that they are not founded in fact or law.”
On behalf of the Government of Serbia,
at the hearing of 28 March 2014, at 3 p.m., in respect of Croatia’s claim and Serbia’s counter-claim:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in its written and oral pleadings, the
Republic of Serbia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
I
1. That the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d), 2
(e), 3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (c) and 3 (d) of the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia as far as they relate to
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acts and omissions, whatever their legal qualification, that took place before 27 April 1992, i.e. prior
to the date when Serbia came into existence as a State and became bound by the Genocide Convention.
2. In the alternative that the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (c)
and 3 (d) of the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia as far as they relate to acts and omissions, what-
ever their legal qualification, that took place before 27 April 1992, i.e. prior to the date when Serbia came
into existence as a State and became bound by the Genocide Convention, are inadmissible.
3. That the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (c) and 3 (d) of
the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia relating to the alleged violations of the obligations under
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide after 27 April 1992
be rejected as lacking any basis either in law or in fact.
4. In the further alternative that the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 3 (a),
3 (b), 3 (c) and 3 (d) of the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia as far as they relate to acts and
omissions, whatever their legal qualification, that took place before 8 October 1991, i.e. prior to
the date when Croatia came into existence as a State and became bound by the Genocide Con-
vention, are inadmissible.
5. In the final alternative, should the Court find that it has jurisdiction concerning the requests
relating to acts and omissions that took place before 27 April 1992 and that they are admissible,
respectively that they are admissible insofar as they relate to acts and omissions that took place
before 8 October 1991, that the requests in paras. 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (c)
and 3 (d) of the Submissions of the Republic of Croatia be rejected in their entirety as lacking any
basis either in law or in fact.
II
6. That the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under Article II of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by committing, during and after Oper-
ation Storm in 1995, the following acts with intent to destroy the Serb national and ethnical group
in Croatia as such, in its substantial part living in the Krajina Region:
— killing members of the group,
— causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, and
— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction.
7. Alternatively, that the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under Article III (b),
(c), (d) and (e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
through the acts of conspiracy, direct and public incitement and attempt to commit genocide, as
well as complicity in genocide, against the Serb national and ethnical group in Croatia as such, in
its substantial part living in the Krajina Region.
8. As a subsidiary finding, that the Republic of Croatia has violated its obligations under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by having failed and by
still failing to punish acts of genocide that have been committed against the Serb national and eth-
nical group in Croatia as such, in its substantial part living in the Krajina Region.
9. That the violations of international law set out in paras. 6, 7 and 8 of these Submissions
constitute wrongful acts attributable to the Republic of Croatia which entail its international respon-
sibility, and, accordingly,
(1) That the Republic of Croatia shall immediately take effective steps to ensure full compliance
with its obligation to punish acts of genocide as defined by Article II of the Convention, or
any other acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention committed on its territory during
and after Operation Storm;
(2) That the Republic of Croatia shall immediately amend its Law on Public Holidays, Remem-
brance Days and Non-Working Days, by way of removing the ‘Day of Victory and Homeland
Gratitude’ and the ‘Day of Croatian Defenders’, celebrated on the 5th of August, as a day of
victory in the genocidal Operation Storm, from its list of public holidays; and
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(3) That the Republic of Croatia shall redress the consequences of its international wrongful acts,
that is, in particular:
(a) Pay full compensation to the members of the Serb national and ethnical group from the
Republic of Croatia for all damages and losses caused by the acts of genocide, in a sum
and in a procedure to be determined by the Court in a subsequent phase of this case; and
(b) Establish all necessary legal conditions and secure environment for the safe and free return
of the members of the Serb national and ethnical group to their homes in the Republic
of Croatia, and to ensure conditions of their peaceful and normal life including full respect
for their national and human rights.”
*
* *
I. BACKGROUND
52. In these proceedings, Croatia contends that Serbia is responsible for breaches of the Genocide Convention
committed in Croatia between 1991 and 1995. In its counter-claim, Serbia contends that Croatia is itself responsible
for breaches of the Convention committed in 1995 in the “Republika Srpska Krajina”, an entity established in late
1991 (for further details, see paragraphs 62–70 below). The Court will briefly set out the factual and historical
background to the present proceedings, i.e., (a) the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
general and (b) the situation in Croatia in particular.
A. The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new
States
53. Until the start of the 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”) consisted of the republics
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia; the republic of Serbia itself
included two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo.
54. Following the death of President Tito, which occurred on 4 May 1980, the SFRY was confronted with an
economic crisis lasting almost ten years and growing tensions between its different ethnic and national groups.
Towards the end of the 1980s and at the start of the 1990s, certain republics sought greater powers within the fed-
eration, and, subsequently, independence from the SFRY.
55. Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves independent from the SFRY on 25 June 1991, although their dec-
larations did not take effect until 8 October 1991. For its part, Macedonia proclaimed its independence on 17 Sep-
tember 1991, and Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit on 6 March 1992. On 22 May 1992, Croatia, Slovenia,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina were admitted as Members of the United Nations, as was the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia on 8 April 1993.
56. On 27 April 1992, “the participants of the Joint Session of the SFRY Assembly, the National Assembly of the
Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro” adopted a declaration stating in particular:
“1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the state, international legal and political
personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the com-
mitments that the SFR of Yugoslavia assumed internationally,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Remaining bound by all obligations to international organizations and institutions whose member
it is . . .” (United Nations, doc. A/46/915, Ann. II.)
57. On the same date, the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations sent a Note to the Secretary-
General, stating, inter alia, that
“[s]trictly respecting the continuity of the international personality of Yugoslavia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia shall continue to fulfil all the rights conferred to, and obligations assumed
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by, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international relations, including its membership
in all international organizations and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by
Yugoslavia” (see also paragraph 76 below).
58. This claim by the FRY that it continued the legal personality of the SFRY was debated at length within the inter-
national community (in this regard, see Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp.
15–23, paras. 28–48; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), pp. 303–309, paras. 58–74; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp.
80–83, paras. 91–97; 2008 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 426–427, paras. 45–49). As has been noted in the Judg-
ments of the Court cited above, the Security Council, the General Assembly and several States rejected the claim that
the FRY continued automatically the membership of the SFRY in the United Nations; the FRY nevertheless maintained
this claim for several years. It was not until 27 October 2000 that Mr. Koštunica, the newly elected President of the FRY,
sent a letter to the Secretary-General requesting that the FRY be admitted to membership in the United Nations. On 1
November 2000, the General Assembly, by resolution 55/12, “[h]aving received the recommendation of the Security
Council of 31 October 2000” and “[h]aving considered the application for membership of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia”, decided to “admit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations”.
59. On 4 February 2003, the FRY officially changed its name, becoming “Serbia and Montenegro”. Following a
referendum of 21 May 2006, in accordance with the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, the Republic of
Montenegro declared its independence on 3 June 2006. By a letter dated 3 June 2006, Serbia informed the Secretary-
General of the United Nations that, as provided for in Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro,
the latter’s membership in the United Nations would be continued by the Republic of Serbia. Montenegro was admitted
into the United Nations as a new member on 28 June 2006. In its Judgment of 18 November 2008 on preliminary objec-
tions, the Court found that Montenegro was not a party to the present proceedings, and that Serbia alone remained the
Respondent in the case (I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 421–423, paras. 23-34; see paragraph 8 above).
B. The situation in Croatia
60. The present case mainly concerns events which took place between 1991 and 1995 in the territory of the
Republic of Croatia as it had existed within the SFRY. The Court will focus now on the background to those events.
61. First, it should be noted that, according to the official census conducted by the Institute for Statistics of the
republic of Croatia at the end of March 1991, the majority of the inhabitants of Croatia (some 78 per cent) were
of Croat origin. A number of ethnic and national minorities were also represented; in particular, some 12 per cent
of the population was of Serb origin. A significant part of that Serb minority lived close to the republics of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Serbia. While the population in these frontier areas was a mixed one — consisting of Croats
and Serbs — there was a majority of Serbs in certain localities. Towns and villages with Serb majorities existed
in close proximity to towns and villages with Croat majorities.
62. In political terms, tensions between, on the one hand, the Government of the republic of Croatia and, on the other,
the Serbs living in Croatia and opposed to its independence, increased at the start of the 1990s. On 1 July 1990, elected
representatives of the Serb Democratic Party in Croatia (SDS) formed the “Union of Municipalities of the Northern Dal-
matia and Lika”. On 25 July 1990, the Constitution of the republic of Croatia was amended; in particular, a new flag
and coat of arms were adopted which, according to Serbia, was perceived by the Serb minority as a sign of hostility towards
them. On the same day, a Serb assembly and a “Serb National Council” (the executive organ of the assembly) were
established at Srb, north of Knin; they proclaimed themselves to be the political representatives of the Serb population
of Croatia and declared the sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia. The “Council” then announced that a
referendum would be held on the autonomy of the Croatian Serbs. In August 1990, the Croatian Government attempted
to oppose this referendum; the Serb minority responded by erecting roadblocks. The referendum took place between 19
August and 2 September 1990; a substantial majority voted in favour of autonomy.
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63. On 21 December 1990, Serbs in the municipalities of northern Dalmatia and Lika proclaimed the “Serb
Autonomous Region of Krajina” (“SAO Krajina”). Two other “Serb autonomous regions” were established later:
the “SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem” (“SAO SBWS”) in February 1991, and the “SAO Western Slavo-
nia” in August of that year.
64. On 22 December 1990, the Croatian Parliament adopted a new Constitution. According to Serbia, the Cro-
atian Serbs considered that the adoption of this new Constitution deprived them of certain basic rights and removed
their status as a constituent nation of Croatia.
65. On 4 January 1991, the SAO Krajina established its own internal affairs secretariat and police and State
security services.
66. In spring 1991, clashes broke out between the Croatian armed forces and those of the SAO Krajina and other
armed groups. The Yugoslav National Army (“JNA”) intervened — officially to separate the protagonists, but,
according to Croatia, in support of the Krajina Serbs.
67. In a referendum organized on 12 May 1991 by the SAO Krajina, a majority of Serbs voted in favour of
attaching the region to Serbia and staying in the SFRY. One week later, on 19 May 1991, Croatian voters, asked
to pronounce by referendum on Croatia’s independence from the SFRY, overwhelmingly approved it.
68. As explained above (see paragraph 55), Croatia declared its independence from the SFRY on 25 June 1991,
and that declaration took effect on 8 October 1991.
69. By the summer of 1991, an armed conflict had broken out in Croatia, in the course of which the violations of
the Genocide Convention alleged by Croatia in this case are claimed to have been committed (see paragraphs 200–442
below). At least from September 1991, the JNA — which, according to Croatia, was by then controlled by the Government
of the republic of Serbia — intervened in the fighting against the Croatian Government forces. By late 1991, the JNA
and Serb forces (see paragraph 204 below) controlled around one-third of Croatian territory within its boundaries in the
SFRY (in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia). These
regions, as well as several towns and villages referred to in the present Judgment, are illustrated on the following sketch-
map.
70. On 19 December 1991, the Serbs of the SAO Krajina (which then comprised territories in Banovina/Banija,
Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia) proclaimed the establishment of the “Republika Srpska Krajina” (“RSK”). Two months
later, the SAO Western Slavonia and the SAO SBWS joined the RSK.
71. Negotiations in late 1991 and early 1992, backed by the international community and involving, inter alia, rep-
resentatives of Croatia, Serbia and the SFRY, resulted in the Vance plan (after Cyrus Vance, the United Nations Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy for Yugoslavia) and the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (“UNPROFOR”).
The Vance plan provided for a ceasefire, demilitarization of those parts of Croatia under the control of the Serb minority
and SFRY forces, the return of refugees and the creation of conditions favourable to a permanent political settlement
of the conflict. UNPROFOR — which was deployed in spring 1992 in three areas protected by the United Nations (the
UNPAs of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina) — was divided into four operational sectors: East (Eastern
Slavonia), West (Western Slavonia), North and South (these two latter sectors covered the Krajina UNPA).
72. The objectives of the Vance plan and of UNPROFOR were never fully achieved: between 1992 and the
spring of 1995, the RSK was not demilitarized, certain military operations were conducted by both parties to the
conflict, and attempts to achieve a peaceful settlement failed.
73. In the spring and summer of 1995, Croatia succeeded in re-establishing control over the greater part of the
RSK following a series of military operations. Thus it recovered Western Slavonia in May through Operation
“Flash”, and the Krajina in August through Operation “Storm”, during which the facts described in the counter-claim
allegedly occurred (see paragraphs 443-522 below). Following the conclusion of the Erdut Agreement on 12 Novem-
ber 1995, Eastern Slavonia was gradually reintegrated into Croatia between 1996 and 1998.
*
* *
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II. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
A. Croatia’s claim
(1) Issues of jurisdiction and admissibility which remain to be determined following the 2008 Judgment
74. Serbia has raised a number of objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of Croatia’s
claim. In its 2008 Judgment, the Court rejected Serbia’s first and third preliminary objections but concluded that
Serbia’s second preliminary objection did not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary
character and so reserved decision thereon to the present phase of the proceedings (I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 460, para.
130 and p. 466, para. 146 (point 4)). Before turning to address Serbia’s second objection, the Court will first recall
certain observations that it made in its 2008 Judgment.
75. In its 2008 Judgment, the Court dismissed Serbia’s first preliminary objection in so far as it related
to its capacity to participate in the present proceedings (I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 444, para. 91, and p. 466, para.
146 (point 1)).
76. The Court also dismissed Serbia’s first preliminary objection in so far as it related to the jurisdiction of the
Court ratione materiae. It referred to the declaration made by the FRY on 27 April 1992 (the date on which the
FRY was proclaimed as a State), which stated that
“The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international legal and political per-
sonality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the commitments
that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally.
At the same time, it is ready to fully respect the rights and interests of the Yugoslav Republics
which declared independence. The recognition of the newly- formed states will follow after all the
outstanding questions negotiated on within the Conference on Yugoslavia have been settled . . .”
(United Nations doc. A/46/915, Ann. II, quoted at I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 446–447, para. 98.)
The Court also referred to the Note sent that day by the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
Secretary-General, which stated that
“The Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at its session held on 27 April
1992, promulgated the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under the Constitution,
on the basis of the continuing personality of Yugoslavia and the legitimate decisions by Serbia and
Montenegro to continue to live together in Yugoslavia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
is transformed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the Republic of Serbia and
the Republic of Montenegro.
Strictly respecting the continuity of the international personality of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall continue to fulfil all the rights conferred
to, and obligations assumed by, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international rela-
tions, including its membership in all international organizations and participation in international
treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia.” (United Nations doc. A/46/915, Ann. I, quoted at
I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 447, para. 99.)
The Court pointed out that the FRY had thus “clearly expressed an intention to be bound . . . by the obligations
of the Genocide Convention” and concluded:
“In the particular context of the case, the Court is of the view that the 1992 declaration must be
considered as having had the effects of a notification of succession to treaties, notwithstanding that
its political premise was different.” (I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 451, para. 111.)
77. The Court considered, however, that it was not in a position to rule upon Serbia’s objection to jurisdiction
and admissibility ratione temporis. This objection was that, in so far as Croatia’s claim was based on acts and omis-
sions alleged to have occurred before 27 April 1992, it fell outside the scope of Article IX of the Genocide Con-
vention — and, accordingly, outside the jurisdiction of the Court — because it concerned events which preceded
the date on which the FRY came into existence as a State and thus became capable of being a party to the Genocide
Convention and that, in any event, that claim was inadmissible. With regard to this objection, the Court stated that
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“In the view of the Court, the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility raised by Serbia’s pre-
liminary objection ratione temporis constitute two inseparable issues in the present case. The first
issue is that of the Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether breaches of the Genocide Convention
were committed in the light of the facts that occurred prior to the date on which the FRY came
into existence as a separate State, capable of being a party in its own right to the [Genocide] Con-
vention; this may be regarded as a question of the applicability of the obligations under the Genocide
Convention to the FRY before 27 April 1992. The second issue, that of admissibility of the claim
in relation to those facts, and involving questions of attribution, concerns the consequences to be
drawn with regard to the responsibility of the FRY for those same facts under the general rules of
State responsibility. In order to be in a position to make any findings on each of these issues, the
Court will need to have more elements before it.” (I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 460, para. 129.)
78. The jurisdiction of the Court, and the admissibility of Croatia’s claim, have therefore been settled by the
2008 Judgment so far as that claim relates to events alleged to have taken place as from 27 April 1992. Both juris-
diction and admissibility remain, however, to be determined in so far as the claim concerns events alleged to have
occurred before that date. On those questions, the Parties remain in disagreement.
(2) The positions of the Parties regarding jurisdiction and admissibility
79. With regard to the jurisdiction of the Court, Serbia maintains that events said to have occurred before 27
April 1992 cannot give rise to a dispute between itself and Croatia regarding the “interpretation, application or
fulfilment” of the Genocide Convention and thus cannot fall within the scope of Article IX of the Convention. It
maintains that a distinction has to be made between the obligations of the SFRY and those of the FRY. While the
SFRY was a party to the Genocide Convention prior to 27 April 1992, it was only from that date that the FRY became
a party to it. Serbia refers to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which it maintains states
a principle of customary international law. That Article provides:
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions
do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased
to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.”
According to Serbia, since the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention cannot apply retroactively, events
alleged to have occurred before the FRY became a party to the Convention cannot engage the responsibility of the
FRY and, therefore, of Serbia.
80. With regard to the admissibility of Croatia’s claim, Serbia advances two arguments. First, it maintains that
events said to have occurred before the FRY came into existence as a State cannot be attributed to the FRY. In
Serbia’s view, any claim against Serbia in respect of such events must, therefore, be regarded as inadmissible. This
argument is advanced as an alternative to the argument regarding jurisdiction. Secondly, Serbia contends, in the
further alternative, that in so far as the claim relates to events said to have occurred before 8 October 1991 — the
date on which Croatia came into existence as a State and became bound by the Genocide Convention — it must
be regarded as inadmissible.
81. Croatia responds that the Court has jurisdiction over the entirety of its claim and that there is no bar to
admissibility. For Croatia, the essential point is that the Genocide Convention was in force in the territories con-
cerned throughout the relevant period, because the SFRY was a party to the Convention. According to Croatia, the
FRY emerged directly from the SFRY, with the organs of the new State taking over the control of those of the old
State during the course of 1991 when the SFRY was “in a process of dissolution” (the phrase used by the Arbitration
Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia in Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, 92 International Law Reports
(ILR), p. 162). On 27 April 1992, the FRY made a declaration which, as the Court determined in 2008, had the
effect of a notification of succession (see paragraph 76 above) to the Genocide Convention and other treaties to
which the SFRY had been party. Croatia maintains that there was, therefore, a continuous application of the Con-
vention, that it would be artificial and formalistic to confine jurisdiction to the period from 27 April 1992, and that
a decision to limit jurisdiction to events occurring on or after that date would create a “time gap” in the protection
afforded by the Convention. Croatia points to the absence of any temporal limitation in the terms of Article IX of
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the Genocide Convention. At least by the early summer of 1991, according to Croatia, the SFRY had ceased to
be a functioning State and what became the FRY was already a State in statu nascendi.
82. Croatia therefore relies on what it describes as the customary international law principle stated in Article
10 (2) of the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, adopted in 2001. Article 10 (2) provides:
“The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State
in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be con-
sidered an act of the new State under international law.”
According to Croatia, that principle is applicable to the facts of the present case with the result that the acts of the
JNA and other armed groups controlled by the movement that later proclaimed the FRY as a State on 27 April 1992,
even though they occurred before that date, must be regarded as acts of the FRY for the purposes of State respon-
sibility. In the alternative, Croatia contends that if those acts should instead be attributed to the SFRY, the FRY
succeeded to the responsibility of the SFRY for them.
83. Further, Croatia denies that its claim is inadmissible, to the extent that it relies upon events said to have
occurred before 8 October 1991. It maintains that the Genocide Convention is not “a bundle of synallagmatic obli-
gations” between parties but creates obligations erga omnes. It also emphasizes that the Convention was in force
for the benefit of the population of Croatia at all relevant times.
* *
(3) The scope of jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention
84. The Court begins by recalling that the only basis for jurisdiction which has been advanced in the present
case is Article IX of the Genocide Convention. That Article provides:
“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment
of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or
for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”
As the Court noted in its 2008 Judgment,
“[t]he SFRY signed the Genocide Convention on 11 December 1948, and deposited an instrument
of ratification, without reservation, on 29 August 1950; it is common ground between the Parties
that the SFRY was thus a party to the Convention at the time in the 1990s when it began to dis-
integrate into separate and independent States” (I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 446, para. 97).
Croatia deposited a notification of succession on 12 October 1992, which it considers took effect from 8 October
1991, the date on which it came into existence as a State. In its Preliminary Objections in the present proceedings,
Serbia took the position that it became bound by the Genocide Convention only when the FRY deposited an instru-
ment of accession containing a reservation to Article IX on 12 March 2001. However, as already noted, the Court
held, in its 2008 Judgment, that the FRY became a party to the Convention on 27 April 1992 on the basis of the
declaration and Note referred to in paragraph 76, above, and was thus bound by the obligations under the Convention
(I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 451, para. 111; pp. 454–455, para. 117).
85. The fact that the jurisdiction of the Court in the present proceedings can be founded only upon Article IX
has important implications for the scope of that jurisdiction. That Article provides for jurisdiction only with regard
to disputes relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention, including disputes
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III of the
Convention. As the Court explained in its 2007 Judgment in the proceedings between Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia, in which Article IX was also the only basis for jurisdiction, Article IX confines the Court to disputes regard-
ing genocide. The Court thus
“has no power to rule on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law, not
amounting to genocide, particularly those protecting human rights in armed conflict. That is so even
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if the alleged breaches are of obligations under peremptory norms, or of obligations which protect
essential humanitarian values, and which may be owed erga omnes.” (Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 104, para. 147.)
That does not prevent the Court from considering, in its reasoning, whether a violation of international humanitarian
law or international human rights law has occurred to the extent that this is relevant for the Court’s determination
of whether or not there has been a breach of an obligation under the Genocide Convention.
86. The Court must, however, recall — as it has done on previous occasions — that the absence of a court or
tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve disputes about compliance with a particular obligation under international law
does not affect the existence and binding force of that obligation. States are required to fulfil their obligations under
international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and they remain
responsible for acts contrary to international law which are attributable to them (see, e.g., Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, pp. 52–53, para. 127, and Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 104, para. 148).
87. Furthermore, since Article IX provides for jurisdiction only with regard to “the interpretation, application
or fulfilment of the Convention, including . . . the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts
enumerated in article III”, the jurisdiction of the Court does not extend to allegations of violation of the customary
international law on genocide. It is, of course, well established that the Convention enshrines principles that also
form part of customary international law. Article I provides that “[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law”. The Court has also
repeatedly stated that the Convention embodies principles that are part of customary international law. That was
emphasized by the Court in its 1951 Advisory Opinion:
“The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to condemn
and punish genocide as ‘a crime under international law’ involving a denial of the right of existence
of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses
to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Res-
olution 96 (I) of the General Assembly, December 11th, 1946). The first consequence arising from
this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized
by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. A second con-
sequence is the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation
required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the Convention).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The Convention was manifestly
adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a con-
vention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is
to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse
the most elementary principles of morality.” (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.)
That statement was reaffirmed by the Court in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I),
pp. 110–111, para. 161). In addition, the Court has made clear that the Genocide Convention contains obligations
erga omnes. Finally, the Court has noted that the prohibition of genocide has the character of a peremptory norm
(jus cogens) (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, pp. 31–32, para. 64).
88. Moreover, the above-mentioned Congo v. Rwanda Judgment explains:
“The Court observes, however, as it has already had occasion to emphasize, that ‘the erga omnes
character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things’ (East Timor
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(Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29), and that the mere fact
that rights and obligations erga omnes may be at issue in a dispute would not give the Court juris-
diction to entertain that dispute.
The same applies to the relationship between peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens) and the establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction: the fact that a dispute relates to com-
pliance with a norm having such a character, which is assuredly the case with regard to the pro-
hibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain
that dispute. Under the Court’s Statute that jurisdiction is always based on the consent of the par-
ties.” (Ibid.)
In the present case, any jurisdiction which the Court possesses is derived from Article IX of the Genocide Convention
and is therefore confined to obligations arising under the Convention itself. Where a treaty states an obligation which
also exists under customary international law, the treaty obligation and the customary law obligation remain separate
and distinct (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 96, para. 179). Accordingly, unless a treaty discloses a different intention,
the fact that the treaty embodies a rule of customary international law will not mean that the compromissory clause
of the treaty enables disputes regarding the customary law obligation to be brought before the Court. In the case
of Article IX of the Genocide Convention no such intention is discernible. On the contrary, the text is quite clear
that the jurisdiction for which it provides is confined to disputes regarding the interpretation, application or fulfilment
of the Convention, including disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or other acts prohibited
by the Convention. Article IX does not afford a basis on which the Court can exercise jurisdiction over a dispute
concerning an alleged violation of the customary international law obligations regarding genocide.
89. Accordingly, in order to establish that the Court has jurisdiction with regard to the claim of Croatia relating
to events alleged to have occurred prior to 27 April 1992, the Applicant must show that its dispute with Serbia
regarding these events is a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Con-
vention. It is not enough that these events may have involved violations of the customary international law regarding
genocide; the dispute must concern obligations under the Convention itself.
* *
(4) Serbia’s objection to jurisdiction
(i) Whether provisions of the Convention are retroactive
90. It is for the Court, on the basis of the submissions of the Parties, and the arguments advanced in support
thereof, to determine the subject-matter of the dispute before it. In the present case, the Court considers that the
essential subject-matter of the dispute is whether Serbia is responsible for violations of the Genocide Convention
and, if so, whether Croatia may invoke that responsibility. Thus stated, the dispute would appear to fall squarely
within the terms of Article IX.
91. Serbia maintains that, in so far as Croatia’s claim concerns acts said to have occurred before the FRY became
party to the Convention on 27 April 1992 (and the great majority of Croatia’s allegations concern events before
that date), the Convention was not capable of applying to the FRY (and, therefore, any breaches of it cannot be
attributable to Serbia). Accordingly, Serbia contends that the dispute regarding those allegations cannot be held to
fall within the scope of Article IX.
92. In response, Croatia refers to what it describes as a presumption in favour of the retroactive effect of com-
promissory clauses, which it maintains finds support in the Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the case of Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. United Kingdom), (Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 2, p. 35), and to the absence of any temporal limitation in Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
93. In its 2008 Judgment in the present case, the Court stated “that there is no express provision in the Genocide
Convention limiting its jurisdiction ratione temporis” (I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 458, para. 123; see also Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 617, para. 34). As will be seen, the absence of a temporal limitation in Article IX is
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not without significance but it is not, in itself, sufficient to establish jurisdiction over that part of Croatia’s claim
which relates to events said to have occurred before 27 April 1992. Article IX is not a general provision for the
settlement of disputes. The jurisdiction for which it provides is limited to disputes between the Contracting Parties
regarding the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the acts enumerated in Article
III of the Convention. Accordingly, the temporal scope of Article IX is necessarily linked to the temporal scope
of the other provisions of the Genocide Convention.
94. Croatia seeks to address that issue by arguing that some, at least, of the substantive provisions of the Con-
vention are applicable to events occurring before it entered into force for the Respondent. Croatia maintains that
the obligation to prevent and punish genocide is not limited to acts of genocide occurring after the Convention enters
into force for a particular State but “is capable of encompassing genocide whenever occurring, rather than only
genocide occurring in the future after the Convention enters into force for a particular State”. Serbia, however, denies
that these provisions were ever intended to impose upon a State obligations with regard to events which took place
before that State became bound by the Convention.
95. The Court considers that a treaty obligation that requires a State to prevent something from happening cannot
logically apply to events that occurred prior to the date on which that State became bound by that obligation; what
has already happened cannot be prevented. Logic, as well as the presumption against retroactivity of treaty obli-
gations enshrined in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, thus points clearly to the conclusion
that the obligation to prevent genocide can be applicable only to acts that might occur after the Convention has
entered into force for the State in question. Nothing in the text of the Genocide Convention or the travaux pre´para-
toires suggests a different conclusion. Nor does the fact that the Convention was intended to confirm obligations
that already existed in customary international law. A State which is not yet party to the Convention when acts of
genocide take place might well be in breach of its obligation under customary international law to prevent those
acts from occurring but the fact that it subsequently becomes party to the Convention does not place it under an
additional treaty obligation to have prevented those acts from taking place.
96. There is no similar logical barrier to a treaty imposing upon a State an obligation to punish acts which took
place before that treaty came into force for that State and certain treaties contain such an obligation. For example,
the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,
1968 (United Nations General Assembly resolution 2391 (XXIII); United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 754,
p. 73), is applicable, according to its Article 1, to the crimes specified therein “irrespective of the date of their com-
mission”. Similarly, Article 2 (2) of the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 1974 (European Treaty Series, No. 82), provides that the Convention
is applicable to offences committed before its entry into force in cases where the statutory limitation period had
not expired at that time. In both those cases, however, the applicability of the relevant Convention to acts which
occurred before it entered into force is the subject of express provision. There is no comparable provision in the
Genocide Convention. Moreover, the provisions requiring States to punish acts of genocide (Articles I and IV) are
necessarily linked to the obligation (in Article V) for each State party to enact legislation for the purpose of giving
effect to the provisions of the Convention. There is no indication that the Convention was intended to require States
to enact retroactive legislation.
97. The negotiating history of the Convention also suggests that the duty to punish acts of genocide, like the
other substantive provisions of the Convention, was intended to apply to acts taking place in the future and not to
be applicable to those which had occurred during the Second World War or at other times in the past. Thus, the
representative of Czechoslovakia stated that the Convention should “include express provisions asserting the peo-
ples’ desire to punish all those who, in the future, might be tempted to repeat the appalling crimes which had been
committed” (United Nations, Official Documents of the General Assembly, Part I, 3rd Session, Sixth Committee,
Minutes of the Sixty-Sixth Meeting, doc. A/C.6/SR.66, p. 30; emphasis added). Similarly, the representative of the
Philippines stated that “[i]t was therefore essential to provide for their punishment in [the] future” (ibid., Minutes
of the Ninety-Fifth Meeting, doc. A/C.6/SR.95, p. 340; emphasis added) and the representative of Peru described
the Convention then under negotiation as one “for the punishment of those who would be guilty of violating its
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provisions in the future” (United Nations, Official Documents of the General Assembly, Part I, 3rd Session, Sixth
Committee, Minutes of the Hundred and Ninth Meeting, doc. A/C.6/SR.109, p. 498; emphasis added). By contrast,
in spite of the events immediately preceding the adoption of the Convention — to which many references were made
— there was no suggestion that the Convention under consideration was intended to impose an obligation on States
to punish acts of genocide committed in the past.
98. Finally, the Court recalls that in its recent Judgment in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 422), it held that the comparable provisions
of the Convention against Torture, which require each State party to submit to their prosecuting authorities the cases
of persons suspected of acts of torture, applied only to acts taking place after the Convention had entered into force
for the State concerned, notwithstanding that such acts are considered crimes under customary international law
(ibid., p. 457, paras. 99–100).
99. In arguing that some of the substantive obligations imposed by the Convention are retroactive, Croatia
focused upon the obligations to prevent and punish genocide. It is, however, the responsibility of a State under the
Convention for the commission of acts of genocide that lies at the heart of Croatia’s claim. The Court considers
that in this respect also the Convention is not retroactive. To hold otherwise would be to disregard the rule expressed
in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. There is no basis for doing so in the text of the
Convention or in its negotiating history.
100. The Court thus concludes that the substantive provisions of the Convention do not impose upon a State
obligations in relation to acts said to have occurred before that State became bound by the Convention.
* *
101. Having reached that conclusion, the Court now turns to the question whether the dispute as to acts said
to have occurred before 27 April 1992 nevertheless falls within the scope of jurisdiction under Article IX. As the
Court has already noted (see paragraph 82 above), Croatia advances two alternative grounds for concluding that
it does so. Croatia relies, first, upon Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, and, secondly, upon
the law of State succession. The Court will consider each of these arguments in turn.
(ii) Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility
102. Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility has already been quoted in paragraph 82, above.
According to Croatia, that provision is part of customary international law. Croatia maintains that, although the FRY
was not proclaimed as a State until 27 April 1992, that proclamation merely formalized a situation that was already
established in fact. During the course of 1991, according to Croatia, the leadership of the republic of Serbia and
other supporters of what Croatia describes as a “Greater Serbia” movement took control of the JNA and other insti-
tutions of the SFRY, while also controlling their own territorial armed forces and various militias and paramilitary
groups. This movement was eventually successful in creating a separate State, the FRY. Croatia contends that its
claim in relation to events prior to 27 April 1992 is based upon acts by the JNA and those other armed forces and
groups, as well as the Serb political authorities, which were attributable to that movement and thus, by operation
of the principle stated in Article 10 (2), to the FRY.
103. Serbia counters that Article 10 (2) represents progressive development of the law and did not form part
of customary international law in 1991-1992. It is therefore inapplicable to the present case. Furthermore, even if
Article 10 (2) had become part of customary law at that time, it is not applicable to the facts of the present case,
since there was no “movement” that succeeded in creating a new State. Serbia also denies that the acts on which
Croatia’s claim is based were attributable to an entity that might be regarded as a Serbian State in statu nascendi
during the period before 27 April 1992. Finally, Serbia contends that even if Article 10 (2) were applicable, it would
not suffice to bring within the scope of Article IX that part of Croatia’s claim which concerns events said to have
occurred before 27 April 1992. According to Serbia, Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles is no more than a principle
of attribution; it has no bearing on the question of what obligations bind the new State or the earlier “movement”,
nor does it make treaty obligations accepted by the new State after its emergence retroactively applicable to acts
of the pre-State “movement”, even if it treats those acts as attributable to the new State. On that basis, Serbia argues
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that any “movement” which might have existed before 27 April 1992 was not a party to the Genocide Convention
and could, therefore, only have been bound by the customary international law prohibition of genocide.
104. The Court considers that, even if Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility could be regarded
as declaratory of customary international law at the relevant time, that Article is concerned only with the attribution
of acts to a new State; it does not create obligations binding upon either the new State or the movement that succeeded
in establishing that new State. Nor does it affect the principle stated in Article 13 of the said Articles that: “An act
of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in
question at the time the act occurs.”
In the present case, the FRY was not bound by the obligations contained in the Genocide Convention until it
became party to that Convention. In its 2008 Judgment, the Court held that succession resulted from the declaration
made by the FRY on 27 April 1992 and its Note of the same date (see paragraph 76, above). The date on which
the notification of succession was made coincided with the date on which the new State came into existence. The
Court has already found, in its 2008 Judgment, that the effect of the declaration and Note of 27 April 1992 was
“that from that date onwards the FRY would be bound by the obligations of a party in respect of all the multilateral
conventions to which the SFRY had been a party at the time of its dissolution” (I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 454–455,
para. 117; emphasis added).
105. The FRY was, therefore, bound by the Genocide Convention only with effect from 27 April 1992. Accord-
ingly, even if the acts prior to 27 April 1992 on which Croatia relies were attributable to a “movement”, within
the meaning of Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles, and became attributable to the FRY by operation of the principle
set out in that Article, they cannot have involved a violation of the provisions of the Genocide Convention but, at
most, only of the customary international law prohibition of genocide. Article 10 (2) cannot, therefore, serve to bring
the dispute regarding those acts within the scope of Article IX of the Convention. That conclusion makes it unnec-
essary for the Court to consider whether Article 10 (2) expresses a principle that formed part of customary inter-
national law in 1991–1992 (or, indeed, at any time thereafter), or whether, if it did so, the conditions for its appli-
cation are satisfied in the present case.
* *
(iii) Succession to responsibility
106. The Court therefore turns to Croatia’s alternative argument that the FRY succeeded to the responsibility
of the SFRY. This argument is based upon the premise that the acts prior to 27 April 1992 on which Croatia bases
its claim were attributable to the SFRY and in breach of the SFRY’s obligations under the Genocide Convention
to which it was, at the relevant time, a party. Croatia then argues that, when the FRY succeeded to the treaty obli-
gations of the SFRY on 27 April 1992, it also succeeded to the responsibility already incurred by the latter for these
alleged violations of the Genocide Convention.
107. Croatia advances two separate grounds on which it claims the FRY succeeded to the responsibility of the
SFRY. First, it claims that this succession came about as a result of the application of the principles of general
international law regarding State succession. In this context, it relies upon the award of the arbitration tribunal in
the Lighthouses Arbitration between France and Greece, Claims No. 11 and 4, 24 July 1956 (United Nations,
Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XII, p. 155; 23 ILR 81), which stated that the responsibility
of a State might be transferred to a successor if the facts were such as to make it appropriate to hold the latter
responsible for the former’s wrongdoing. The tribunal considered that whether there would be a succession to
responsibility would depend on the particular facts of each case. Croatia contends that the facts of the present case,
in which the dissolution of the SFRY was a gradual process involving armed conflict between what became its
successor States and in which one of the entities which emerged as a successor — the FRY — largely controlled
the armed forces of the SFRY during the last year of the latter’s formal existence, justify the succession of the FRY
to the responsibility incurred by the SFRY for the acts of armed forces that subsequently became organs of the FRY.
Secondly, Croatia argues that the FRY, by the declaration of 27 April 1992 already discussed, indicated not only
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that it was succeeding to the treaty obligations of the SFRY, but also that it succeeded to the responsibility incurred
by the SFRY for the violation of those treaty obligations.
108. Serbia maintains that this alternative argument is a new claim introduced by Croatia only at the oral phase
of the proceedings and is hence inadmissible. In the event that the Court decides that it can entertain it, Serbia argues
that neither Article IX, nor the other provisions of the Genocide Convention, makes any provision for the trans-
mission of responsibility by succession, so that any succession would have to be by operation of principles outside
the Convention and a dispute regarding those principles would not therefore fall within the scope of Article IX.
In any event, Serbia contends that there is no principle of succession to responsibility in general international law.
It maintains that the Lighthouses case was concerned with the violation of private rights under a concession contract
and is of no relevance to responsibility for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. According to Serbia,
the declaration of 27 April 1992 was concerned only with succession to the treaties themselves and not with suc-
cession to responsibility. Serbia further maintains that all issues of succession to the rights and obligations of the
SFRY are governed by the Agreement on Succession Issues, 2001 (UNTS, Vol. 2262, p. 251), which lays down
a procedure for considering outstanding claims against the SFRY. Finally, Serbia argues that the Court should, in
any event, decline to exercise jurisdiction on the alternative basis advanced by Croatia, because of the principle
enunciated by the Court in its Judgments in Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United
Kingdom and United States of America) (Preliminary Question, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 19) and East
Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90).
109. While the Court has made clear that an applicant may not introduce a new claim which has the effect of
transforming the subject-matter of the dispute (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras
in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 695, para. 108), it is not
persuaded that, in advancing its argument regarding State succession, Croatia has introduced a new claim into the
proceedings. The Court has already stated that the subject-matter of the dispute is whether or not Serbia is responsible
for violations of the Genocide Convention (see paragraph 90 above), including those allegedly committed before
27 April 1992. The question whether Serbia is responsible for such alleged violations must be distinguished from
the manner in which that responsibility is said to be established. Croatia initially maintained — and continues to
advance as its principal argument — that the FRY (and, thus, Serbia) incurred responsibility for the conduct which
Croatia contends violated the Convention, because that conduct was directly attributable to the FRY. However,
Croatia also advances, as an alternative argument, that, if that conduct was attributable to the SFRY, then the FRY
(and, consequently, Serbia) incurred responsibility on the basis of succession. Croatia has not, therefore, introduced
a new claim but advanced, in support of its original claim, a new argument as to the manner in which Serbia’s
responsibility is said to be established. Moreover, that argument involves no new title of jurisdiction but concerns
the interpretation and application of the title of jurisdiction invoked in the Application, namely Article IX of the
Genocide Convention.
110. As noted at paragraph 77 above, the Court observed in 2008, when deciding that Serbia’s objections to
jurisdiction and admissibility ratione temporis did not possess an exclusively preliminary character, that the issues
of jurisdiction and merits are closely related and the Court needed to have more elements before it in order to be
in a position to make findings on each of those issues. Now that the Court, having received the further pleadings
and heard the oral arguments of the Parties, is in possession of those additional elements, it can distinguish what
has to be decided in order to determine the question of jurisdiction from those decisions which properly belong only
to the merits.
111. In relation to jurisdiction, the question which has to be decided is confined to whether the dispute between
the Parties is one which falls within the jurisdiction of the Court under Article IX of the Genocide Convention. That
dispute will do so only if it is one concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, which
includes disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III of the Convention.
112. Within the framework of the dispute, as analysed in paragraphs 90 and 109, above, it is possible to identify
a number of contested points. Thus, on Croatia’s alternative argument, in order to determine whether Serbia is
responsible for violations of the Convention, the Court would need to decide:
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(1) whether the acts relied on by Croatia took place; and, if they did, whether they were contrary to the Convention;
(2) if so, whether those acts were attributable to the SFRY at the time that they occurred and engaged its respon-
sibility; and
(3) if the responsibility of the SFRY had been engaged, whether the FRY succeeded to that responsibility.
While there is no dispute that many (though not all) of the acts relied upon by Croatia took place, the Parties disagree
over whether or not they constituted violations of the Genocide Convention. In addition, Serbia rejects Croatia’s
argument that Serbia has incurred responsibility, on whatever basis, for those acts.
113. What has to be decided in order to determine whether or not the Court possesses jurisdiction with regard
to the claim concerning acts said to have taken place before 27 April 1992 is whether the dispute between the Parties
on the three issues set out in the preceding paragraph falls within the scope of Article IX. The issues in dispute
concern the interpretation, application and fulfilment of the provisions of the Genocide Convention. There is no
suggestion here of giving retroactive effect to the provisions of the Convention. Both Parties agree that the SFRY
was bound by the Convention at the time when it is alleged that the relevant acts occurred. Whether those acts were
contrary to the provisions of the Convention and, if so, whether they were attributable to and thus engaged the
responsibility of the SFRY are matters falling squarely within the scope ratione materiae of the jurisdiction provided
for in Article IX.
114. So far as the third issue in dispute is concerned, the question the Court is asked to decide is whether the
FRY — and, therefore, Serbia — is responsible for acts of genocide and other acts enumerated in Article III of
the Convention allegedly attributable to the SFRY. Article IX provides for the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to
“[d]isputes . . . relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the . . . Convention, including those relating
to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III”. Croatia’s contention
is that Serbia is responsible for the breaches of the Genocide Convention which it maintains were committed before
27 April 1992. On Croatia’s principal argument, that responsibility results from the direct attribution of those
breaches to the FRY, and thus to Serbia, while on Croatia’s alternative argument (with which this part of the Judg-
ment is concerned), responsibility is said to result from succession. The Court notes that Article IX speaks generally
of the responsibility of a State and contains no limitation regarding the manner in which that responsibility might
be engaged. While Croatia’s arguments regarding the third issue identified in paragraph 112 above raise serious
questions of law and fact, those questions form part of the merits of the dispute. They would require a decision
only if the Court finds that the acts relied upon by Croatia were contrary to the Convention and were attributable
to the SFRY at the time of their commission.
115. It is true that whether or not the Respondent State succeeds, as Croatia contends, to the responsibility of
its predecessor State for violations of the Convention is governed not by the terms of the Convention but by rules
of general international law. However, that does not take the dispute regarding the third issue outside the scope of
Article IX. As the Court explained in its 2007 Judgment in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro
case,
“[t]he jurisdiction of the Court is founded on Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and the disputes
subject to that jurisdiction are those ‘relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Con-
vention, but it does not follow that the Convention stands alone. In order to determine whether the
Respondent breached its obligations under the Convention, as claimed by the Applicant, and, if a breach
was committed, to determine its legal consequences, the Court will have recourse not only to the Con-
vention itself, but also to the rules of general international law on treaty interpretation and on respon-
sibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 105, para. 149.)
The Court considers that the rules on succession that may come into play in the present case fall into the same
category as those on treaty interpretation and responsibility of States referred to in the passage just quoted. The
Convention itself does not specify the circumstances that give rise to the responsibility of a State, which must be
determined under general international law. The fact that the application — or even the existence — of a rule on
some aspect of State responsibility or State succession in connection with allegations of genocide may be vigorously
contested between the parties to a case under Article IX does not mean that the dispute between them ceases to
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fall within the category of “disputes . . . relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the [Genocide]
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide”. Since Croatia’s alternative argu-
ment calls for a determination whether the SFRY was responsible for acts of genocide allegedly committed when
the SFRY was a party to the Convention, the Court’s conclusion regarding the temporal scope of Article IX does
not constitute a barrier to jurisdiction.
116. With regard to Serbia’s arguments based on the Judgments in Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943
(Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United States of America) (Preliminary Question, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1954, p. 19) and East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90), the Court recalls that
those Judgments concern one aspect of “the fundamental principles of its Statute . . . that it cannot decide a dispute
between States without the consent of those States to its jurisdiction” (ibid., p. 101, para. 26). In both Monetary
Gold and East Timor, the Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the application, because it
considered that to do so would have been contrary to the right of a State not party to the proceedings not to have
the Court rule upon its conduct without its consent. That rationale has no application to a State which no longer
exists, as is the case with the SFRY, since such a State no longer possesses any rights and is incapable of giving
or withholding consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. So far as concerns the position of the other successor States
to the SFRY, it is not necessary for the Court to rule on the legal situation of those States as a prerequisite for the
determination of the present claim. The principle discussed by the Court in the Monetary Gold case is therefore
inapplicable (cf. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1992, pp. 261–262, para. 55).
117. Having concluded in its 2008 Judgment that the present dispute falls within Article IX of the Genocide Con-
vention in so far as it concerns acts said to have occurred after 27 April 1992, the Court now finds that, to the extent
that the dispute concerns acts said to have occurred before that date, it also falls within the scope of Article IX and that
the Court therefore has jurisdiction to rule upon the entirety of Croatia’s claim. In reaching that conclusion, it is not nec-
essary to decide whether the FRY, and therefore Serbia, actually succeeded to any responsibility that might have been
incurred by the SFRY, any more than it is necessary to decide whether acts contrary to the Genocide Convention took
place before 27 April 1992 or, if they did, to whom those acts were attributable. Those questions are matters for the merits
to be considered — to the extent necessary — in the following sections of this Judgment.
* *
(5) Admissibility
118. The Court therefore turns to the two alternative arguments advanced by Serbia regarding the admissibility
of the claim. The first such argument is that a claim based upon events said to have occurred before the FRY came
into existence as a State on 27 April 1992 is inadmissible. The Court recalls that it has already, in its 2008 Judgment,
held that this argument involves questions of attribution. The Court observes that it is not necessary to determine
these matters before it has considered on the merits the acts alleged by Croatia.
119. Serbia’s second alternative argument is that, even if a claim might be admissible in relation to events said
to have occurred before the FRY came into existence as a State, Croatia could not maintain a claim in relation to
events alleged to have taken place before it became a party to the Genocide Convention on 8 October 1991. The
Court observes that Croatia has not made discrete claims in respect of the events before and after 8 October 1991;
rather, it has advanced a single claim alleging a pattern of conduct increasing in intensity throughout the course
of 1991 and has referred, in the case of many towns and villages, to acts of violence taking place both immediately
prior to, and immediately following, 8 October 1991. In this context, what happened prior to 8 October 1991 is,
in any event, pertinent to an evaluation of whether what took place after that date involved violations of the Genocide
Convention. In these circumstances, the Court considers that it is not necessary to rule upon Serbia’s second alter-
native argument before it has examined and assessed the totality of the evidence advanced by Croatia.
B. Serbia’s counter-claim
120. With regard to the counter-claim made by Serbia, Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court as adopted
on 14 April 1978, which, as the Court has already noted (see paragraph 7, above), is applicable to this case as the
Application was submitted prior to 1 February 2001, provides that
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“A counter-claim may be presented provided that it is directly connected with the subject-matter
of the claim of the other party and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”
121. In its counter-claim, Serbia alleges that Croatia violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention
by taking action, and failing to punish the action taken, against the Serb population in the Krajina region of
Croatia. The counter-claim relates exclusively to the fighting which took place in the summer of 1995 in the
course of what was described by Croatia as Operation “Storm” and its aftermath. By the time that Operation
“Storm” took place, both Croatia and the FRY had been parties to the Genocide Convention for several years.
Croatia does not contest that the counter-claim thus falls within the jurisdiction of the Court under Article IX
of the Genocide Convention.
122. With regard to the requirement that the counter-claim be directly connected with the subject-matter
of the claim, Serbia maintains that the counter-claim raises “virtually identical legal issues related to the inter-
pretation of the Genocide Convention . . . as well as related issues of State responsibility arising under the
Convention and general international law” as those raised by the claim and that the claim and counter-claim
relate to the same armed conflict and share “a common territorial and temporal setting”. Croatia denies that
the counter-claim is based on the same “factual complex” as the claim and highlights what it maintains are
a number of significant differences between them, including the fact that the events to which the claim relates
took place over a much wider geographical area and that most of them occurred more than two years before
the events on which the counter-claim is based.
123. The Court notes, however, that Croatia does not submit that the counter-claim is inadmissible; the factual
differences suggested by Croatia are invoked in support of its arguments on the merits of the counter-claim (some-
thing which will be considered in Part VI of this Judgment). The Court considers that the counter-claim is directly
connected with the claim of Croatia both in fact and in law. The legal basis for both the claim and the counter-claim
is the Genocide Convention. Moreover, even if one accepts that the factual differences suggested by Croatia exist,
the hostilities in Croatia in 1991–1992 that gave rise to most of the allegations in the claim were directly connected
with those in the summer of 1995, not least because Operation “Storm” was launched as a response to what Croatia
maintained was the occupation of part of its territory as a result of the earlier fighting. The Court therefore concludes
that the requirements of Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court are satisfied. As Article IX is the only basis
for jurisdiction which has been advanced in respect of the counter-claim, the comments made in paragraphs 85 to
88 above are equally applicable to the counter-claim.
*
* *
III. APPLICABLE LAW: THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
124. The Genocide Convention, which is binding on the Parties, and the sole basis on which the Court has
jurisdiction, is the law applicable to the present case. Accordingly, the Court can rule only on alleged breaches of
that Convention (see paragraphs 85–88 above).
125. In ruling on disputes relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide, the Court bases itself on the Convention, but also on
the other relevant rules of international law, in particular those governing the interpretation of treaties and the respon-
sibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. Moreover, as it observed in its Judgment of 18 November 2008
on the preliminary objections in the present case,
“[i]n general the Court does not choose to depart from previous findings, particularly when sim-
ilar issues were dealt with in the earlier decisions . . . unless it finds very particular reasons to do
so” (I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 449, para. 104).
In this connection, the Court recalls that, in its Judgment of 26 February 2007 in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro case, it considered certain issues similar to those before it in the present case. It will take into account
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that Judgment to the extent necessary for its legal reasoning here. This will not, however, preclude it, where necessary,
from elaborating upon this jurisprudence, in light of the arguments of the Parties in the present case.
126. In its final submissions, Croatia requests the Court to rule on Serbia’s responsibility for alleged breaches
of the Convention. According to the Applicant, a distinction must be drawn between the issue of Serbia’s inter-
national responsibility for a series of crimes, which is a matter for the Court in this case, and that of individual
responsibility for particular crimes, which it is the function of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) to determine.
127. For its part, Serbia points out that the Court’s Judgment in 2007 was built upon the case law of the ICTY,
and that its analysis used individual criminal responsibility rather than State responsibility as the starting-point.
128. The Court recalls that, in its 2007 Judgment, it observed that “if a State is to be responsible because it has
breached its obligation not to commit genocide, it must be shown that genocide as defined in the Convention has been
committed” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 119, para. 180). It may consist of acts, attributable to the State, committed by
a person or a group of persons whose individual criminal responsibility has already been established. But the Court also
envisaged an alternative scenario, in which “State responsibility can arise under the Convention for genocide and com-
plicity, without an individual being convicted of the crime or an associated one” (ibid., p. 120, para. 182).
In either of these situations, the Court applies the rules of general international law on the responsibility of States
for internationally wrongful acts. Specifically, Article 3 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which reflects
a rule of customary law, states that “[t]he characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed
by international law.”
129. State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are governed by different legal re´gimes and pur-
sue different aims. The former concerns the consequences of the breach by a State of the obligations imposed upon
it by international law, whereas the latter is concerned with the responsibility of an individual as established under
the rules of international and domestic criminal law, and the resultant sanctions to be imposed upon that person.
It is for the Court, in applying the Convention, to decide whether acts of genocide have been committed, but it
is not for the Court to determine the individual criminal responsibility for such acts. That is a task for the criminal
courts or tribunals empowered to do so, in accordance with appropriate procedures. The Court will nonetheless take
account, where appropriate, of the decisions of international criminal courts or tribunals, in particular those of the
ICTY, as it did in 2007, in examining the constituent elements of genocide in the present case. If it is established
that genocide has been committed, the Court will then seek to determine the responsibility of the State, on the basis
of the rules of general international law governing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.
130. Article II of the Convention defines genocide in the following terms:
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
According to that Article, genocide contains two constituent elements: the physical element, namely the act per-
petrated or actus reus, and the mental element, or mens rea. Although analytically distinct, the two elements are
linked. The determination of actus reus can require an inquiry into intent. In addition, the characterization of the
acts and their mutual relationship can contribute to an inference of intent.
131. The Court will begin by defining the intent to commit genocide, before analysing the legal issues raised
by the acts referred to in Article II of the Convention.
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A. The mens rea of genocide
132. The “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such” is the
essential characteristic of genocide, which distinguishes it from other serious crimes.
It is regarded as a dolus specialis, that is to say a specific intent, which, in order for genocide to be established,
must be present in addition to the intent required for each of the individual acts involved (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I),
p. 121, para. 187).
133. In the present case, the Parties differ (1) on the meaning and scope of “destruction” of a group, (2) on the
meaning of destruction of a group “in part”, and finally (3) on what constitutes the evidence of the dolus specialis.
1. The meaning and scope of “destruction” of a group
(a) Physical or biological destruction of the group
134. Croatia argues that the required intent is not limited to the intent to physically destroy the group, but
includes also the intent to stop it from functioning as a unit. Thus, according to Croatia, genocide as defined in Article
II of the Convention need not take the form of physical destruction of the group. As evidence of this, it points out
that some of the acts of genocide listed in Article II of the Convention do not imply the physical destruction of
the group. By way of example, it cites “causing serious . . . mental harm to members of the group” (subparagraph
(b) of Article II), and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (subparagraph (e) of that Article).
135. Serbia, on the contrary, rejects this functional approach to the destruction of the group, taking the view
that what counts is the intent to destroy the group in a physical sense, even if the acts listed in Article II may some-
times appear to fall short of causing such physical destruction.
136. The Court notes that the travaux pre´paratoires of the Convention show that the drafters originally envis-
aged two types of genocide, physical or biological genocide, and cultural genocide, but that this latter concept was
eventually dropped in this context (see Report of the ad hoc Committee on Genocide, 5 April to 10 May 1948, United
Nations, Proceedings of the Economic and Social Council, 7th Session, Supplement No. 6, doc. E/794; and United
Nations, Official Documents of the General Assembly, Part I, 3rd Session, Sixth Committee, Minutes of the Eighty-
Third Meeting, pp. 193–207, doc. A/C.6/SR.83).
It was accordingly decided to limit the scope of the Convention to the physical or biological destruction of the
group (Report of the ILC on the work of its Forty-eighth Session, Yearbook of the ILC, 1996, Vol. II, Part Two,
pp. 45–46, para. 12, quoted by the Court in its 2007 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 186, para. 344).
It follows that “causing serious . . . mental harm to members of the group” within the meaning of Article II (b),
even if it does not directly concern the physical or biological destruction of members of the group, must be regarded
as encompassing only acts carried out with the intent of achieving the physical or biological destruction of the group,
in whole or in part.
As regards the forcible transfer of children of the group to another group within the meaning of Article II (e),
this can also entail the intent to destroy the group physically, in whole or in part, since it can have consequences
for the group’s capacity to renew itself, and hence to ensure its long-term survival.
(b) Scale of destruction of the group
137. Croatia contends that the extermination of the group is not required according to the definition of genocide
as set out in Article II of the Convention. It argues that there is a requirement to prove that the perpetrator intended
to destroy the group, in whole or in part, and that that intent need not necessarily involve the extermination of the
group. Croatia has even argued that a small number of victims who are members of the group would suffice, citing
the travaux pre´paratoires, and in particular the draft amendment proposed by the French delegation to the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly (United Nations, Official Documents of the General Assembly, Part I, 3rd
Session, Sixth Committee, Minutes of the Seventy-Third Meeting, pp. 90–91, doc. A/C.6/SR.73; and ibid., Annex
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to the Minutes of the Two-Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Meeting, p. 22, doc. A/C.6/224), even though that proposal
was ultimately withdrawn.
According to Serbia, extermination, as a crime against humanity, may be related to genocide in that both crimes
are directed against a large number of victims. It accepts that, in order to demonstrate the existence of genocide,
it is necessary to prove that the acts were committed with the intent to destroy the group physically. It argues, how-
ever, that, where there is evidence of extermination, “the deduction that the perpetrator intended the physical destruc-
tion of the targeted group will be much more plausible”. Conversely, where there is no evidence of extermination,
this deduction of genocidal intent “will be implausible, absent other compelling evidence”.
138. The Court considers that Article II of the Convention, including the phrase “committed with intent to
destroy”, must be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”, as prescribed by customary law as reflected
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
139. The Preamble to the Genocide Convention emphasizes that “genocide has inflicted great losses on human-
ity”, and that the Contracting Parties have set themselves the aim of “liberat[ing] mankind from such an odious
scourge”. As the Court noted in 1951 and recalled in 2007, an object of the Convention was the safeguarding of
“the very existence of certain human groups” (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23, and Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 125, para. 194).
The Court recalls that, in 2007, it held that the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as
such is specific to genocide and distinguishes it from other related criminal acts such as crimes against humanity
and persecution (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 121–122, paras. 187–188).
Since it is the group, in whole or in part, which is the object of the genocidal intent, the Court is of the view
that it is difficult to establish such intent on the basis of isolated acts. It considers that, in the absence of direct proof,
there must be evidence of acts on a scale that establishes an intent not only to target certain individuals because
of their membership of a particular group, but also to destroy the group itself in whole or in part.
2. The meaning of destruction of the group “in part”
140. Croatia accepts that, according to the case law of the Court and of the international criminal tribunals, “the
intent to destroy . . . in part” the protected group relates to a substantial part of that group. However, it objects to
a purely numerical approach to this criterion, arguing that the emphasis should be on the geographical location of
the part of the group, within a region, or a subregion or a community, as well as the opportunities presented to the
perpetrators of the crime to destroy the group.
141. Serbia focuses on the criterion that the targeted part of the group must be substantial and on the established
case law in that regard, while accepting that it might be relevant to consider the issue of opportunity.
142. The Court recalls that the destruction of the group “in part” within the meaning of Article II of the Con-
vention must be assessed by reference to a number of criteria. In this regard, it held in 2007 that “the intent must
be to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular group” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 126, para. 198), and that
this is a “critical” criterion (ibid., p. 127, para. 201). The Court further noted that “it is widely accepted that genocide
may be found to have been committed where the intent is to destroy the group within a geographically limited area”
(ibid., p. 126, para. 199) and that, accordingly, “[t]he area of the perpetrator’s activity and control are to be con-
sidered” (ibid.). Account must also be taken of the prominence of the allegedly targeted part within the group as
a whole. With respect to this criterion, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY specified in its Judgment rendered in the
Krstic´ case that “[i]f a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival,
that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4 [of the ICTY Statute,
paragraph 2 of which essentially reproduces Article II of the Convention]” (IT-98-33-A, Judgment of 19 April 2004,
para. 12, reference omitted, cited in I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 127, para. 200).
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In 2007, the Court held that these factors would have to be assessed in any particular case (ibid., p. 127, para.
201). It follows that, in evaluating whether the allegedly targeted part of a protected group is substantial in relation
to the overall group, the Court will take into account the quantitative element as well as evidence regarding the
geographic location and prominence of the allegedly targeted part of the group.
3. Evidence of the dolus specialis
143. The Parties agree that the dolus specialis is to be sought, first, in the State’s policy, while at the same time
accepting that such intent will seldom be expressly stated. They agree that, alternatively, the dolus specialis may
be established by indirect evidence, i.e., deduced or inferred from certain types of conduct. They disagree, however,
on the number and nature of instances of such conduct required for this purpose.
144. Croatia considers that conduct of this kind may be reflected in the actions of a small number of identified
individuals, whereas Serbia cites the Elements of Crimes, adopted pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which refer to “a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against [the] group”. The Respondent
considers that this excludes the possibility of genocide being committed by a single individual or a small number
of individuals.
145. In the absence of a State plan expressing the intent to commit genocide, it is necessary, in the Court’s view,
to clarify the process whereby such an intent may be inferred from the individual conduct of perpetrators of the
acts contemplated in Article II of the Convention. In its 2007 Judgment, the Court held that
“[t]he dolus specialis, the specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, has to be con-
vincingly shown by reference to particular circumstances, unless a general plan to that end can be
convincingly demonstrated to exist; and for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its
existence, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent” (I.C.J.
Reports 2007 (I), pp. 196–197, para. 373).
The Parties have cited this passage of the Judgment, and they accept that intent may be inferred from a pattern of
conduct, but they disagree on how this pattern should be characterized, and on the criterion by reference to which
the Court should assess its existence.
146. Croatia considers that the above criterion, as defined in 2007, is excessively restrictive and not based on
any precedent, and asks the Court to reconsider it. It points out that it has been unable to find any decision of an
international court or tribunal since 2007 in which this criterion has been applied. It invites the Court to draw inspi-
ration from the following passage in the ICTY Trial Judgment in the Tolimir case (currently under appeal) in order
to modify the criterion laid down by it in 2007 regarding evidence of dolus specialis:
“Indications of such intent are rarely overt, however, and thus it is permissible to infer the exis-
tence of genocidal intent based on ‘all of the evidence taken together’, as long as this inference
is ‘the only reasonable [one] available on the evidence’.” (Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgment of 12 December 2012, para. 745.)
According to Croatia, even where there may be other possible explanations for a pattern of conduct, the Court is
bound to find that there was dolus specialis if it is fully convinced that the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from that conduct is one of genocidal intent.
147. For its part, Serbia points out that, even though the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Tolimir case did not cite
paragraph 373 of the Court’s 2007 Judgment, its conclusion that the inference of genocidal intent must be “the only
reasonable [one] available on the evidence” was consistent with that passage in the Court’s Judgment. Serbia accord-
ingly takes the view that the two approaches to the criterion of genocidal intent — the only possible inference (the
line taken in the Court’s 2007 Judgment), or the only reasonable inference (the ICTY’s approach in its decision
in the Tolimir case) — come to the same thing and are both equally stringent.
148. The Court recalls that, in the passage in question in its 2007 Judgment, it accepted the possibility of geno-
cidal intent being established indirectly by inference. The notion of “reasonableness” must necessarily be regarded
as implicit in the reasoning of the Court. Thus, to state that, “for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence
of . . . existence [of genocidal intent], it [must] be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent” amounts
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to saying that, in order to infer the existence of dolus specialis from a pattern of conduct, it is necessary and sufficient
that this is the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the acts in question. To interpret paragraph 373
of the 2007 Judgment in any other way would make it impossible to reach conclusions by way of inference. It follows
that the criterion applied by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Judgment in the Tolimir case is in substance identical
with that laid down by the Court in its 2007 Judgment.
B. The actus reus of genocide
149. The acts listed in Article II of the Convention constitute the actus reus of genocide. Such acts are proscribed
in the context of genocide inasmuch as they are directed against the members of the protected group and reflect
the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part. As the Court has already pointed out, such acts cannot be taken
in isolation, but must be assessed in the context of the prevention and punishment of genocide, which is the object
of the Convention.
150. The Court will review the categories of acts in issue between the Parties in order to determine their meaning
and scope. It will begin by addressing the issue of whether acts committed during the course of an armed conflict
must, in order to constitute the actus reus of genocide, be unlawful under international humanitarian law (jus in
bello).
1. The relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law
151. Both in the proceedings on the principal claim and in those on the counter-claim, the Parties debated the
relationship between international humanitarian law and the Convention. They disagreed on the issue of whether
acts which are lawful under international humanitarian law can constitute the actus reus of genocide.
152. On the principal claim, Serbia argued that acts committed by Serb forces occurred during what it described
as “legitimate combat” with Croatian armed forces. Croatia replied that the Convention applied both in times of
peace and in times of war and that, in any event, the attacks on Croat localities by the Serb forces had not been
conducted in accordance with international humanitarian law.
On the counter-claim, Croatia recalled that the ICTY Appeals Chamber had held in Gotovina (IT-06-90-A,
Appeals Judgment, 16 November 2012, hereinafter “Gotovina Appeals Judgment”) that the shelling of Serb towns
during Operation “Storm” had not been indiscriminate and hence was not contrary to international humanitarian
law. Serbia, for its part, argued that, even if the Operation “Storm” attacks had been conducted in compliance with
international humanitarian law, they could still constitute the actus reus of genocide.
153. The Court notes that the Convention and international humanitarian law are two distinct bodies of rules,
pursuing different aims. The Convention seeks to prevent and punish genocide as a crime under international law
(Preamble), “whether committed in time of peace or in time of war” (Article I), whereas international humanitarian
law governs the conduct of hostilities in an armed conflict and pursues the aim of protecting diverse categories of
persons and objects.
The Court recalls that it has jurisdiction to rule only on violations of the Genocide Convention, and not on breaches
of obligations under international humanitarian law (see paragraph 85 above). The Court is called upon here to
decide a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of that Convention, and will not therefore rule, in
general or in abstract terms, on the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law.
In so far as both of these bodies of rules may be applicable in the context of a particular armed conflict, the rules
of international humanitarian law might be relevant in order to decide whether the acts alleged by the Parties con-
stitute genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention.
2. The meaning and scope of the physical acts in question
154. In subparagraphs (a) to (e) of Article II, the Convention lists the acts which constitute the actus reus of
genocide. The Court will examine each in turn, with the exception of “[f]orcibly transferring children of the group
to another group” (subparagraph (e)), which is not relied on by either of the Parties in this case.
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(a) Killing members of the group
155. The Court notes that there is no disagreement between the Parties on the definition of killing in the sense
of subparagraph (a) of Article II of the Convention.
156. The Court observes that the words “killing” and “meurtre” appear in the English and French versions
respectively of subparagraph (a) of Article II of the Convention. For the Court, these words have the same meaning,
and refer to the act of intentionally killing members of the group (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 121, para. 186 and
Blagojevic´ and Jokic´, IT-02-60-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 17 January 2005, para. 642).
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
157. The Parties disagree on whether causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group must
contribute to the destruction of the group, in whole or in part, in order to constitute the actus reus of genocide for
purposes of Article II (b) of the Convention. Croatia argues that there is no need to show that the harm itself con-
tributed to the destruction of the group. Serbia, on the other hand, contends that the harm must be so serious that
it threatens the group with destruction.
The Court considers that, in the context of Article II, and in particular of its chapeau, and in light of the Con-
vention’s object and purpose, the ordinary meaning of “serious” is that the bodily or mental harm referred to in
subparagraph (b) of that Article must be such as to contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the group,
in whole or in part.
The Convention’s travaux pre´paratoires confirm this interpretation. Thus the representative of the United King-
dom, in proposing an amendment to characterize the harm as “grievous” in the English version of the Convention,
stated that “[i]t would not be appropriate to include, in the list of acts of genocide, acts which were of little importance
in themselves and were not likely to lead to the physical destruction of the group”. Upon the proposal of the rep-
resentative of India, the term “grievous” was eventually replaced by the term “serious” in the English version of
the Convention, without affecting the idea behind the proposal of the representative of the United Kingdom (United
Nations, Official Documents of the General Assembly, Part I, 3rd Session, Sixth Committee, Minutes of the Eighty-
First Meeting, pp. 175 and 179, doc. A/C.6/SR.81, and United Nations, Official Documents of the General Assembly,
Part I, 3rd Session, Sixth Committee, Annex to Minutes of the Meetings, p. 21, doc. A/C.6/222).
In its commentary on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the ILC adopted a
similar interpretation according to which “[t]he bodily or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must
be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part” (Report of the ILC on the work of
its Forty-eighth Session, Yearbook of the ILC, 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 46, para. 14).
Finally, that is the interpretation of “serious harm” adopted by the ICTY, in particular in the Krajišnik case where
the Trial Chamber ruled that the harm must be such “as to contribute, or tend to contribute, to the destruction of
the group or part thereof” (IT-00-39-T, Judgment of 27 September 2006, para. 862; see also Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment of 12 December 2012, para. 738).
The Court concludes that the serious bodily or mental harm within the meaning of Article II (b) of the Convention
must be such as to contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the group, in whole or in part.
158. The Court recalls that rape and other acts of sexual violence are capable of constituting the actus reus of
genocide within the meaning of Article II (b) of the Convention (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 167, para. 300 (citing
in particular the judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber, rendered on 31 July 2003 in the Stakic´ case, IT-97-24-T)
and p. 175, para. 319).
159. The Parties also disagree on the meaning and scope of the notion of “causing serious mental harm to mem-
bers of the group”. For Croatia, this includes the psychological suffering caused to their surviving relatives by the
disappearance of members of the group. It thus argues that Article II (b) has been the subject of a continuing breach
in the present case, since insufficient action has been initiated by Serbia to ascertain the fate of individuals having
disappeared during the events cited in support of the principal claim.
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For the Respondent, this is not an issue covered by the Genocide Convention, but by human rights instruments,
and falls outside the scope of the present case.
160. In the Court’s view, the persistent refusal of the competent authorities to provide relatives of individuals
who disappeared in the context of an alleged genocide with information in their possession, which would enable
the relatives to establish with certainty whether those individuals are dead, and if so, how they died, is capable of
causing psychological suffering. The Court concludes, however, that, to fall within Article II (b) of the Convention,
the harm resulting from that suffering must be such as to contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the
group, in whole or in part.
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
161. Deliberate infliction on the group of conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part, within the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention, covers methods of physical destruction,
other than killing, whereby the perpetrator ultimately seeks the death of the members of the group (see, inter alia,
Stakic´, IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 31 July 2003, paras. 517 and 518). Such methods of destruction
include notably deprivation of food, medical care, shelter or clothing, as well as lack of hygiene, systematic expul-
sion from homes, or exhaustion as a result of excessive work or physical exertion (Branin, IT-99-36-T, Trial Cham-
ber, Judgment of 1 September 2004, para. 691). Some of these acts were indeed alleged by the Parties in support
of their respective claims, and those allegations will be examined by the Court later in the Judgment.
The Parties disagree, however, on whether forced displacement should be characterized as “[d]eliberately inflict-
ing on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, in the sense
of Article II (c) of the Convention. They agree that the forced displacement of the population cannot constitute,
as such, the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of subparagraph (c) of Article II of the Convention. However,
Croatia argues that forced displacement, accompanied by other acts listed in Article II of the Convention, and cou-
pled with an intent to destroy the group, is a genocidal act. For its part, Serbia maintains that neither the case law
of the Court nor that of the ICTY has accepted that forced displacement can constitute genocide within the meaning
of Article II of the Convention.
162. The Court recalls that, in its 2007 Judgment, it stated that
“[n]either the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ‘ethnically homogeneous’, nor the
operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide:
the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘to destroy, in whole or in part’ a particular group, and
deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily
equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of the
displacement” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 123, para. 190; emphasis in original).
It explained, however, that
“[t]his is not to say that acts described as ‘ethnic cleansing’ may never constitute genocide, if
they are such as to be characterized as, for example, ‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’, contrary to Article II,
paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the necessary specific
intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from
its removal from the region . . . In other words, whether a particular operation described as ‘ethnic
cleansing’ amounts to genocide depends on the presence or absence of acts listed in Article II of
the Genocide Convention, and of the intent to destroy the group as such. In fact, in the context of
the Convention, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ has no legal significance of its own. That said, it is clear
that acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ may occur in parallel to acts prohibited by Article II of the Con-
vention, and may be significant as indicative of the presence of a specific intent (dolus specialis)
inspiring those acts.” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 123, para. 190.)
163. The Court has no reason here to depart from its previous conclusions. In order to determine whether the
forced displacements alleged by the Parties constitute genocide in the sense of Article II of the Convention (sub-
paragraph (c), in particular), it will seek to ascertain whether, in the present case, those forced displacements took
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place in such circumstances that they were calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group. The
circumstances in which the forced displacements were carried out are critical in this regard.
(d) Measures intended to prevent births within the group
164. According to Croatia, rape and other acts of sexual violence can fall within subparagraph (d) of Article
II of the Convention, which covers measures intended to prevent births within the group. In support of this con-
tention, it refers to the observation of the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the
Akayesu case that the mental effects of rape could lead members of the group not to procreate. Croatia also cites
the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that, “in patriarchal societies where membership of a group is determined by the
identity of the father”, rape could be “an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group” (ICTR-
96-4-T, Trial Chamber 1, Judgment of 2 September 1998, paras. 507–508).
165. Serbia disputes the contention that rape and other acts of sexual violence can fall within the terms of Article
II (d) of the Convention, unless they are of a systematic nature — which, it contends, is not the case here.
166. The Court considers that rape and other acts of sexual violence, which may also fall within subparagraphs
(b) and (c) of Article II, are capable of constituting the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (d)
of the Convention, provided that they are of a kind which prevent births within the group. In order for that to be
the case, it is necessary that the circumstances of the commission of those acts, and their consequences, are such
that the capacity of members of the group to procreate is affected. Likewise, the systematic nature of such acts has
to be considered in determining whether they are capable of constituting the actus reus of genocide within the mean-
ing of Article II (d) of the Convention.
*
* *
IV. QUESTIONS OF PROOF
167. In support of their respective claim and counter-claim, the Parties have alleged a number of facts which
have been contested, to some degree, by one side or the other. The existence of the alleged facts must be established
before applying the relevant rules of international law.
168. The Court observes, however, that as regards the principal claim, the differences between the Parties relate
less to the existence of the facts than to their characterization by reference to the Convention and, in particular, to
the inferences to be drawn from them in respect of proof of specific intent (dolus specialis).
169. The Parties have discussed at some length the burden of proof, the standard of proof and the methods of
proof. The Court will consider these questions in turn.
A. The burden of proof
170. Croatia recognizes that the actori incumbit probatio principle should generally apply, but considers that
in the present case, Serbia should co-operate in putting before the Court all relevant evidence in its possession con-
cerning the facts relied on in support of the principal claim. The Respondent is best placed, in Croatia’s view, to
provide explanations of acts which are claimed to have taken place in a territory over which Serbia exercised exclu-
sive control. Moreover, Serbia is said to have failed to offer explanations or produce evidence in rebuttal of the
Applicant’s claims. Croatia considers that the Court should draw adverse inferences from this in respect of Serbia.
171. For Serbia, Croatia is seeking, in this way, to reverse the burden of proof. It maintains that one party cannot
be forced to give an explanation in response to the claims of the other party. It further contends that it has adequately
rebutted Croatia’s claims by giving explanations and producing reliable evidence.
172. The Court recalls that it is for the party alleging a fact to demonstrate its existence. This principle is not
an absolute one, however, since “[t]he determination of the burden of proof is in reality dependent on the subject-
matter and the nature of [the] dispute brought before the Court; it varies according to the type of facts which it is
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necessary to establish for the purposes of the decision of the case” (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea
v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 660, para. 54). In particular,
the Court has recognized that there may be circumstances in which the Applicant cannot be required to prove a
“negative fact” (ibid., p. 661, para. 55).
173. Whilst the burden of proof rests in principle on the party which alleges a fact, this does not relieve the
other party of its duty to co-operate “in the provision of such evidence as may be in its possession that could assist
the Court in resolving the dispute submitted to it” (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 163). In this regard, the Court recalls that, between September 2010 and
May 2011, Serbia provided Croatia with approximately 200 documents requested by the latter (see paragraph 13
above).
174. In the present case, neither the subject-matter nor the nature of the dispute makes it appropriate to con-
template a reversal of the burden of proof. It is not for Serbia to prove a negative fact, for example the absence
of facts constituting the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention in localities to
which Croatia called the Court’s attention.
175. Consequently, it is for Croatia to demonstrate the existence of the facts put forward in support of its claims,
and the Court cannot demand of Serbia that it provide explanations of the facts alleged by the Applicant.
176. The same principles are applicable, mutatis mutandis, in respect of the counter-claim.
B. The standard of proof
177. The Parties agree on the fact that the standard of proof, laid down by the Court in its 2007 Judgment in
the proceedings between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia is applicable in the present case.
178. The Court, after recalling that “claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be
proved by evidence that is fully conclusive (cf. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 17)”, added that it “requires that it be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings,
that the crime of genocide or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed, have been clearly estab-
lished. The same standard applies to the proof of attribution for such acts.” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 129, para.
209.)
179. Allegations similar to those examined in the 2007 Judgment have been made in the present dispute, both
in the principal claim and in the counter-claim. Hence, in the present case, the Court will apply the same standard
of proof.
C. Methods of proof
180. In order to rule on the facts alleged, the Court must assess the relevance and probative value of the evidence
proffered by the Parties in support of their versions of the facts (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 200, para. 58).
181. The Court observes that certain facts at issue in the present case have formed the subject of proceedings
before the ICTY, some of which are still pending, and that the Parties have made copious reference to documents
arising from the proceedings of that Tribunal (indictments by the Prosecutor, decisions and judgments of the Trial
Chamber, judgments of the Appeals Chamber, written and oral evidence).
182. The Parties agree, in general, on the evidential weight to be given to these various documents, following
the approach adopted in the 2007 Judgment, according to which the Court “should in principle accept as highly
persuasive relevant findings of fact made by the Tribunal at trial, unless of course they have been upset on appeal”,
and “any evaluation by the Tribunal based on the facts as so found for instance about the existence of the required
intent, is also entitled to due weight” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 134, para. 223).
183. They differ, however, on the probative value to be attributed to the ICTY Prosecutor’s decisions not to
include a charge of genocide in an indictment, and on that to be accorded, respectively, to the judgment of the ICTY
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Trial Chamber in the case concerning Gotovina et al. (IT-06-90-T, Judgment of 15 April 2011, hereinafter the
“Gotovina Trial Judgment”) and the judgment of the Appeals Chamber in the same case.
184. As regards the probative value of the ICTY Prosecutor’s decisions not to include a charge of genocide in
an indictment, the Court recalls that it drew the following distinction in its 2007 Judgment:
“as a general proposition the inclusion of charges in an indictment cannot be given weight. What
may however be significant is the decision of the Prosecutor, either initially or in an amendment
to an indictment, not to include or to exclude a charge of genocide.” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p.
132, para. 217.)
185. Croatia, which has contested this distinction, argues that the Court should not accord probative value to
the Prosecutor’s decisions not to include a charge of genocide in an indictment, since the Prosecutor has a dis-
cretionary power as to what charges, if any, to bring. The Prosecutor’s decision, according to Croatia, might have
been influenced by various factors, without it meaning that the facts in question do not, for the Prosecutor, constitute
genocide, or that he or she has no evidence of their existence.
186. Serbia, for its part, recognizes that such a decision does not create an irrebuttable presumption, but considers
that the Court should nonetheless accord it some degree of probative value.
187. The fact that the Prosecutor has discretion to bring charges does not call into question the approach which
the Court adopted in its 2007 Judgment (see I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 132, para. 217, reproduced at paragraph
184). The Court did not intend to turn the absence of charges into decisive proof that there had not been genocide,
but took the view that this factor may be of significance and would be taken into consideration. In the present case,
there is no reason for the Court to depart from that approach. The persons charged by the Prosecutor included very
senior members of the political and military leadership of the principal participants in the hostilities which took
place in Croatia between 1991 and 1995. The charges brought against them included, in many cases, allegations
about the overall strategy adopted by the leadership in question and about the existence of a joint criminal enterprise.
In that context, the fact that charges of genocide were not included in any of the indictments is of greater significance
than would have been the case had the defendants occupied much lower positions in the chain of command. In
addition, the Court cannot fail to note that the indictment in the case of the highest ranking defendant of all, former
President Milosˇevic´, did include charges of genocide in relation to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas
no such charges were brought in the part of the indictment concerned with the hostilities in Croatia.
188. As regards the evidential weight to be given to the judgments of the ICTY in the Gotovina case, the Court
will return to this question in due course when examining the counter-claim (see paragraphs 464–472 below).
189. The Court observes that in addition to materials from the ICTY, the Parties have made use of many other
documents, from a variety of sources, and have discussed their evidential weight. In particular, they have referred
to several reports from official or independent bodies, and to statements with diverse origins and content.
190. The Court recalls that it has held, with regard to reports from official or independent bodies, that their value
“depends, among other things, on (1) the source of the item of evidence (for instance partisan,
or neutral), (2) the process by which it has been generated (for instance an anonymous press report
or the product of a careful court or court-like process), and (3) the quality or character of the item
(such as statements against interest, and agreed or uncontested facts)” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p.
135, para. 227).
191. It will consider the probative value of the reports in question on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with
these criteria, when examining the merits of the claims.
192. The Court notes that Croatia annexed to its written pleadings numerous statements by individuals, some
of whom were called to give oral testimony before the Court. Serbia asserts that many of the statements produced
by Croatia are flawed in such a way as to call into question their probative value: certain statements are said not
to have been signed by their authors or by the persons who took them, or not to specify the circumstances in which
they were allegedly taken. In particular, it is claimed that some statements were taken by the Croatian police and
that, as a consequence, they cannot be regarded as impartial and would not even be admissible before Croatian courts.
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Lastly, a large number of statements submitted by Croatia are said not to demonstrate a direct knowledge of the
facts on the part of their authors, but to represent hearsay evidence.
193. Croatia acknowledges that some of the statements annexed to its Memorial were not initially signed by
those who made them. It points out, however, that it collected a number of signatures at a later stage and appended
the signed statements to its Reply. Croatia adds that some of the individuals who had not signed their statements
have testified before the ICTY, and that their evidence given before the Tribunal was consistent with that contained
in the unsigned statements. Lastly, Croatia considers that the hearsay evidence is relevant and should be assessed
in the light of its content and the circumstances in which it was obtained.
194. During the oral proceedings, a Member of the Court put a question to the Parties concerning the probative
value to be given to the various types of statements annexed to the Parties’ written pleadings, according to whether
or not the author had been called to give oral testimony and cross-examined by the opposing Party. In reply, Croatia
maintained that all the statements had the same probative value, but that it was for the Court to determine what
weight should be given to them, on the basis of the criteria set forth in the 2007 Judgment. Serbia, for its part, drew
a distinction between the statements of individuals called to give oral testimony in these proceedings, whether or
not they had been cross-examined, and the statements of individuals who were not so called. According to the
Respondent, whereas the former should all be accorded the same probative value, the latter should be treated as
out-of-court statements and assessed as such in light of the criteria established in the 2007 Judgment, in the same
way as all other documentary evidence furnished by the Parties. Serbia stated that the Court should nonetheless
give special attention to the evidence given before the ICTY and to testimonies before national courts. It added,
finally, that the unsigned statements and those produced in unknown circumstances, as well as the statements pre-
pared by official bodies whose impartiality had not been established, should be disregarded.
195. Another Member of the Court put a question to Croatia concerning the admissibility before Croatian courts
of the unsigned statements attached to its Memorial. Croatia replied that statements taken by the police or other
authorities were not necessarily signed and were not themselves admissible before Croatian courts. Croatia
explained, however, that these formed the basis upon which an investigating judge could interrogate the individual
concerned, giving rise to a signed statement that would be admissible before Croatian courts. Serbia indicated that
if a party appeared before a court in the former Yugoslavia with an unsigned out-of-court statement, it would not
be admitted into evidence.
196. The Court recalls that neither its Statute nor its Rules lay down any specific requirements concerning the
admissibility of statements which are presented by the parties in the course of contentious proceedings, whether
the persons making those statements were called to give oral testimony or not. The Court leaves the parties free
to determine the form in which they present this type of evidence. Consequently, the absence of signatures of the
persons who made the statements or took them does not in principle exclude these documents. However, the Court
has to ensure that documents, which purport to contain the statements of individuals who are not called to give oral
testimony, faithfully record the evidence actually given by those individuals. Moreover, the Court recalls that even
affidavits will be treated “with caution” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 731, para. 244). In determining
the evidential weight of any statement by an individual, the Court necessarily takes into account its form and the
circumstances in which it was made.
197. The Court has thus held that it must assess “whether [such statements] were made by State officials or by
private persons not interested in the outcome of the proceedings and whether a particular affidavit attests to the
existence of facts or represents only an opinion as regards certain events” (ibid.). On this second point, the Court
has stated that “testimony of matters not within the direct knowledge of the witness, but known to him only from
hearsay, [is not] of much weight” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 42, para. 68, referring to Corfu Channel, I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 17). Lastly, the Court has recognized that “in some cases evidence which is contemporaneous with
the period concerned may be of special value” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras
in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 731, para. 244).
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198. The Court recognizes the difficulties of obtaining evidence in the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless,
it notes that many of the statements produced by Croatia are deficient.
Thus, certain statements consist of records of interviews by the Croatian police of one or sometimes several indi-
viduals which are not signed by those persons and contain no indication that those individuals were aware of the
content. Moreover, the words used appear to be those of the police officers themselves. The Court cannot accord
evidential weight to such statements.
Other statements appear to record the words of the witness but are not signed. Some of these statements were
subsequently confirmed by signed supplementary statements deposited with the Reply and can, therefore, be given
the same evidential weight as statements which bore the signature of the witness when they were initially produced
to the Court. In some cases, the witness in question has testified before the Court or before the ICTY and that tes-
timony has confirmed the content of the original statement to which the Court can, therefore, also accord some
evidential weight. However, the Court cannot accord evidential weight to those statements which are neither signed
nor confirmed.
199. Certain statements present difficulties in that they fail to mention the circumstances in which they were
given or were only made several years after the events to which they refer. The Court might nonetheless accord
some evidential weight to these statements. Other statements are not eyewitness accounts of the facts. The Court
will accord evidential weight to these statements only where they have been confirmed by other witnesses, either
before the Court or before the ICTY, or where they have been corroborated by credible evidence. The Court will
refer to these categories of statements subsequently when it examines Croatia’s allegations.
*
* *
V. CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS OF THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM
200. The Court will now examine Croatia’s claims relating to the commission of genocide between 1991 and
1995 in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia.
201. The Court will seek first to determine whether the alleged acts have been established and, if so, whether
they fall into the categories of acts listed in Article II of the Convention; and then, should that be established, whether
those physical acts were committed with intent to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part.
202. Only if the Court finds that there has been genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention
will it consider the questions of the admissibility of the principal claim in respect of the acts prior to 8 October
1991 and whether any acts in respect of which the claim is held to be admissible can entail the responsibility of
Serbia.
A. The actus reus of genocide
1. Introduction
203. The Court does not consider it necessary to deal separately with each of the incidents mentioned by the
Applicant, nor to compile an exhaustive list of the alleged acts. It will focus on the allegations concerning localities
put forward by Croatia as representing examples of systematic and widespread acts committed against the protected
group, from which an intent to destroy it, in whole or in part, could be inferred. These are the localities cited by
Croatia during the oral proceedings or in regard to which it called witnesses to give oral testimony, as well as those
where the occurrence of certain acts has been established before the ICTY.
204. Croatia’s allegations refer to acts committed by the JNA and other entities (police and defence forces of
the SAOs and the RSK — territorial defence forces (TO), units of the Ministry of the Interior (MUP), Milicija
Krajine — and paramilitary groups) which are allegedly attributable to Serbia. Solely for the purpose of discussing
the facts which form the subject of the principal claim, the Court will use the terms “Serbs” or “Serb forces” to
designate entities other than the JNA, without prejudice to the question of the attribution of their conduct.
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205. Under the terms of Article II of the Convention, genocide covers acts committed with intent to destroy
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group in whole or in part. In its written pleadings, Croatia defines that group
as the Croat national or ethnical group on the territory of Croatia, which is not contested by Serbia. For the purposes
of its discussion, the Court will designate that group using the terms “Croats” or “protected group” interchangeably.
206. Croatia claims that acts constituting the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) to (d)
of the Convention were committed by the JNA and Serb forces against members of the protected group as defined
in the previous paragraph. The Court will consider these claims by referring in turn to the categories of acts laid
down in Article II of the Convention and assessing whether they have been established to the standard set out in
paragraphs 178 and 179.
207. Serbia acknowledges that war crimes, crimes against humanity and other atrocities were perpetrated against
Croats by various armed groups, although it maintains that it has not been established that those crimes were com-
mitted with the intent to destroy the Croat group, in whole or in part, or that they are attributable to Serbia.
208. The Court notes that the ICTY found that, from the summer of 1991, the JNA and Serb forces had per-
petrated numerous crimes (including killing, torture, ill-treatment and forced displacement) against Croats in the
regions of Eastern Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia (see, in particular, IT-95-13/1-T, Trial
Chamber, Judgment of 27 September 2007 (hereinafter “Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment”); IT-95-11-T, Trial Chamber, Judg-
ment of 12 June 2007 (hereinafter “Martic´ Trial Judgment”); IT-03-69-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 30 May 2013
(hereinafter “Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment”)).
2. Article II (a): killing members of the protected group
209. Article II (a) of the Convention concerns the killing of members of the protected group. Croatia claims
that large numbers of ethnic Croats were killed between 1991 and 1995 by the JNA and Serb forces in the regions
of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia.
210. In response, Serbia contests the probative value of the evidence presented by Croatia. Further, while it
acknowledges that many ethnic Croats were killed, it disputes that the killings were committed with genocidal intent
or that such intent is attributable to it.
211. The Court will consider in turn Croatia’s claims concerning killings perpetrated by the JNA and Serb forces
in various localities.
Region of Eastern Slavonia
(a) Vukovar and its surrounding area
212. Croatia attaches particular importance to the events which took place in Vukovar and its surrounding area
in the autumn of 1991. According to the Applicant, the JNA and Serb forces killed several hundred civilians in that
multi-ethnic city in Eastern Slavonia, situated on the border with Serbia and intended to become, under the plans
for a “Greater Serbia”, the capital of the new Serbian region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem.
213. Croatia first asserts that, between the end of August and 18 November 1991, Vukovar was besieged and
subjected to sustained and indiscriminate shelling, laying waste to the city. It alleges that between 1,100 and 1,700
people, 70 per cent of whom were civilians, were killed during that period. According to the Applicant, the attacks
on Vukovar were directed not simply against an opposing military force, but also against the civilian population;
moreover, those attacks are said to show that the aim of the JNA and Serb forces was the destruction of the Croats
of Vukovar.
214. The Applicant then claims that hundreds of Croats were killed when the JNA and Serb forces moved for-
ward to seize ground, burning, raping and killing as they did so.
215. Finally, Croatia contends that, following the fall of all districts of Vukovar on 18 November 1991, the JNA
and Serb forces continued to target Croat survivors. In particular, it alleges that 350 Croat detainees at Velepromet
and another 260 at Ovcˇara were killed after having been evacuated from Vukovar and from its hospital in particular.
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216. In response to the accusations made against it, Serbia argues that, on the whole, the written statements
provided by Croatia in support of its allegations do not fulfil the minimum evidentiary requirements. It further main-
tains that much of the evidence presented by Croatia is hearsay, contradictory, vague or from unreliable sources.
217. Serbia does not deny, however, that crimes were committed in Vukovar and its surrounding area. Nev-
ertheless, it argues that the figures advanced by Croatia are very clearly exaggerated and that the Applicant has not
(1) produced reliable evidence relating to the number of persons allegedly killed, (2) attempted to distinguish
between the deaths resulting from a legitimate use of force and those resulting from criminal acts, (3) specified what
proportion of the alleged victims were civilians and what proportion were combatants, and (4) demonstrated that
all victims were of Croat ethnicity. Although Serbia admits that “incidents” occurred, it considers that it was an
excess of violence which led to the commission of crimes, by a minority, and that those crimes were directed against
members of the Croatian forces, who represented but a very small fraction of all those evacuated from Vukovar.
Serbia adds that while the use of force by the assailants may have exceeded the needs of a normal military operation,
and while it certainly caused grave suffering to the civilian population, regardless of ethnicity, there is nothing to
suggest that the attack on Vukovar was carried out with the intent to destroy the Croat population as such.
218. The Court will first consider the allegations concerning those killed during the siege and capture of Vuko-
var. The Parties have debated the number of victims, their status and ethnicity and the circumstances in which they
died. The Court need not resolve all those issues. It observes that, while there is still some uncertainty surrounding
these questions, it is clear that the attack on Vukovar was not confined to military objectives; it was also directed
at the then predominantly Croat civilian population (many Serbs having fled the city before or after the fighting
broke out). Although the indictment in the Mrksˇic´ et al. case did not contain a charge relating to the siege of Vukovar,
the Trial Chamber found:
“470 . . .The duration of the fighting, the gross disparity between the numbers of the Serb and
Croatian forces engaged in the battle and in the armament and equipment available to the opposing
forces and, above all, the nature and extent of the devastation brought on Vukovar and its immediate
surroundings by the massive Serb forces over the prolonged military engagement, demonstrate, in
the finding of the Chamber, that the Serb attack was also consciously and deliberately directed
against the city of Vukovar itself and its hapless civilian population, trapped as they were by the
Serb military blockade of Vukovar and its surroundings and forced to seek what shelter they could
in the basements and other underground structures that survived the ongoing bombardments and
assaults. What occurred was not, in the finding of the Chamber, merely an armed conflict between
a military force and an opposing force in the course of which civilians became casualties and some
property was damaged. The events, when viewed overall, disclose an attack by comparatively mas-
sive Serb forces, well armed, equipped and organised, which slowly and systematically destroyed
a city and its civilian and military occupants to the point where there was a complete surrender of
those that remained.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
472. It is in this setting that the Chamber finds that, at the time relevant to the Indictment,
there was in fact, not only a military operation against the Croat forces in and around Vukovar,
but also a widespread and systematic attack by the JNA and other Serb forces directed against the
Croat and other non-Serb civilian population in the wider Vukovar area. The extensive damage to
civilian property and civilian infrastructure, the number of civilians killed or wounded during the
military operations and the high number of civilians displaced or forced to flee clearly indicate that
the attack was carried out in an indiscriminate way, contrary to international law. It was an unlawful
attack. Indeed it was also directed in part deliberately against the civilian population.” (Mrksˇic´ Trial
Judgment, paras. 470 and 472; references omitted.)
219. The Chamber’s findings confirm that numerous Croat civilians were killed by the JNA and Serb forces
during the siege and capture of Vukovar (ibid., paras. 468–469). Moreover, the Respondent admits that the fighting
which occurred in Vukovar and its surrounding area caused grave suffering to the civilian population. Although
Serbia has suggested that Serb civilians trapped in the city of Vukovar may also have been killed, the fact remains,
as established before the ICTY, that many of the victims were Croat and that the attacks were chiefly directed against
Croats and other non-Serbs (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 468–469, 472). In addition, statements produced by
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Croatia, to which the Court can give evidential weight, support the Applicant’s allegations concerning the killing
of Croat civilians during the siege and capture of Vukovar.
220. The Court will now examine the allegations that Croats were killed after the surrender of Vukovar, in
particular those relating to the events at Ovcˇara and Velepromet. In respect of Ovcˇara, the findings of the ICTY
in the aforementioned Mrksˇic´ et al. case largely substantiate Croatia’s position. The Court thus notes that, according
to the Trial Chamber, 194 persons suspected of involvement in the Croatian forces and evacuated from Vukovar
hospital on the morning of 20 November 1991 were killed by members of Serb forces at Ovcˇara that same evening
and night (20-21 November 1991) (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, para. 509); it appears from this finding that almost all
the victims were of Croat ethnicity (ibid., para. 496), were considered to be prisoners of war and, for the most part,
were sick or wounded (ibid., para. 510).
Serbia takes note of the Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment and does not contest the fact that these killings were committed
at Ovcˇara, adding that “[t]his was the gravest mass murder in which Croats were the victims during the entire con-
flict”. The Respondent also acknowledges that the Higher Court in Belgrade convicted 15 Serbs for war crimes at
Ovcˇara.
221. The ICTY also found that acts of ill-treatment occurred at Velepromet and that several individuals sus-
pected of involvement in the Croatian forces were killed there by members of Serb forces, including at least 15
Croats (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 163, 165, 167). Serbia notes the finding of the ICTY on this issue, but insists
on the fact that the number of persons killed at Velepromet is far below the 350 alleged by the Applicant.
222. Finally, the Court observes that the statement of Mr. Franjo Kožul, called for oral testimony by Croatia
and who appeared before the Court, also substantiates certain of the Applicant’s allegations. Mr. Kožul states that
he was evacuated from Vukovar hospital and taken to Velepromet, where he witnessed various acts of violence
and, in particular, saw a member of the Serb forces holding the head of a prisoner he had decapitated, a claim which
was not challenged by Serbia. The Court considers that it is therefore bound to give some evidential weight to this
testimony. The statement of F.G. also provides evidence of the fact that decapitations occurred at Velepromet. This
individual states that he was saved from decapitation at the last moment by a JNA officer, and that he saw “approx-
imately fifteen decapitated bodies in [a] hole”.
223. The Court concludes that Croat detainees were killed at Velepromet by Serb forces, although it is unable
to determine the exact number. However, it takes note of the ICTY’s finding that civilians detained at Velepromet
and not suspected of involvement in the Croatian forces were evacuated to destinations in Croatia or Serbia on 20
November 1991 (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, para. 168).
224. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it is established that killings were perpetrated by the
JNA and Serb forces against Croats in Vukovar and its surrounding area during the siege and capture of Vukovar,
and by Serb forces at Ovcˇara and Velepromet camps.
(b) Bogdanovci
225. The Applicant claims that no fewer than 87 Croats were killed in the predominantly Croat village of Bog-
danovci, approximately 8 km south-east of Vukovar, during and after the attacks carried out on the village on 2
October and 10 November 1991 by the JNA and Serb forces. In support of its arguments, Croatia produces a number
of written statements.
226. One of the statements on which Croatia relies is that of Ms Marija Katic´, who was called for oral testimony
and appeared before the Court. In her written statement, Ms Katic´ names eight individuals who she says were killed
by grenades thrown into the basement of a house on 2 October 1991, and a further three individuals who she believes
were killed by firearms on the same day. She adds that another ten people were killed during the subsequent destruc-
tion of Bogdanovci.
227. Croatia also relies on an unsigned police record of an interview.
228. The Respondent disputes the probative value of the statements produced by Croatia in support of its alle-
gations, on the grounds that they do not contain the signatures of the individuals said to have given them and, in
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some cases, that it is not even possible to identify the person or body to whom they were made. It further argues
that these statements are based on hearsay evidence, are imprecise and contradict one another. Serbia contends that
the events which occurred in Bogdanovci on 2 October and 10 November 1991 were part of a legitimate military
operation and that Croatian forces were actively involved in the fighting, destroying tanks and armoured vehicles
and inflicting heavy losses on the JNA and Serb forces. It admits in this regard that
“[u]ndoubtedly horrible crimes were committed in that town”, but argues that “once again, the pattern is combat
and excesses arising therein”.
229. The Court notes that many statements provided by Croatia were made several years after the events in
Bogdanovci are alleged to have taken place and accordingly may be given only limited evidential weight. To those
statements which do not constitute first-hand accounts of the events, the Court gives no evidential weight. In this
regard, the Court notes that, although Ms Katic´ confirmed her account when testifying, it is not certain that she
witnessed at first hand all the killings which she mentions. Finally, the Court recalls that no evidential weight can
be given to an unsigned police record of an interview.
230. Taking account of Serbia’s admission (see paragraph 228 above) and the evidence put before it, the Court
concludes that a number of Croats were killed by the JNA and Serb forces in Bogdanovci on both 2 October and
10 November 1991, although it is unable to determine the exact number.
(c) Lovas
231. Croatia claims that dozens of people were killed by the JNA and Serb forces in Lovas, a predominantly
Croat village situated approximately 20 km south-east of Vukovar, between October 1991 and the end of December
1991.
232. The Applicant states that the village was attacked by the JNA and Serb paramilitary forces, despite the
fact that it offered no resistance, that there were no Croatian forces in the village and that its residents had given
up their arms following an ultimatum from the JNA. According to Croatia, on 10 October 1991, at least 20 Croat
civilians lost their lives during an artillery attack carried out by the JNA against the Croat-inhabited areas of the
village. Others were subsequently massacred by Serb paramilitary groups and the JNA infantry, which stormed the
village on the same day.
233. Croatia then contends that, one week after that attack, all the Croat males of fighting age were rounded
up and tortured. According to the Applicant, 11 of them died as a result of the ill-treatment they received. Croatia
goes on to claim that the following day, on 18 October 1991, some of the survivors were forced to march to a field,
not far from the village. One man was executed en route because he was unable to keep up with the group, due
to injuries inflicted the previous night. Once at the field, Serb forces ordered the prisoners to walk forward holding
hands, and to sweep the ground with their feet, in order to clear the area of mines. One or more mines then exploded,
before the Serb forces opened fire on the survivors. At least 21 men died during what has become known as the
Lovas “minefield massacre”. Finally, Croatia submits that, between 19 October 1991 and the beginning of 1992,
the violence against Croat civilians continued and a further 68 people were killed.
234. For its part, Serbia argues that the written statements relied on by the Applicant in support of its allegations
that killings were committed in Lovas do not fulfil the minimum evidentiary requirements and that, in any event,
they do not corroborate Croatia’s claims, in particular because they show that there was Croatian resistance during
the attack of 10 October 1991. Serbia concedes, nevertheless, that 14 individuals have appeared before a Belgrade
court accused of killing 68 Croats from the village of Lovas, and that some of the alleged acts referred to during
that trial “probably amount to war crimes and might also be deemed crimes against humanity”; it insists, however,
that there is nothing to support an accusation of genocide.
235. The Court notes that some of the facts alleged by Croatia have been established before the ICTY. Thus,
although the attack on Lovas was not referred to in the indictment in the Mrksˇic´ et al. case, the Tribunal’s Trial
Chamber concluded that “Serb ‘volunteers’ in Lovas had attacked specific homes on 10 October 1991 killing 22
Croats” (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, para. 47).
2015] 845APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (CROATIA V. SERBIA) (I.C.J.)
236. With respect to the “minefield massacre”, Croatia relies on various items of evidence in order to establish
its allegations. In particular, the statement of Stjepan Peulic´, a witness called by Croatia to give oral testimony but
whom Serbia did not wish to cross-examine (see paragraph 25 above) and whose accounts have not been otherwise
contradicted, may be given evidential weight. Mr. Peulic´ offers a first-hand account of being held throughout the
night of 17 October 1991, with approximately 100 other Croats, and tortured. He states that the following day, they
were further tortured, and ordered to go out to a field. On the road, he witnessed the killing of one Croat who could
not keep up because of injuries sustained during the torture. He testifies that he was then ordered by Serb forces
in mottled uniforms to walk through a field, holding hands with other detained Croats and sweeping for mines with
their legs. He states that at “[a]round 1.00 hrs, when we activated the first mine, someone shouted ‘Lie down’ and
we all probably did lie down, and the mentioned Serbo-Chetniks started firing at us fiercely from all their infantry
weapons, and the shooting lasted for about 15 minutes”. According to Mr. Peulic´ 17 people were killed on the field,
most of whom he recalled by name.
237. Croatia further relies on the indictment prepared by the War Crimes Prosecutor for the Belgrade District
Court, issued against 14 Serbs accused of killings committed in Lovas, including the “minefield massacre”. In a
judgment of 26 June 2012, the Higher Court of Belgrade convicted the 14 accused of war crimes. The Court notes,
however, that this judgment was quashed by the Belgrade Appeals Court in January 2014 due to shortcomings in
the Higher Court’s findings regarding the individual criminal responsibility of the accused, and that the accused
must be retried. The Court takes the view that, in the absence of definitive findings, adopted by a court at the close
of a rigorous process, it can give no evidential weight to the War Crimes Prosecutor’s indictment.
238. Croatia also invokes another document from domestic judicial proceedings, namely the statement of Alek-
sandar Vasiljevic´, Chief of Security in the Federal Secretariat for National Defence from 1 June 1991 to 5 August
1992, given to the Belgrade Military Court in 1999. In that statement, Mr. Vasiljevic´ mentions the fact that he was
informed on 28 October 1991 not only of the “minefield massacre”, but also of the execution of some 70 civilians
in Lovas. The Court notes that this statement was made by a former JNA officer to a Serbian court in the context
of a war crimes prosecution. Mr. Vasiljevic´ also testified before the ICTY during the trial of Slobodan Milosevic´.
His testimony before that Tribunal confirms his statement, in so far as he admits having been informed of the “mine-
field massacre”. In the Court’s view, this statement has some evidential weight.
239. In addition, Croatia relies on a documentary film produced by a Serbian television channel, in which indi-
viduals are interviewed and offer first-hand accounts of the “minefield massacre”. Evidence of this kind and other
documentary material (such as press articles and extracts from books) are merely of a secondary nature and may
only be used to confirm the existence of facts established by other evidence, as the Court has previously explained:
“[T]he Court regards them not as evidence capable of proving facts, but as material which can
nevertheless contribute, in some circumstances, to corroborating the existence of a fact, i.e., as illus-
trative material additional to other sources of evidence.” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 40, para. 62.)
In the present case, the Serbian television documentary does corroborate the evidence set out above.
240. Finally, the Court observes that Serbia does not deny that killings were committed in Lovas, but contests
their characterization under the Convention (see paragraph 234 above). Taking all this evidence into account, the
Court finds that it is established that Croat civilians were killed by the JNA and Serb forces in the village of Lovas
between 10 October 1991 and the end of December 1991, although it is unable to determine their precise number.
(d) Dalj
241. According to the Applicant, a great number of Croats were killed in Dalj, a village situated to the north
of Vukovar in which approximately one fifth of the population was of Croat ethnicity. Croatia first contends that
dozens of Croats died during the attack carried out by the JNA and Serb paramilitary groups on 1 August 1991:
it alleges that civilians were directly targeted and that Croatian combatants were executed after they had surrendered.
It further claims that several Croats captured at or taken to Dalj were murdered by Serb forces in the autumn of
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1991. In response, Serbia states, as it does with respect to claims concerning other localities, that the evidence pre-
sented by Croatia is insufficient to establish its allegations. Although the Respondent appears to accept that a number
of people were killed in Dalj, it argues that the Applicant has not shown that these were acts of genocide.
242. The Court notes that Croatia relies on several individual statements in order to establish its allegations.
With respect to the killings allegedly carried out on 1 August 1991, certain of the statements relied on are not signed
or confirmed; the others do not appear to provide a first-hand account of the killings alleged. The Court concludes
that Croatia has not produced sufficient evidence to substantiate its claim that Croats were killed by the JNA and
Serb forces on 1 August 1991.
With respect to the killings allegedly perpetrated later, in the autumn of 1991, the Court observes that the statement
of B.I. was subsequently confirmed by this individual. B.I. states that, after having surrendered on 21 November
1991, he was put on a truck with others and driven to Dalj. On the way, 35 people were forced off the truck; he
then heard gunshots and these people did not return. After having arrived in Dalj, he was taken out to a mass grave,
in which he saw “many corpses”, and watched as other Croats in his group were shot and fell into the grave. He
was saved because the shots fired at him only hit his arm and an attempt to slit his throat with a knife also failed.
The Court considers that it can rely on this statement by a person who provides a first-hand account.
243. Croatia has also produced exhumation reports which indicate that Croats, including Croatian combatants,
were killed by firearms, without, however, specifying the circumstances of their deaths.
244. The Court further notes that in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, currently under appeal on dif-
ferent grounds, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that some of the alleged crimes had been committed in this locality.
In its Judgment, the Chamber concluded that, on or around 21 September 1991, members of a Serb paramilitary
group killed ten people held at the police building in Dalj, eight of whom were Croats (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial
Judgment, paras. 419–420 and 975). The Chamber also found that 22 other detainees had been killed in this locality
on 4 and 5 October 1991, and that 17 of those victims were Croat civilians (ibid., paras. 432 and 975).
245. The evidence presented by Croatia, considered in the light of the findings of the ICTY in the Stanisˇic´ and
Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, is sufficient for the Court to conclude that members of the protected group were killed
by Serb forces in the village of Dalj between September and November 1991.
Region of Western Slavonia
Voc´in
246. Croatia claims that killings were committed by Serb forces against Croats in the village of Voc´in
(Podravska Slatina Municipality), in which approximately one third of the population was of Croat ethnicity. Relying
on statements appended to its written pleadings, Croatia contends in particular that at least 35 Croats were killed
between 12 and 14 December 1991 by Serb forces driven out of Voc´in.
247. For its part, Serbia argues that the crimes allegedly committed throughout the Podravska Slatina munic-
ipality cannot be substantiated by the evidence in the case file, in particular because that evidence constitutes hearsay.
248. Croatia has referred to the statements appended to its written pleadings in order to support its allegations.
Most of these statements are unsigned and were not otherwise confirmed; they will not be considered further. The
Court observes that the statement of M.S. was subsequently confirmed by this individual. However, her evidence
as to the killing of Croats by Serbs is hearsay. In particular, M.S. states that Serbs committed a massacre in 9Ru¨LQ
on 13 December 1991, but she does not seem to have personally witnessed the killing of Croats as she hid in a
shelter when the Serb forces attacked the Croats in the village. The Court finds that this evidence is insufficient
to establish the killing of Croats in this locality.
249. In support of its allegations of a massacre in Voc´in around 13 December 1991, Croatia also relies on the
report of a non-governmental organization, Helsinki Watch, sent to Slobodan Milosˇevic´ and General Blagoje Adzˇic´
on 21 January 1992 and based on investigations carried out by that organization (hereinafter the “Helsinki Watch
report”). According to the report, Serb forces withdrawing from the villages of Hum and Voc´in killed 43 Croats
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in December 1991. The Court recalls that the value of such documents depends on the source of the information
contained therein, the process by which they were generated and their quality or character (see paragraph 190 above).
In this regard, it notes that the basis for the report’s findings on the alleged killings in Voc´in is unclear, as it refers
to unidentified eyewitnesses and autopsy reports that are not appended. The Court therefore concludes that this
report, on its own, is insufficient to prove Croatia’s allegations.
At the hearings, Croatia also presented audio-visual materials (an excerpt from a BBC documentary and pho-
tographs taken from a book) showing victims alleged to have been killed during this massacre. The BBC docu-
mentary and photographs taken from the book “Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia in 1991/92: A Book of Evi-
dence” show several bodies which are said to be the victims of the massacre at Voc´in. As the Court has previously
explained (see paragraph 239 above), this kind of evidence cannot, on its own, establish the facts alleged.
250. In the opinion of the Court, although the material before it raises grounds for grave suspicious about what
occurred at Voc´in, Croatia has not produced sufficient evidence to substantiate its claim that Croats were killed by
Serb forces in that locality in December 1991.
Region of Banovina/Banija
(a) Joševica
251. Croatia claims that several Croats were killed by Serb forces in Joševica, a village situated in the Glina
municipality and populated almost exclusively by Croats. It states that Serb paramilitary forces killed three villagers
on 5 November 1991. On 16 December 1991, those Serb forces are said to have returned to the village and searched
the houses one by one in order to slaughter Croat citizens; 21 people were reportedly killed in this way. According
to the Applicant, the majority of Croats left the village following these killings; only ten stayed behind. Of those
ten, four were then killed in 1992. The remaining Croats then left the village.
252. Serbia repeats its general assertion regarding flaws in the statements appended to Croatia’s written plead-
ings (see paragraph 192 above). Serbia also states that the Applicant has not produced any detailed information in
support of its claim that killings were perpetrated in 1992. Finally, it observes that no individual has been indicted
or sentenced by the ICTY for the alleged crimes.
253. Croatia relies on statements in order to substantiate its allegations. Among them is that of Ms Paula Milic´
(pseudonym), who was called for oral testimony and appeared before the Court. The Court notes that, according
to her statement, Ms Milic´ witnessed the killings committed on 5 November 1991 by Serb forces. This part of her
statement was not contested by Serbia. Moreover, it is corroborated by the statement of I.Š., who attests to having
subsequently buried the three individuals named by Ms Milic´. For these reasons, the Court considers that Ms Milic´’s
testimony has evidential weight.
254. With respect to the alleged killings on 16 December 1991, Croatia provides a statement by A.Š. Although
this statement originally took the form of a police record, it has subsequently been confirmed by A.Š., and the Court
considers that it can give it evidential weight. A.Š. describes Serb forces in mottled uniforms entering her home
on 16 December 1991 and firing shots at her and others. While suffering from gunshot wounds, she crawled on
her knees from one grandchild to another and to her cousin and she saw that they were all dead. A medical report
is attached to the statement, confirming her gunshot wounds. Her evidence of killings on 16 December 1991 is
corroborated by the statement of I.Š., examined in the previous paragraph.
255. Croatia also relies on the Helsinki Watch Report (see paragraph 249 above). The relevant section of the
report describes the killing of Croats by Serb forces in Joševica in mid-December 1991. The ICTY referred to it
in its judgment in the Martic´ case (Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 324, footnote 1002) before finding that Croats had
been killed in the SAO Krajina in 1991, but that does not give the report value as such. However, the Court notes
that this report confirms the evidence outlined above.
256. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Croatia has established that Serb forces carried out kill-
ings of Croats in Joševica on 5 November 1991 and 16 December 1991. In contrast, Croatia has failed to provide
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sufficient evidence that killings were committed in 1992, the statements relied on in this regard being neither signed
nor confirmed.
(b) Hrvatska Dubica and its surrounding area
257. Croatia claims that numerous Croats were killed by units of the JNA and Serb forces in the Hrvatska Kosta-
jnica municipality, notably inhabitants of the villages of Hrvatska Dubica, Cerovljani and Bac´in. In particular, the
Applicant alleges that, in October 1991, 60 ethnic Croats from the surrounding villages were rounded up and held
at the fire station in Hrvatska Dubica. They were then executed by a firing squad in a meadow close to Bac´in and
their bodies subsequently buried in a previously prepared mass grave.
258. In response, Serbia disputes the probative value of the evidence produced by Croatia. It notes, however,
the conclusions of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Martic´ case, in which it was found that a number of killings of
Croats had taken place in this area.
259. The Court notes that several of the crimes whose perpetration has been alleged by the Applicant have been
examined by the Chambers of the ICTY. In its Judgment rendered on 12 June 2007 in the Martic´ case, the Trial
Chamber concluded that 41 civilians (the large majority Croats) from Hrvatska Dubica were executed on 21 October
1991 by Serb forces (Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 183, 354, 358). The Trial Chamber further found that nine
civilians from Cerovljani and seven civilians from Bac´in were executed on or around 20–21 October 1991 by the
JNA or Serb forces, or a combination thereof, and that a further 21 inhabitants of Bac´in were killed during the month
of October 1991 by the JNA or Serb forces, or a combination thereof (Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 188–191, 359,
363–365, 367). The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case reached the same conclusions con-
cerning the victims from Hrvatska Dubica and Cerovljani (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 56–64
and 975).
260. These findings substantiate the evidence presented by Croatia before the Court. In particular, Croatia has
produced the statement made before a Croatian court by Mr. Miloš Andric´ (pseudonym), whom it called for oral
testimony but whom Serbia did not wish to cross-examine. In his statement, Mr. Andric´ indicates in particular that,
following the Bac´in massacre, he was present in person during the identification of the bodies in the mass grave;
he states that civilians had been heaped in the grave, all crumpled, and that many of them had been beaten to death,
struck on the head by blunt instruments.
261. The Court concludes that a significant number of Croat civilians were killed by the JNA and Serb forces
in Hrvatska Dubica and its surrounding area during October 1991.
Region of Kordun
Lipovacˇa
262. The Applicant alleges that the JNA seized the Croat-majority village of Lipovacˇa at the end of September
or the beginning of October 1991, causing most of its inhabitants to flee; only 16 Croats remained. It claims that
seven Croat civilians were then killed by Serb forces on 28 October 1991, which led to the departure of a further
four Croats from the village. According to Croatia, the five remaining Croats were subsequently killed on 31 Decem-
ber 1991. The Applicant points out that the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Martic´ case examined in detail the events
which took place in Lipovacˇa and concluded that seven Croat civilians had been killed by Serb forces at the end
of October 1991 (Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 202–208).
263. The Respondent concedes that the ICTY’s judgment in the Martic´ case confirmed the killing of seven
civilians by Serb paramilitary forces in Lipovacˇa at the end of October 1991. It maintains, however, that the other
alleged crimes have not been convincingly established.
264. The Court notes that the ICTY has examined the Lipovacˇa killings in two judgments. In the Martic´ Trial
Judgment, the Trial Chamber found that the seven individuals alleged by the Applicant to have been killed on 28
October 1991 had indeed been executed in Lipovacˇa on or around that date after the arrival of Serb forces. It held
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that there was direct evidence of the Croat ethnicity of three of the victims and deduced from all the evidence avail-
able to it that the other four victims were also Croats (Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 370). However, in the Stanisˇic´
and Simatovic´ case, the Trial Chamber concluded that the Croat ethnicity of only three of the victims had been
established (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 67).
265. In respect of the killings allegedly committed in December 1991, the Martic´ Trial Chamber found that the
five persons named by the Applicant had been killed at some point during the occupation of the village by Serb
forces, although the accused was not convicted of those killings because they were not listed in the indictment
(Martic´ Trial Judgment, footnote 555). The Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Chamber also concluded that those five
individuals had been killed in Lipovacˇa, but added that it could not be determined who had committed these killings,
and did not consider them any further (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 68). In neither of these cases
did the Trial Chamber rule on the ethnicity of the victims.
266. The only statement produced by Croatia in support of its allegation relating to the killings of 31 December
1991 is based on hearsay and does not, in the opinion of the Court, make it possible for the existence of the facts
in question to be established. Consequently, the Court is unable to uphold the Applicant’s claim that five Croats
were killed on 31 December 1991.
267. The Court deduces however from the foregoing that it has been established that Serb forces killed at least
three Croats on 28 October 1991 Lipovacˇa.
Region of Lika
(a) Saborsko
268. The Applicant states that the village of Saborsko, situated in the Ogulin municipality and populated pre-
dominantly by Croats, was surrounded and shelled by Serb paramilitary forces from the beginning of August 1991
until 12 November of the same year, when it was attacked by combined JNA and Serb paramilitary forces. According
to Croatia, following aerial bombardments and sustained artillery and mortar fire, the JNA and Serb paramilitaries
entered the village and began destroying property belonging to Croats and killing the remaining civilian population.
Croatia points out that, in the Martic´ and Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ cases, the ICTY examined in detail the events which
took place in Saborsko.
269. Serbia recognizes that “most of the acts alleged to have taken place in Saborsko have been confirmed by
the judgment[s] of the ICTY”; it adds, however, that they were not committed with genocidal intent.
270. Since Serbia does not dispute the existence of the alleged facts to the extent that they have been established
before the ICTY, the Court will refer to the ICTY’s conclusions. Thus, the Trial Chamber in the Martic´ case con-
cluded that 20 people had been killed by the JNA and Serb forces on 12 November 1991, at least 13 of whom were
civilians not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of their death. The Chamber further found that the
killings had been carried out with intent to discriminate on the basis of Croat ethnicity (Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras.
233–234, 379 and 383). In the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case, the Trial Chamber confirmed the killings of nine Croats
in Saborsko on 12 November 1991 by the JNA and Serb forces, but noted that it had received insufficient evidence
on the circumstances in which the other 11 persons had been killed (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras.
102–107, 975). The Court also notes that certain statements produced by Croatia corroborate the findings of the
ICTY.
271. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it has been established that the JNA and Serb forces
killed several Croats in Saborsko on 12 November 1991.
(b) Poljanak
272. Croatia claims that in 1991, the village of Poljanak (Titova Korenica municipality) had 160 inhabitants,
145 of whom were Croats. In the autumn of 1991, numerous Croat civilians from the village were allegedly killed
by the JNA and Serb forces.
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273. The Applicant relies in particular on the factual findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Martic´ Judgment
(Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 211–213 and 216–219) in claiming that, between September and November 1991,
several attacks were carried out against civilians in Poljanak and its hamlet Vukovic´i.
274. Serbia acknowledges that, in the Martic´ Judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber confirmed that a number of
killings had been committed in Poljanak.
275. The Court observes that several of the crimes whose perpetration is alleged by the Applicant were examined
by the ICTY Trial Chamber in its Martic´ Judgment. In particular, that Chamber concluded that:
— one Croat civilian had been killed on 8 October 1991 by the JNA and armed inhabitants (Martic´ Trial Judgment,
paras. 212, 371, 377);
— on or around 14 October 1991, two Croat civilians had been found hanged in their homes, although it was not
clear from the evidence whether these men had been murdered or committed suicide (ibid., para. 212 and foot-
note 566);
— on 7 November 1991, seven Croat civilians had been lined up and executed by the JNA and armed inhabitants
at the house of Nikola “Šojka” Vukovic´, while the latter had been shot from the window while he was lying
sick in his bed (ibid., paras. 214, 371, 377);
— finally, also on 7 November 1991, 20 Serb soldiers had surrounded a family home in Poljanak and then shot
two Croat men, having separated them from the women and a boy (ibid., paras. 216–218, 372, 377).
276. The Court also notes that the Appeals Chamber in the Martic´ case concluded that the perpetrators of three
of these murders (that committed on 8 October 1991 and the murders of two men on 7 November 1991) could not
be identified with certainty and thus acquitted the accused of those crimes (IT-95-11-A, Judgment of 8 October 2008,
paras. 200–201). However, it upheld the finding that the accused was responsible for the massacre of eight Croats
on 7 November 1991 by the JNA and armed inhabitants (ibid., paras. 204–206). Subsequently, the Trial Chamber
in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case also concluded that the said massacre had been established (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´
Trial Judgment, paras. 85 and 975). The Court notes that the ICTY’s findings are not contested by Serbia. Con-
sequently, it does not deem it necessary to examine the other evidence produced by Croatia, in particular the state-
ments appended to its written pleadings.
277. The Court deduces from the foregoing that it has been established that several killings were perpetrated
by the JNA and Serb forces in Poljanak against members of the protected group in November 1991.
Region of Dalmatia
(a) Škabrnja and its surrounding area
278. Croatia claims that, on 18 and 19 November 1991, the JNA and Serb forces killed dozens of Croat civilians
in Škabrnja and the neighbouring village of Nadin, both located in the Zadar municipality of Dalmatia, and populated
almost exclusively by ethnic Croats.
279. The Applicant alleges that, throughout September and October 1991, Škabrnja and Nadin were subjected
to mortar fire and aerial bombardments with no military justification. It claims that, following the deaths of three
civilians at the start of October, the majority of Škabrnja’s inhabitants had been evacuated; most, however, had
returned after a ceasefire agreement was signed on 5 November 1991. Croatia asserts that, in breach of that agree-
ment, the JNA and Serb forces launched a full-scale aerial and ground assault on the two villages on 18 and 19
November 1991. According to the Applicant, after intensive shelling, infantry troops and heavily armed paramili-
taries invaded Škabrnja; JNA tanks fired on houses, the school and a church, while Serb forces fired rocket launchers
at dwellings.
280. Croatia maintains that, after occupying Škabrnja and Nadin, Serb forces attacked Croat civilians. It claims
that those forces killed civilians who had hidden in the basements of their houses during the fighting. In particular,
the Applicant invokes, in support of its allegations, the factual findings of the ICTY in the Martic´ and Stanisˇic´ and
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Simatovic´ cases, pointing out that the Tribunal ruled that there had been a number of killings of Croat civilians in
Škabrnja and Nadin.
281. In response to the accusations made against it, Serbia does not deny that crimes were perpetrated in the
two above-mentioned villages. It accepts that atrocities were committed against the civilian population and admits
that the majority of the killings alleged by the Applicant have been confirmed by the ICTY’s Trial judgment in the
Martic´ case. The Respondent argues, however, that fierce fighting occurred before the JNA and Serb forces entered
the village of Škabrnja, resulting in heavy losses to those forces, and that some Croatian combatants were dressed
in civilian clothing.
282. Croatia bases its allegations on the statement of Mr. Ivan Krylo (pseudonym), whom it called for oral tes-
timony. Mr. Krylo appeared before the Court and was cross-examined by Serbia at a closed hearing (see paragraph
46 above). The Court notes that, in his written statement, Mr. Krylo states that a number of people had taken shelter
in the basements of their homes during the fighting which took place in Škabrnja on the morning of 18 November
1991, and that, after invading the village, the JNA and Serb forces flushed those people out and shot several of them.
Mr. Krylo further claims that he was taken prisoner along with other villagers, and detained and subjected to violence
over the course of the following months. The Court notes that Serbia did not dispute that killings had been perpetrated
against the inhabitants of Škabrnja. During Mr. Krylo’s cross-examination, its questions focused on the fighting
that preceded the capture of the village. The Respondent even accepted that “when the town surrendered to the Serb
forces, there were atrocities committed on civilians”.
283. The Court next observes that, in the Martic´ case, the Trial Chamber noted that around 50 people had been
murdered by the JNA and Serb forces in Škabrnja and the surrounding villages, including Nadin, on 18 and 19
November 1991, observing that “the majority of the victims in Škabrnja . . . were of Croat ethnicity” (Martic´ Trial
Judgment, paras. 386–391, 398); the Tribunal also found that 18 civilians had been murdered by the JNA and Serb
forces in Škabrnja between 18 November 1991 and 11 March 1992 (ibid., para. 392). The Court further observes
that, in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case, the Trial Chamber held that 37 Croats had been murdered in Škabrnja on
18 November 1991 by the JNA and Serb forces (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 131–136, 975).
284. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it has been established that killings were perpetrated
by the JNA and Serb forces in Škabrnja and Nadin against members of the protected group between 18 November
1991 and 11 March 1992.
(b) Bruška
285. The Applicant alleges that, on 21 December 1991, Serb paramilitaries killed nine Croats in the village of
Bruška, in the Benkovac municipality, which had a population that was approximately 90 per cent Croat. It adds
that another Croat was murdered in June 1992. The Applicant points out that, in the Martic´ case, the ICTY Trial
Chamber examined in detail the events which took place in Bruška and concluded that the nine individuals named
had been killed on 21 December 1991 by the Krajina militia (Milicija Krajine). The Chamber further concluded
that those individuals were all civilians, not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of their death, and
that the killings had been carried out with intent to discriminate on the basis of Croat ethnicity (Martic´ Trial Judg-
ment, paras. 400 and 403).
286. The Respondent accepts that the Martic´ Trial Chamber examined the events which took place in the Ben-
kovac municipality and found that nine Croats had been killed in Bruška. It maintains, however, that the allegations
concerning other crimes are not supported by sufficient evidence.
287. In respect of the killings of 21 December 1991, the Court finds, in light of the foregoing, that it has been
conclusively established that the nine individuals named by the Applicant were killed on that day by the Milicija
Krajine, and that those individuals are the same as those listed in the judgment rendered by the ICTY in the Martic´
case, referred to above, and in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 145-
147).
288. With regard to the killing alleged to have been perpetrated in June 1992, the Court observes that this was
not examined by the Trial Chamber in either the Martic´ case or the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case. Furthermore, it
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notes that the statement produced by Croatia in support of this claim does not constitute a first-hand account of the
events in question. In the Court’s view, the Applicant has not proved that this killing took place.
(c) Dubrovnik
289. The Applicant claims that numerous Croat civilians were killed by the JNA in or around Dubrovnik, a town
where 80 per cent of the population was of Croat origin. It states that, on 1 October 1991, the JNA instituted a
blockade of Dubrovnik from land, sea and air, and that civilians were given an opportunity to leave the town at
the end of that month. Thereafter, according to Croatia, all supplies were cut off and the town was bombarded with
heavy artillery until the end of the year. The Applicant claims that 123 civilians from Dubrovnik were killed during
the course of these events.
290. For its part, the Respondent argues that the evidence submitted by the Applicant cannot substantiate its
allegations, because it is either inadmissible or it has no probative value. It also points out that the crimes allegedly
committed in Dubrovnik were examined by two ICTY Trial Chambers in the Jokic´ and Strugar cases, and that those
Chambers concluded that there had been a limited number of civilian victims.
291. The Court notes that only one of the statements produced on the subject of this locality describes a death
which could be categorized as a killing within the meaning of Article II (a) of the Convention. This statement is
not a first-hand account however and is insufficient, on its own, to prove Croatia’s allegations.
292. The Applicant also has presented letters from the Croatian police in support of its claim regarding the
number of victims. The Court observes that these were drawn up specifically for the purposes of the present case.
As the Court has had occasion to observe in the past, it “will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially pre-
pared for th[e] case and also materials emanating from a single source” (Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 201, para. 61). Further-
more, these letters do not indicate the circumstances in which the 123 supposed victims were killed, nor whether
they were Croats. As regards the other documents prepared by the Dubrovnik Police Department, although drawn
up at the time of the events and not solely for the purposes of this case, they have not been corroborated by evidence
from an independent source and appear only to refer to two deaths which might be categorized as killings within
the meaning of Article II (a).
293. In the Jokic´ and Strugar cases, it was established before the ICTY that two civilians had been killed during
the unlawful shelling of the old town on 6 December 1991 (Jokic´, IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judg-
ment of 18 March 2004, para. 27; Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 31 January 2005 (hereinafter
“Strugar Trial Judgment”), paras. 248, 250, 256, 259 and 289). In the Strugar case, the ICTY also found that at
least one individual had been killed during the shelling of the town on 5 October 1991 (Strugar Trial Judgment,
para. 49).
294. The Court concludes from the foregoing that it has been established that some killings were perpetrated
by the JNA against the Croats of Dubrovnik between October and December 1991, although not on the scale alleged
by Croatia.
Conclusion
295. On the basis of the facts set out above, the Court considers it established that a large number of killings
were carried out by the JNA and Serb forces during the conflict in several localities in Eastern Slavonia, Banovina/
Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia. Furthermore, the evidence presented shows that a large majority of the victims
were members of the protected group, which suggests that they may have been systematically targeted. The Court
notes that while the Respondent has contested the veracity of certain allegations, the number of victims and the
motives of the perpetrators, as well as the circumstances of the killings and their legal categorization, it has not
disputed the fact that members of the protected group were killed in the regions in question. The Court thus finds
that it has been proved by conclusive evidence that killings of members of the protected group, as defined above
(see paragraph 205), were committed, and that the actus reus of genocide specified in Article II (a) of the Convention
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has therefore been established. At this stage of its reasoning, the Court is not required to draw up a complete list
of the killings carried out, nor to make a conclusive finding as to the total number of victims.
3. Article II (b): causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
296. Croatia alleges that the JNA and Serb forces also inflicted serious bodily harm on Croats. Such harm is
alleged to have taken the form of physical injury, ill-treatment and acts of torture, rape and sexual violence. More-
over, Serbia’s failure to co-operate in the process of tracing and identifying missing persons is alleged to have caused
their surviving relatives psychological pain constituting serious mental harm.
297. The Court will examine in turn Croatia’s allegations concerning the various localities where acts causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the protected group were allegedly perpetrated, after which it will
address the alleged infliction of mental harm on the relatives of missing persons.
Region of Eastern Slavonia
(a) Vukovar
298. Croatia claims that, between August and December 1991 at Vukovar, the JNA and Serb forces injured Croat
civilians and prisoners of war, subjected them to ill-treatment and torture, and also committed rape and sexual vio-
lence. For the purposes of the Court’s analysis, Croatia’s claims will be examined successively by reference to the
various phases of the battle for Vukovar.
(i) The shelling of Vukovar
299. Croatia claims that, during the shelling of Vukovar by the JNA between 25 August and 18 November 1991,
large numbers of Croat civilians were injured. According to Serbia, the only reason that the ICTY found the attack
on Vukovar to have been unlawful was that it was partly directed against civilians. However, Serbia argues that
the attack must be considered in the wider context of a lawful military operation against the Croatian armed forces.
300. The Court recalls that, in the Mrksˇic´ case, the ICTY found that large numbers of civilians had been injured
by the JNA and Serb forces during the siege of Vukovar (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, para. 472, reproduced in paragraph
218 above).
301. The Court regards the Tribunal’s factual findings as sufficient to confirm that, during the attack on Vukovar
and the surrounding area, the JNA and Serb forces injured a large number of Croat civilians, without it being nec-
essary to determine their exact number.
(ii) The capture of Vukovar and its surrounding area
302. Croatia claims that, during the capture of Vukovar and the surrounding area, which took place between
mid-September and mid-November 1991, the JNA and Serb forces perpetrated acts of ill-treatment, torture and rape
against Croat civilians. They are also alleged to have deported Croat civilians to camps located in Serbia, where
they were subjected to torture and ill-treatment.
303. Serbia disputes Croatia’s allegations. It argues that they are unfounded, and that the statements presented
by Croatia are mere hearsay and lack precision.
304. The Court notes that Croatia’s allegations rely essentially on statements that were either signed or sub-
sequently confirmed. Although some of these statements were made several years after the events in question, they
are by victims or eyewitnesses of acts of ill-treatment, torture and rape. The Court gives evidential weight to these
statements.
305. Accordingly, the Court finds that Croatia has shown that acts of ill-treatment, torture and rape were per-
petrated against Croats by the JNA and Serb forces during the capture of Vukovar and the surrounding area.
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(iii) The invasion of Vukovar hospital and the transfers to Ovcˇara and Velepromet camps
306. Croatia alleges that, on 19 and 20 November 1991, the JNA and Serb forces invaded the hospital at Vukovar
where Croats had taken refuge and subsequently transferred them to camps at Ovcˇara and Velepromet, where they
were ill-treated and tortured. Croatia further alleges that Croat women were raped at Velepromet.
307. Serbia admits that crimes were committed at Ovcˇara by Serb forces. However, it points out that, in the
Mrksˇic´ et al. case, the accused were not prosecuted for genocide, and that the ICTY characterized the crimes in
question as war crimes.
308. Regarding the events at Ovcˇara, the Court notes that Serbia does not dispute that they took place. In the
Mrksˇic´ et al. case, the ICTY made the following findings on those events:
“530. The Chamber is persuaded and finds that the beatings of prisoners of war from Vukovar
hospital outside the hangar on 20 November 1991 were well capable of inflicting severe physical
pain, and in very many cases they did so. They constitute the actus reus of torture. The Chamber
is also satisfied that the acts of grave and persistent mistreatment to so many prisoners that occurred
inside the hangar during the afternoon of 20 November 1991 were such as to constitute the actus
reus of torture.
531. Turning to the mens rea requisite for the offence of torture the Chamber refers to the
nature and duration of the beatings, the implements used by the perpetrators to inflict suffering, the
number of persons attacking individual victims, the verbal threats and abuse occurring simulta-
neously with the beatings, and the terribly threatening atmosphere in which the victims were
detained as they were beaten. All these factors indicate that the beatings outside and in the hangar
were carried out intentionally.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
536. Further, the Chamber is persuaded and finds that the beatings of prisoners of war from
Vukovar hospital outside and inside the hangar on 20 November 1991 constitute the actus reus of
cruel treatment. The Chamber is satisfied that these beatings were carried out with the requisite mens
rea to constitute cruel treatment.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
538. With respect to the mens rea requisite for cruel treatment, the Chamber accepts that in
keeping the prisoners under constant threat of beatings and physical abuse, in creating an atmo-
sphere of fear, in depriving the prisoners of food and water as well as toilet facilities, the direct
perpetrators acted with the intent to cause physical suffering, or an affront to the detainees’ human
dignity, or in the knowledge that cruel treatment was a probable consequence of their acts, or with
all or some of these intents. The Chamber finds that the intent requisite for cruel treatment has been
established.” (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 530, 531, 536 and 538.)
309. The Court notes that Serbia does not dispute the existence of the facts found by the ICTY. It considers
that the Tribunal’s findings are sufficient to establish that acts of ill-treatment and torture were perpetrated against
Croats by certain members of the JNA and Serb forces at Ovcˇara.
310. Regarding the events at Velepromet, Croatia has produced a statement by Mr. Franjo Kožul, who appeared
before the Court, and to whose testimony the Court has already given evidential weight (see paragraph 222 above).
Mr. Kožul described scenes of ill-treatment. His testimony is corroborated by the findings of the ICTY in the Mrksˇic´
et al. case. Although these facts were not referred to in the indictment, the Trial Chamber found that
“on 19 November 1991 some hundreds of non-Serb people were taken from the Vukovar hospital
and transferred to the facility of Velepromet by Serb forces. Others arrived at Velepromet from
elsewhere. At Velepromet these people were separated according to their ethnicity and suspicion
of involvement in the Croatian forces. The Chamber finds it established that interrogations of some
of these people were conducted at Velepromet in the course of which the suspects were beaten,
insulted or otherwise mistreated. A number of them were shot dead at Velepromet, some of them
on 19 November 1991. The Chamber finds that many, if not all, of the persons responsible for the
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brutal interrogations and killings were members of the Serb TO or paramilitary units.” (Mrksˇic´ Trial
Judgment, para. 167.)
Croatia has also produced a statement of an individual, B.V., who was taken from Velepromet to the JNA barracks
and raped by five men. The Court considers that it must give this statement evidential weight.
311. The Court finds that Croatia has shown that acts of ill-treatment and rape were perpetrated against Croats
by Serb forces at Velepromet.
(b) Bapska
312. Croatia claims that, from October 1991, the JNA and Serb forces perpetrated acts of ill-treatment and torture
against the Croat inhabitants of Bapska, a village located 26 km south-east of Vukovar, with a population some
90 per cent of whom were Croats. The JNA and Serb forces also allegedly committed rape and other acts of sexual
violence. Croatia has produced a number of statements in support of its allegations.
313. Serbia disputes the probative value of those statements.
314. Among the items produced by Croatia, the Court notes the signed statement of F.K., as well as those of
A.Š., J.K. and P.M., which were subsequently confirmed. The authors of those statements are victims of ill-treatment,
as well as rape and other acts of sexual violence. The Court considers that it must give these statements evidential
weight.
315. The Court accordingly finds that Croatia has established that, from October 1991 to January 1994 at Bapska,
the JNA and Serb forces subjected members of the protected group to acts of ill-treatment and committed rape and
other acts of sexual violence.
(c) Tovarnik
316. Croatia claims that, from September 1991 and continuing throughout the year 1992, the JNA and Serb
forces perpetrated acts of ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence (including rape and castration) against Croats
in the village of Tovarnik, located south-east of Vukovar and having a majority Croat population, and that Croats
were transferred to Begejci camp, where they were tortured.
317. Serbia contends that Croatia has failed to prove the perpetration of such acts at Tovarnik. It disputes the
probative value of the statements produced by Croatia in support of its allegations.
318. The Court notes that Croatia mainly bases its allegations on statements appended to its written pleadings.
The Court considers that it can give credence to several signed or confirmed statements. These statements were made
by victims of acts of ill-treatment, or by persons having witnessed such acts, as well as acts of sexual violence
perpetrated against Croats at Tovarnik.
319. The Court accordingly finds that Croatia has shown that acts of ill-treatment and sexual violence were
perpetrated against Croats by the JNA and Serb forces at Tovarnik, in or around the month of September 1991.
It finds in contrast that the allegations of rape have not been established.
(d) Berak
320. Croatia alleges that, between September and December 1991, the JNA and Serb forces perpetrated acts
of ill-treatment against the Croat inhabitants of the village of Berak, located some 16 km from Vukovar and having
a majority Croat population, and that those forces established a prison camp in the village, where Croats were alleg-
edly tortured. Several instances of rape are also alleged.
321. Serbia maintains that Croatia has failed to provide sufficient evidence of the acts alleged by it. It contends
that the statements produced by Croatia lack probative value. It further points out that the ICTY has not prosecuted
or convicted any individuals for crimes committed at Berak.
322. Croatia bases its allegations on statements appended to its written pleadings. The Court considers that it
can give credence to several statements which have been confirmed subsequently. These are accounts by victims
of acts of ill-treatment or rape, or by individuals who witnessed such acts.
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323. Croatia has also produced a report prepared by Stanko Penavic´, Deputy Defence Commander of Berak at
the time of the events in question, concerning the 87 persons held at Berak between 2 October and 1 December
1991. That report lists individuals injured or raped and corroborates the previous evidence.
324. The Court accordingly finds that Croatia has shown that acts of ill-treatment and rape were perpetrated
against members of the protected group by Serb forces and the JNA at Berak between September and October 1991.
(e) Lovas
325. Croatia alleges that Serb forces perpetrated acts of torture, as well as rape and other acts of sexual violence
against Croats in the village of Lovas between October 1991 and December 1991. Croats are also alleged to have
been injured during the “minefield massacre” (see paragraph 233 above).
326. Serbia has disputed the probative value of the statements presented by Croatia, but admits that the suspected
perpetrators of some of the acts alleged by Croatia are being prosecuted before Serbian courts. It argues, however,
that these were not acts of genocide, but rather war crimes or crimes against humanity.
327. In support of its allegations, Croatia relies on the indictment prepared by the War Crimes Prosecutor for
the Belgrade District Court, issued against 14 Serbs accused, inter alia, of ill-treatment and torture of Croat civilians
at Lovas, to which the Court has already found that it cannot give any evidential weight in itself (see paragraph
237 above).
328. Croatia also relies on a number of statements, in particular that of Stjepan Peulic´, a witness whom Serbia
did not wish to cross-examine (see paragraph 25 above), to whose statement the Court has already given evidential
weight (see paragraph 236 above). Mr. Peulic´ describes the ill-treatment suffered by him at the hands of Serb forces.
Croatia also produces a statement by another victim of ill-treatment by Serb forces, to which the Court also gives
evidential weight.
Regarding the allegations of rape, one of the statements is from an individual alleged to have been raped by a
member of Serb forces, but it is neither signed nor confirmed. The Court considers that it cannot give it evidential
weight. Another statement refers to rape of Croat women by Serb forces, but its author did not witness the events
at first hand. The Court cannot give this statement any evidential weight.
329. Croatia further relies on a documentary film produced by a Serbian television channel, which includes
descriptions of the “minefield massacre”. While a documentary of this kind cannot in itself serve to prove the facts
alleged (see paragraph 239 above), it does corroborate the previous evidence with respect to the allegations of ill-
treatment.
330. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Croatia has established that acts of ill-treatment were per-
petrated against members of the protected group by Serb forces at Lovas between October and December 1991.
It considers that the allegations of rape and other acts of sexual violence have not been proved.
(f) Dalj
331. Croatia alleges that, following the occupation of the village of Dalj by the JNA as from 1 August 1991,
Serb forces perpetrated acts of ill-treatment and torture against Croat civilians, and that Croat soldiers and civilians
captured during the hostilities at Vukovar were transferred to Dalj, where they were tortured and raped.
332. Serbia maintains that Croatia has failed to provide sufficient evidence of the facts which it alleges. It dis-
putes the probative value of the statements produced by Croatia.
333. The Court notes that Croatia’s allegations are based on statements by individuals. It observes that some
of these are unsigned and were taken by the Croatian police, and cannot be relied on by the Court, for the reasons
set out previously (see paragraph 198 above). Another statement was made by a victim of ill-treatment. It seems
to have been been made before a court in domestic judicial proceedings. However, it is neither signed, nor confirmed.
The Court cannot give it any evidential weight. On the other hand, some statements were signed or subsequently
confirmed. They are by victims of ill-treatment. The Court considers that it must give them evidential weight.
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334. The Court notes that, in the Stanisˇic and Simatovic´ case, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that
“following the take-over of Dalj, civilians, policemen, as well as a person called Dafinic´, who
the Trial Chamber elsewhere found was an SNB member . . . engaged in looting of houses. In August
1991, Croats, including Zlatko Antunovic´, and Hungarians were detained by Milorad Stricˇevic´ and
the TO at the Dalj police station and were beaten by members of the SDG. In September 1991,
the detainees of the Dalj police station were forced to engage in manual labour and were further
beaten by the aforementioned. Members of the Prigrevica paramilitaries also participated in the
beatings.” (Stanisˇic and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 528; reference omitted.)
335. The Court considers that these findings of the ICTY corroborate the statements produced by Croatia. The
Court accordingly finds that Croatia has proved that, following the capture of Dalj in August 1991, Serb forces
perpetrated acts of ill-treatment against Croats. On the other hand, it finds that the allegations of rape have not been
proved.
Region of Western Slavonia
(a) Kusonje
336. Croatia claims that, on 8 September 1991, a group of Croat soldiers was ambushed and took refuge in the
village of Kusonje, where they were captured and then tortured by Serb forces, before being killed.
337. Serbia disputes the probative value of the evidence produced by Croatia, and moreover observes that no
individual has been prosecuted or convicted by the ICTY on account of acts committed at Kusonje.
338. In support of its allegations, Croatia relies on two statements taken by the Croatian police, which are not
signed or otherwise confirmed by the individuals allegedly having made these statements. The Court cannot give
evidential weight to these statements.
339. The other evidence produced by Croatia consists of a list of dead civilians in the municipality of Pakrac
and a video showing the exhumation of a mass grave; these do not concern the events alleged to have taken place
on or around 8 September 1991 at Kusonje.
340. The Court accordingly considers that Croatia has failed to provide sufficient evidence that Serb forces
perpetrated acts of torture at Kusonje on or around 8 September 1991.
(b) Voc´in
341. Croatia alleges that, between August and December 1991 at Voc´in, Serb forces subjected Croats to ill-
treatment and torture, and raped Croat women.
342. Serbia disputes the probative value of the evidence presented by Croatia, describing it as hearsay. Serbia
notes that Slobodan Milosˇevic´’s indictment at the ICTY refers to the murder of 32 Croat civilians on 13 December
1991 by Serb paramilitaries, but that there is no reference in any judgment or indictment of the ICTY to any of
the other crimes.
343. The Court notes that Croatia’s allegations rest essentially on statements. It observes that the statement by
M.S. refers to ill-treatment of Croats by Serbs, but the author does not appear to have witnessed this directly. The
Court thus cannot give the statement any evidential weight in this regard. A statement by a nurse, D.V., working
in the clinic at Voc´in also describes ill-treatment of Croats by Serb forces inside the clinic. This statement appears
to have been made in the context of domestic judicial proceedings, but contains no details about the nature of the
proceedings or the court where the statement was made. Moreover, the statement is not signed. The Court thus
considers that it cannot give it any evidential weight. On the other hand, the statement by F.D. is signed, and can
be given evidential weight as regards the allegations of ill-treatment. The author describes the acts of ill-treatment
to which he and others with him were subjected at the hands of Serb forces in late August 1991. Serbia acknowledges,
moreover, that his statement represents a first-hand account of ill-treatment and beatings. In his statement, F.D. also
claims to have heard a woman screaming and assumed that she was being raped. However, it appears that he did
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not witness this alleged rape directly. Accordingly, the Court cannot give it evidential weight with respect to the
allegations of rape.
344. Croatia cites a publication entitled The Anatomy of Deceit by Doctor Jerry Blaskovich, in which he
describes the torture suffered by a Croat at the hands of Serb forces. The Court recalls that a publication of this
kind can only constitute secondary evidence and can only be used to corroborate facts established by other evidence
(see paragraph 239 above). The Court is therefore unable to find, solely on the basis of this publication, that acts
of torture were committed at 9Ru¨LQ by Serb forces.
345. Croatia also cites the report of Helsinki Watch. The Court notes that the section describing acts of ill-
treatment and torture perpetrated by Serb forces at Voc´in in late December 1991 relies on eyewitness testimony
and autopsy reports. It recalls that the authors of the testimony are not identified, and that the autopsy reports are
not appended to the Helsinki Watch report (see paragraph 249 above). The Court is unable to conclude, on the basis
of that report alone, that acts of ill-treatment and torture were perpetrated by Serb forces at Voc´in in December
1991.
346. In light of the above, the Court accordingly finds that Croatia has shown that acts of ill-treatment were
perpetrated against Croats by Serb forces at Voc´in in August 1991. It finds that Croatia has not proved its allegations
of rape.
(c) Ðulovac
347. Croatia contends that, from September 1991, Serb forces ill-treated and tortured (in particular mutilated)
Croats living in the village of Ðulovac, located in the municipality of Daruvar and with a Croat population of around
50 per cent. Serb forces also allegedly established a prison in the village’s veterinary station and tortured villagers
there, before transferring them to other camps.
348. Serbia disputes the probative value of the statements produced by Croatia in support of these allegations,
and further points out that no individual has been prosecuted or convicted by the ICTY for crimes committed in
the municipality of Daruvar.
349. The Court notes that Croatia relies on statements to which it can give evidential weight. This is the case,
in particular, for two signed statements made, respectively, before a Croatian investigating judge and the repre-
sentative of the Croatian Government in the Daruvar municipality, by victims of ill-treatment inflicted by the Serb
forces.
350. While these statements do not substantiate all of Croatia’s allegations, the Court concludes that Serb forces
perpetrated acts of ill-treatment against Croats at Ðulovac between September and December 1991.
Region of Dalmatia
Knin
351. Croatia alleges that acts of ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence were perpetrated against Croats in
detention centres located in the former hospital at Knin and in the barracks of the JNA 9th Corps.
352. Croatia produces inter alia two statements by victims of ill-treatment and torture perpetrated by Serb forces
in the former hospital at Knin. One of these victims also witnessed acts of sexual violence, and his statement rep-
resents a first-hand account of the events in question. The Court considers that it can give these statements evidential
weight.
353. The Court notes that this evidence is corroborated by the findings of the ICTY. Thus, in the Martic´ case,
the ICTY found that between 120 and 300 persons were detained in the former hospital at Knin (for the period from
mid-1991 to mid-1992), and between 75 and 200 persons were detained in the barracks of the JNA 9th Corps,
amongst whom were Croat and non-Serb civilians, as well as members of the Croatian armed forces. The ICTY
found that these persons had been subjected to ill-treatment by Serb forces or other individuals and that those acts
had caused them serious physical and mental suffering. The Tribunal described these acts as torture and cruel and
inhumane treatment, and noted that they had been committed with discriminatory intent based on ethnic origin
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(Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 407–415). The Tribunal also accepted that, at the former hospital at Knin, some of
the prisoners were subjected to acts of sexual violence (ibid., para. 288). In the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case, the
Trial Chamber made similar findings (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 387–390).
354. The Court considers that it has been established that acts of ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence were
perpetrated against Croat civilians between mid-1991 and mid-1992, at detention centres located in the former hos-
pital at Knin and the barracks of the JNA 9th Corps.
Missing persons
355. The Court notes that, late on in the oral proceedings, Croatia raised the argument that the psychological
pain suffered by the relatives of missing persons constituted serious mental harm within the meaning of Article II
(b) of the Convention.
356. The Court has accepted that the psychological pain suffered by the relatives of individuals who have dis-
appeared in the context of an alleged genocide, as a result of the persistent refusal of the competent authorities to
provide the information in their possession which would enable these relatives to establish with certainty whether
and how the persons concerned died, can in certain circumstances constitute serious mental harm within the meaning
of Article II (b) of the Convention (see paragraph 160 above). The Court acknowledges that in the present case,
the relatives of individuals who disappeared during the events that took place on the territory of Croatia between
1991 and 1995 suffer psychological distress as a result of the continuing uncertainty which they face. However,
Croatia has failed to provide any evidence of psychological suffering sufficient to constitute serious mental harm
within the meaning of Article II (b) of the Convention.
357. The Parties debated the fate of missing persons. The Court notes that the Parties disagree on the number
and ethnicity of the persons having disappeared. However, since it is not disputed that many individuals have dis-
appeared, it is not for the Court to determine their precise number and ethnicity.
358. In reply to a question by a Member of the Court as to whether there had been any recent initiatives to
ascertain the fate of missing or disappeared persons, the Parties stated that, following their agreement in 1995 at
Dayton to co-operate in tracing missing persons, some progress had been made, but they admitted that this remained
insufficient.
359. The Court notes that the Parties have expressed their willingness, in the interest of the families concerned,
to elucidate the fate of those who disappeared in Croatia between 1991 and 1995. It notes Serbia’s assurance that
it will fulfil its responsibilities in the co-operation process with Croatia. The Court encourages the Parties to pursue
that co-operation in good faith and to utilize all means available to them in order that the issue of the fate of missing
persons can be settled as quickly as possible.
Conclusion
360. In light of the foregoing, the Court considers it established that during the conflict in a number of localities
in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Dalmatia, the JNA and Serb forces injured members of the protected
group as defined above (see paragraph 205) and perpetrated acts of ill-treatment, torture, sexual violence and rape.
These acts caused such bodily or mental harm as to contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the pro-
tected group. The Court considers that the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (b) of the Con-
vention has accordingly been established.
4. Article II (c): deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part
361. Croatia asserts that the JNA and Serb forces deliberately inflicted on the protected group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, within the meaning of Article II (c) of the
Convention, at a number of localities within Croatia. Croatia refers to acts of rape committed by the JNA and Serb
forces. It claims that Croats were deprived of food and medical care. According to Croatia, the JNA and Serb forces
instituted a policy of systematic expulsion of Croats from their homes and of forced displacement from the areas
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under their control. Croats are alleged to have been forced to display signs of their ethnicity. The JNA and Serb
forces allegedly destroyed and looted Croat property and vandalized their cultural heritage. Finally, Croats are
claimed to have been subjected to forced labour. The Court will examine in turn each of Croatia’s various allegations.
Rape
362. Croatia alleges that multiple acts of rape were committed by the JNA and Serb forces against Croat women,
both in various localities throughout Croatian territory and in camps.
363. In support of its allegations, Croatia relies on statements appended to its written pleadings. The Court notes
that some of these statements constitute first-hand accounts of the events in question. It notes the statement by a
member of Serb forces, contemporary with the facts, who confesses to acts of rape. However, that statement is neither
signed nor confirmed. The Court cannot therefore give it any evidential weight. On the other hand, there are a number
of direct, detailed accounts of rape by members of the JNA or Serb forces given by the victims. The Court considers
that there is sufficient reliable evidence to establish that a number of instances of rape and other acts of sexual
violence were perpetrated within the context of the conflict. It recalls that Croatia has established that acts of rape
were committed in a number of localities in Eastern Slavonia and that they caused serious bodily and mental harm
to members of the protected group (see paragraphs 305, 311, 315 and 324 above).
364. Nevertheless, it has not been shown that these occurrences were on such a scale as to have amounted also
to inflicting conditions of life on the group that were capable of bringing about its physical destruction in whole
or in part.
Deprivation of food
365. Croatia alleges that the JNA and Serb forces subjected Croats to food deprivation.
366. The Court notes that some of the statements produced by Croatia refer to occasional denials of food supplies
to Croats. However, these statements do not suffice to show that such denials were of a systematic or general nature.
367. Regarding Dubrovnik, the Court notes that in the Strugar case the ICTY found that
“[b]ecause of the blockade that had been enforced by the JNA the population of Dubrovnik,
including the Old Town, had been without normal running water and electricity supplies for some
weeks and essential products to sustain the population, such as food and medical supplies, were
in extremely short supply” (Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 176; reference omitted).
The Court considers that it has not been established that this restriction on food supplies was calculated to bring
about the physical destruction in whole or in part of the Croat inhabitants of Dubrovnik, within the meaning of Article
II (c) of the Convention.
368. The Court concludes that Croatia has not established that the JNA and Serb forces denied access by Croats
to food supplies, thereby subjecting them to food deprivation in a manner capable of falling within the scope of
Article II (c) of the Convention.
Deprivation of medical care
369. Croatia alleges that Croats were deprived of medical care.
370. The Court notes that Croatia’s allegations rely on statements appended to its written pleadings which are
not signed or confirmed by the declarants. This evidence cannot demonstrate a practice of a systematic or general
nature.
371. In regard to Dubrovnik, the Court relies on the findings of the ICTY in the Strugar case cited above (see
paragraph 367). The Court likewise recalls that it has not been established that the denial of medical supplies was
imposed with the intention of causing the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of the Croat inhabitants of
Dubrovnik.
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372. The Court concludes that Croatia has failed to show deprivations of medical care such as to be capable
of coming within the scope of Article II (c) of the Convention.
Systematic expulsion from homes and forced displacement
373. Croatia alleges that the JNA and Serb forces systematically expelled Croats from their homes and forcibly
displaced them from the areas under their control throughout the Croatian territory.
374. The Court notes that, in the Martic´ case, the ICTY found that between 1991 and 1995, the JNA and Serb
forces had deliberately created a coercive atmosphere in the SAO Krajina, and then in the RSK, with the aim of
forcing the non-Serb population to leave that territory:
“427. From August 1991 and into early 1992, forces of the TO and the police of the SAO Krajina
and of the JNA attacked Croat-majority villages and areas, including the villages of Hrvatska Kosta-
jnica, Cerovljani, Hrvatska Dubica, Bac´in, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovacˇa, Sˇkabrnja and Nadin. The
displacement of the non-Serb population which followed these attacks was not merely the con-
sequence of military action, but the primary objective of it . . .
428. The Trial Chamber considers the evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
systematic acts of violence and intimidation carried out, inter alia, by the JNA, the TO and the
Milicija Krajine against the non-Serb population in the villages created a coercive atmosphere in
which the non-Serb population did not have a genuine choice in their displacement. Based on this
evidence, the Trial Chamber concludes that the intention behind these acts was to drive out the
non-Serb population from the territory of the SAO Krajina . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
430. With regard to the period from 1992 to 1995, the Trial Chamber has been furnished with
a substantial amount of evidence of massive and widespread acts of violence and intimidation com-
mitted against the non-Serb population, which were pervasive through the RSK territory. The Trial
Chamber notes, in particular, that during this time period there was a continuation of incidents of
killings, beatings, robbery and theft, harassment, and extensive destruction of houses and Catholic
churches carried out against the non-Serb population. These acts created a coercive atmosphere
which had the effect of forcing out the non-Serb population from the territory of the RSK. As a
consequence, almost the entire non-Serb population left the RSK . . .
431. Based on the substantial evidence referred to above, the Trial Chamber finds that due
to the coercive atmosphere in the RSK from 1992 through 1995, almost the entire non-Serb pop-
ulation was forcibly removed to territories under the control of Croatia. The elements of the crime
of deportation (Count 10) have therefore been met.” (Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 427, 428, 430
and 431; references omitted.)
375. The ICTY reached similar findings in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case regarding the SAO Krajina (and then
the RSK) and the SAO SBWS:
“997. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings . . . that from April 1991 to April 1992, between
80,000 and 100,000 Croat and other non-Serb civilians fled the SAO Krajina (and subsequently the
Krajina area of the RSK). They did so as a result of the situation prevailing in the region at the
time of their respective departures, which was created by a combination of: the attacks on villages
and towns with substantial or completely Croat populations; the killings, use as human shields,
detention, beatings, forced labour, sexual abuse, and other forms of harassment of Croat persons;
and the looting and destruction of property. These actions were committed by the local Serb author-
ities and the members and units of the JNA (including JNA reservists), the SAO Krajina TO, the
SAO Krajina Police, and Serb paramilitary units, as well as local Serbs and certain named indi-
viduals (including Milan Martic´). The Trial Chamber notes that the persons fleeing were Croats
and other non-Serbs and that their ethnicity thus corresponds to the charges in the Indictment.
998. The Trial Chamber finds that the aforementioned acts caused duress and fear of violence
such that they created an environment in which the Croats and other non-Serbs in the SAO Krajina
had no choice but to leave. Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that those who left were forcibly
displaced. Considering the circumstances of the forcible displacement, and absent any indication
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to the contrary, the Trial Chamber finds that the displaced individuals were forced to leave an area
in which they were lawfully present.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings . . . that between 1991 and 1992, the JNA,
Šešelj’s men, Serbian volunteers, local authorities, SRS, paramilitaries from Prigrevica, SNB,
police, TO, a “Special Unit”, and the SDG launched attacks all over the SAO SBWS, causing thou-
sands of people to flee. The Trial Chamber recalls that these attacks involved acts of forcible trans-
fer, detentions, destruction of a Catholic Church, looting, restriction of freedom, forced labour, beat-
ings, killings, threats, and harassment. The Trial Chamber notes that a significant number of those
people who fled were Croats, and other non-Serbs and concludes that their ethnicity thus corre-
sponds to the charges in the Indictment.
1050. The Trial Chamber considers that the aforementioned acts caused duress and fear of vio-
lence such that they created an environment in which the Croats and other non-Serbs had no choice
but to leave. Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that those who left were forcibly displaced. The
Trial Chamber finds, having considered that those who were forcibly displaced were inhabitants
of the SAO SBWS, absent any indication to the contrary, were lawfully present there.” (Stanisˇic´
and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 997, 998, 1049 and 1050.)
376. In the Court’s view, the findings of the ICTY show that the JNA and Serb forces carried out expulsions
and forced displacements of Croats in the SAO Krajina (and then the RSK) and the SAO SBWS. The Court recalls
that the forced displacement of a population does not, as such, constitute the actus reus of genocide within the
meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention (see paragraph 162 above). Such characterization would depend on the
circumstances in which the forced displacement was carried out (see paragraph 163 above). The Court notes that,
in the present case, the forced displacement of the population is a consequence of the commission of acts capable
of constituting the actus reus of genocide, in particular as defined in Article II (a) to (c) of the Convention. However,
the Court notes that there is no evidence before the Court enabling it to conclude that the forced displacement was
carried out in circumstances calculated to result in the total or partial physical destruction of the group.
377. In these circumstances, the Court finds that Croatia has failed to show that the forced displacement of Croats
by the JNA and Serb forces is capable of constituting the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II
(c) of the Convention.
Restrictions on movement
378. Croatia alleges that in many villages, the movements of Croats were restricted.
379. The Court refers to the findings of the Trial Chamber in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case, which state that
between 1991 and 1992, the JNA and Serb forces imposed restrictions on the free movement of Croats living in
the SAO Krajina (and then in the RSK) and the SAO SBWS (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 997
and 1049, reproduced at paragraph 375 above; see also para. 1250, not reproduced). The Court considers that these
findings constitute sufficient evidence to substantiate Croatia’s allegations.
380. The Court notes that the restrictions on the movement of the Croats were part of the creation of a climate
of coercion and terror, with the aim of forcing those persons to leave the territories under the control of the JNA
and Serb forces. The Court recalls that Article II (c) of the Convention refers only to conditions of life calculated
to bring about the physical destruction of the group. It considers that restrictions on freedom of movement may
undermine the social bond between members of the group, and hence lead to the destruction of the group’s cultural
identity. However, such restrictions cannot be regarded as calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction,
which is the sole criterion in Article II (c) of the Convention. The Court accordingly concludes that the restrictions
on movement imposed on Croats by the JNA and Serb forces do not constitute the actus reus of genocide within
the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention.
Forced wearing of insignia of ethnicity
381. Croatia alleges that, in certain localities, Croats were obliged to wear insignia of ethnicity, in the form of
a white ribbon on their sleeves, or a white sheet attached to their houses.
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382. The Court considers that the purpose of forcing individuals to wear signs of their membership of a group
is to stigmatize the group’s members. This enables the authors of such acts to identify the members of the group.
The aim is not the immediate physical destruction of the group, but it may represent a preliminary step towards
perpetration of the acts listed in Article II of the Convention against the group members thus identified. Conse-
quently, forcing individuals to wear insignia of their ethnicity does not in itself fall within the scope of Article II
(c) of the Convention, but it might be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether or not there existed
an intent to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part.
Looting of property belonging to Croats
383. Croatia alleges that Croat property was repeatedly looted in a number of localities.
384. The Court refers to the findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case. According
to the ICTY, between 1991 and 1992, the JNA and Serb forces looted the property of Croat and non-Serb civilians
in the SAO Krajina (and then in the RSK) and in the SAO SBWS (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras.
997 and 1049, reproduced at paragraph 375 above; see also para. 1250, not reproduced). The Court considers that
these findings suffice to substantiate the facts alleged by Croatia.
385. The Court is of the view, however, that it has not been established that such attacks on Croat property were
intended to inflict on the Croat group “conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part”. Accordingly, the looting of Croat property by the JNA and Serb forces cannot constitute the actus reus
of genocide within the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention.
Destruction and looting of the cultural heritage
386. Croatia alleges that the JNA and Serb forces destroyed and looted assets forming part of the cultural heritage
and monuments of the Croats.
387. The Court notes that in the Babic´ case, where the accused pleaded guilty, the ICTY found that the JNA
and Serb forces had, between 1 August 1991 and 15 February 1992, established in the SAO Krajina a re´gime of
persecutions designed to drive the Croat and other non-Serb populations out of the territory. These persecutions
included the deliberate destruction of cultural institutions, historic monuments and sacred sites of the Croat and other
non-Serb populations in various localities (IT-03-72-S, Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgment of 29 June 2004 (here-
inafter “Babic´ Trial Judgment”), para. 15). The Tribunal made similar findings in the Martic´ case, where it held
that in 1991 and 1992, the JNA and Serb forces had destroyed churches and religious buildings in Croatian towns
and villages located in the SAO Krajina, and then in the RSK (Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 324 and 327).
388. The Court recalls that it held in 2007 that
“the destruction of historical, cultural and religious heritage cannot be considered to constitute
the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the
group. Although such destruction may be highly significant inasmuch as it is directed to the elim-
ination of all traces of the cultural or religious presence of a group, and contrary to other legal norms,
it does not fall within the categories of acts of genocide set out in Article II of the Convention. In
this regard, the Court observes that, during its consideration of the draft text of the Convention,
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly decided not to include cultural genocide in the list
of punishable acts.” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 185–186, para. 344.)
389. The Court considers that there is no compelling reason in the present case for it to depart from that approach.
It accordingly finds that it is unnecessary to proceed any further with its examination of Croatia’s allegations in
order to establish the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention.
390. The Court recalls, however, that it may take account of attacks on cultural and religious property in order
to establish an intent to destroy the group physically (ibid., p. 186, para. 344).
Forced labour
391. Croatia alleges that the JNA and Serb forces obliged Croats to perform forced labour in numerous localities.
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392. The Court again refers to the findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case. These
show that between 1991 and 1992, the JNA and Serb forces obliged Croat civilians to perform forced labour in
the SAO Krajina (and then in the RSK) and in the SAO SBWS (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 997
and 1049 reproduced above at paragraph 375; see also para. 1250, not reproduced).
393. The Court considers that these findings suffice to establish the facts alleged by Croatia. The Court takes
the view that the characterization of forced labour as the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II
(c) of the Convention depends on the conditions under which that labour is carried out. In this regard, the Court
notes that in the Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ case, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that forced labour formed part of a
series of actions aimed at the forced expulsion of the Croat population (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, paras.
998 and 1050, reproduced above at paragraph 375). The Court finds in this instance that Croatia has not established
that the forced labour imposed on the Croat population is capable of constituting the actus reus of genocide within
the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention.
Conclusion
394. The Court concludes that Croatia has failed to establish that acts capable of constituting the actus reus of
genocide, within the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention, were committed by the JNA and Serb forces.
5. Article II (d): measures intended to prevent births within the group
395. Croatia alleges that, as well as rape, the JNA and Serb forces committed other acts of sexual violence (in
particular castrations) against Croats, constituting the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (d)
of the Convention.
396. Serbia maintains that, in order to be regarded as measures intended to prevent births within the group, within
the meaning of Article II (d) of the Convention, it is necessary for the rape and other acts of sexual violence to
have been carried out systematically, whereas in the present case such acts were merely random incidents, and hence
cannot constitute such measures.
397. The Court recalls that it has already found that Croatia has failed to provide sufficient evidence that acts
of rape were carried out on such a scale that it can be said that they inflicted conditions of life on the group that
were capable of bringing about its physical destruction in whole or in part (see paragraph 364 above). Similarly,
Croatia has not provided sufficient evidence that rape was committed in order to prevent births within the group,
within the meaning of Article II (d). The Court will therefore concentrate on the other acts of sexual violence alleged
by Croatia.
398. Croatia relies principally on statements appended to its written pleadings. The Court notes that several of
these statements, which are signed or confirmed, are by victims or eyewitnesses of acts of sexual violence. They
are mutually consistent and constitute first-hand accounts of the events in question. The Court considers that there
is sufficiently reliable evidence that acts of sexual violence did indeed take place, in particular involving the targeting
of the genitalia of Croat males. It recalls that the ICTY also established that acts of sexual violence were perpetrated
by the JNA and Serb forces in the SAO Krajina (and then in the RSK) and in the SAO SBWS between 1991 and
1992 (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 997, reproduced above at paragraph 375; see also para. 1250,
not reproduced).
399. Nevertheless, Croatia has produced no evidence that the acts of sexual violence were perpetrated in order
to prevent births within the group.
400. The Court accordingly finds that Croatia has failed to show that rapes and other acts of sexual violence
were perpetrated by the JNA and Serb forces against Croats in order to prevent births within the group, and that,
hence, the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (d) of the Convention has not been established.
Conclusion on the actus reus of genocide
401. The Court is fully convinced that, in various localities in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/
Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia, the JNA and Serb forces perpetrated against members of the protected group
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acts falling within subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article II of the Convention, and that the actus reus of genocide
has been established.
B. The genocidal intent (dolus specialis)
402. The actus reus of genocide having been established, the Court will now examine whether the acts per-
petrated by the JNA and Serb forces were committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the protected group
as defined above (see paragraph 205).
403. Croatia contends that the crimes committed by the JNA and Serb forces represent a pattern of conduct from
which the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is an intent on the part of the Serbian authorities to destroy in
part the Croat group. It maintains that the Croats living in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia,
Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia targeted by those crimes constituted a substantial part of the protected
group, and that the intent to destroy the protected group “in part”, which characterizes genocide as defined in Article
II of the Convention, is thus established.
404. The Court will begin by examining whether the Croats living in the above regions constituted a substantial
part of the protected group. If so, it will then seek to determine whether the acts proved to have been committed
by the JNA and Serb forces represented a pattern of conduct from which the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn
is an intent on the part of the Serbian authorities to destroy “in part” the protected group.
1. Did the Croats living in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and
Dalmatia constitute a substantial part of the protected group?
405. According to Croatia, the Croats living in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/
Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia constituted a substantial part of the Croat group targeted by the genocidal intent.
406. As the Court has already recalled (see paragraph 142 above), it must take account not only of the quan-
titative element, but also of the geographic location and prominence of the targeted part of the group in order to
determine whether it constitutes a substantial part of the protected group.
Regarding the quantitative element, Croatia maintains that the target group was “the Croat population that was,
at the relevant time, living in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina, Kordun, Lika, and Dalmatia, including
those living as groups in individual villages”. It provides data taken from the last official census carried out in 1991
in the SFRY, which is not disputed by Serbia. According to that data, the ethnic Croat population living in the regions
of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika, and Dalmatia in 1991 numbered between
1.7 and 1.8 million. It constituted slightly less than half of the ethnic Croat population living in Croatia. According
to the 1991 census, the total population of Croatia was approximately 4.8 million persons, of which 78 per cent
were ethnic Croats.
Regarding the geographic location of the part of the group concerned, the Court has already found (see paragraphs
295, 360 and 401 above) that the acts committed by the JNA and Serb forces in the regions of Eastern Slavonia,
Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia, targeted the Croats living in those regions, within
which these armed forces exercised and sought to expand their control.
Finally as regards the prominence of that part of the group, the Court notes that Croatia has provided no infor-
mation on this point.
The Court concludes from the foregoing that the Croats living in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavo-
nia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia constituted a substantial part of the Croat group.
* *
2. Is there a pattern of conduct from which the only reasonable inference to be drawn is an intent of the
Serb authorities to destroy, in part, the protected group?
407. The Court will now examine whether Croatia has established the existence of a pattern of conduct from
which the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is an intent of the Serb authorities to destroy that substantial part
of the group.
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408. Croatia argues that the scale and consistent nature of the crimes committed by the JNA and Serb forces
evince a clear intention to bring about the physical destruction of the Croats. It contends that these crimes constitute
a pattern of conduct from which the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that the Serb leaders were motivated
by genocidal intent. Croatia thus sets out a series of 17 factors which it believes, individually or taken together,
could lead the Court to conclude that there was a systematic policy of targeting Croats with a view to their elimination
from the regions concerned: (1) the political doctrine of Serbian expansionism which created the climate for geno-
cidal policies aimed at destroying the Croat population living in areas earmarked to become part of “Greater Serbia”;
(2) the statements of public officials, including demonization of Croats and propaganda on the part of State-con-
trolled media; (3) the fact that the pattern of attacks on groups of Croats far exceeded any legitimate military objec-
tive necessary to secure control of the regions concerned; (4) contemporaneous video footage evidencing the geno-
cidal intent of those carrying out the attacks; (5) the explicit recognition by the JNA that paramilitary groups were
engaging in genocidal acts; (6) the close co-operation between the JNA and the Serb paramilitary groups responsible
for some of the worst atrocities, implying close planning and logistical support; (7) the systematic nature and sheer
scale of the attacks on groups of Croats; (8) the fact that ethnic Croats were constantly singled out for attack while
local Serbs were excluded; (9) the fact that during the occupation, ethnic Croats were required to identify themselves
and their property as such by wearing white ribbons tied around their arms and by affixing white cloths to their
homes; (10) the number of Croats killed and missing as a proportion of the local population; (11) the nature, degree
and extent of the injuries inflicted (through physical attacks, acts of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, rape
and sexual violence), “including injuries with recognizable ethnic characteristics”; (12) the use of ethnically derog-
atory language in the course of acts of killing, torture and rape; (13) the forced displacement of Croats and the
organized means adopted to this end; (14) the systematic looting and destruction of Croat cultural and religious
monuments; (15) the suppression of Croat culture and religious practices among the remaining population; (16) the
consequent permanent and evidently intended demographic changes to the regions concerned; (17) the failure to
punish the crimes which the Applicant alleges to be genocide.
409. All these elements indicate, according to Croatia, the existence of a pattern of conduct from which the only
reasonable inference is an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Croat group.
410. Consequently, the Court will examine first whether the acts committed by the JNA and Serb forces form
part of a pattern of conduct and, if so, it will then consider whether an intent to destroy the Croat group is the only
reasonable conclusion that can be inferred from that pattern of conduct.
411. The Parties disagree on the existence of a pattern of conduct. Croatia considers that the scale, intensity
and systematic nature of the attacks directed against the Croat population, based on the same modus operandi, dem-
onstrate the existence of a pattern of conduct. According to Croatia, the JNA and Serb forces applied a massive
use of force which can only be explained by an intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.
412. Serbia does not contest the systematic and widespread nature of certain attacks. However, it claims that
these were intended to force the Croats to leave the regions concerned. In this regard, it cites the Martic´ and Mrksˇic´
et al. cases, in which the ICTY found that the purpose of the attacks on the Croat population was to force it to leave.
Serbia points out that, in the Martic´ case, although the accused had not been charged with genocide, there was
nothing to prevent the Trial Chamber from concluding that the attacks indicated an intent to persecute or to exter-
minate “or worse”, but that it had not done so. Regarding the attack on Vukovar and the surrounding area, Serbia
submits that, in the Mrksˇic´ et al. case, the Trial Chamber found that the purpose of that attack was also to punish
the town’s Croat population, but not to destroy it.
Serbia maintains that the evidence “shows a multitude of patterns giving rise to inferences of combat and/or
forcible transfer and/or punishment”, but not genocide.
413. The Court considers that, of the 17 factors suggested by Croatia to establish the existence of a pattern of
conduct revealing a genocidal intent, the most important are those that concern the scale and allegedly systematic
nature of the attacks, the fact that those attacks are said to have caused casualties and damage far in excess of what
was justified by military necessity, the specific targeting of Croats and the nature, extent and degree of the injuries
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caused to the Croat population (i.e., the third, seventh, eighth, tenth and eleventh factors identified in paragraph
408, above).
414. The Court notes that, in the Mrksˇic´ et al. case, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that in Eastern Slavonia:
“the system of attack employed by the JNA typically evolved along the following lines: ‘(a)
tension, confusion and fear is built up by a military presence around a village (or bigger community)
and provocative behaviour; (b) there is then artillery or mortar shelling for several days, mostly
aimed at the Croatian parts of the village; in this stage churches are often hit and destroyed; (c)
in nearly all cases JNA ultimata are issued to the people of a village demanding the collection and
the delivery to the JNA of all weapons; village delegations are formed but their consultations with
JNA military authorities do not lead, with the exception of Ilok, to peaceful arrangements; with or
without waiting for the results of the ultimata a military attack is carried out; and (d) at the same
time, or shortly after the attack, Serb paramilitaries enter the village; what then follows varied from
murder, killing, burning and looting, to discrimination’” (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, para. 43, citing
the testimony of Ambassador Kypr of the European Community Monitoring Mission; reference
omitted).
The Tribunal adopted similar conclusions in the Martic´ case:
“[t]he area or village in question would be shelled, after which ground units would enter. After
the fighting had subsided, acts of killing and violence would be committed by the forces against
the civilian non-Serb population who had not managed to flee during the attack. Houses, churches
and property would be destroyed in order to prevent their return and widespread looting would be
carried out. In some instances the police and the TO of the SAO Krajina organised transport for
the non-Serb population in order to remove it from SAO Krajina territory to locations under Cro-
atian control. Moreover, members of the non-Serb population would be rounded up and taken away
to detention facilities, including in central Knin, and eventually exchanged and transported to areas
under Croatian control.” (Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 427; reference omitted.)
415. The Court likewise notes that there were similarities, in terms of the modus operandi used, between some
of the attacks confirmed to have taken place. Thus it observes that the JNA and Serb forces would attack and occupy
the localities and create a climate of fear and coercion, by committing a number of acts that constitute the actus
reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention. Finally, the occupation would end
with the forced expulsion of the Croat population from these localities.
416. The findings of the Court and those of the ICTY are mutually consistent, and establish the existence of
a pattern of conduct that consisted, from August 1991, in widespread attacks by the JNA and Serb forces on localities
with Croat populations in various regions of Croatia, according to a generally similar modus operandi.
417. The Court recalls that, for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of intent to destroy the group,
in whole or in part, it must be “such that it could only point to the existence of such intent” (I.C.J. Reports 2007
(I), p. 197, para. 373). This signifies that, for the Court, intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, must be
the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the pattern of conduct (see paragraph 148 above).
418. In its oral argument, Croatia put forward two factors which, in its view, should lead the Court to conclude
that intent to destroy is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the pattern of conduct previously established:
the context in which those acts were committed and the opportunity which the JNA and Serb forces had of destroying
the Croat population. The Court will examine these in turn.
(a) Context
419. The Court will examine the context in which the acts constituting the actus reus of genocide within the
meaning of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the Convention were committed, in order to determine the aim pursued
by the authors of those acts.
420. Croatia claims that the acts committed by the JNA and Serb forces against Croats between 1991 and 1995
represented the implementation, by the Serb nationalists and leadership, of the objective of a “Greater Serbia”. That
entailed unifying those parts of the territories of the various entities of the SFRY in which ethnic Serbs were living.
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Croatia relies inter alia on a memorandum prepared in 1986 by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (here-
inafter “the SANU Memorandum”), which allegedly contributed to the rebirth of the idea of a “Greater Serbia”.
Croatia contends that the destruction of the Croats in these areas, who were perceived as a threat to the Serb people,
was necessary for the creation of “Greater Serbia”. In this regard, the SANU Memorandum is claimed to have acted
as a catalyst for the genocide of the Croats.
421. Serbia contests Croatia’s historical approach and argues that it is conflating issues, since the idea of a
“Greater Serbia” never implied an intent to commit genocide against the Croats.
422. The Court considers that there is no need to enter into a debate on the political and historical origins of
the events that took place in Croatia between 1991 and 1995. It notes that the SANU Memorandum cited by Croatia
has no official standing and certainly does not contemplate the destruction of the Croats. It cannot be regarded, either
by itself or in connection with any of the other factors relied on by Croatia, as an expression of the dolus specialis.
423. The Court will seek to determine what aim was being pursued by the JNA and Serb forces when they
committed acts that constitute the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Con-
vention, where those acts have been established before the Court.
424. The Court notes that the ICTY has stated the political objective being pursued by the leadership of the
SAO Krajina and then the RSK, and shared with the leaderships in Serbia and in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia
and Herzegovina as follows:
“442 . . . The evidence establishes the existence, as of early 1991, of a political objective to unite
Serb areas in Croatia and in BiH with Serbia in order to establish an unified territory. Moreover,
the evidence establishes that the SAO Krajina, and subsequently the RSK, government and author-
ities fully embraced and advocated this objective, and strove to accomplish it in cooperation with
the Serb leaderships in Serbia and in the RS in BiH.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
445. From at least August 1991, the political objective to unite Serb areas in Croatia and in BiH
with Serbia in order to establish a unified territory was implemented through widespread and sys-
tematic armed attacks on predominantly Croat and other non-Serb areas and through the commis-
sion of acts of violence and intimidation. In the Trial Chamber’s view, this campaign of violence
and intimidation against the Croat and non-Serb population was a consequence of the position taken
by the SAO Krajina and subsequently the RSK leadership that co-existence with the Croat and other
non-Serb population, in Milan Martic´’s words, ‘in our Serbian territories of the SAO Krajina’, was
impossible. Thus, the implementation of the political objective to establish a unified Serb territory
in these circumstances necessitated the forcible removal of the non-Serb population from the SAO
Krajina and RSK territory. The Trial Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the
common purpose of the [joint criminal enterprise] was the establishment of an ethnically Serb ter-
ritory through the displacement of the Croat and other non-Serb population, as charged in Counts
10 and 11 [deportation and forcible transfer].” (Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 442 and 445; ref-
erence omitted.)
425. In its Trial Chamber Judgment in the Babic´ case, the ICTY, following the defendant’s guilty plea, held
that there had been a joint criminal enterprise whose objective “was the permanent and forcible removal of the
majority of Croat and other non-Serb populations from approximately one-third of Croatia through a campaign of
persecutions in order to make that territory a Serb-dominated state” (Babic´ Trial Judgment, para. 34).
426. According to the ICTY, the leadership of Serbia and that of the Serbs in Croatia, inter alia, shared the
objective of creating an ethnically homogeneous Serb State. That was the context in which acts were committed
that constitute the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention. However,
the conclusion of the ICTY indicates that those acts were not committed with intent to destroy the Croats, but rather
with that of forcing them to leave the regions concerned so that an ethnically homogeneous Serb State could be
created. The Court agrees with this conclusion. As the Tribunal found in the Martic´ case:
“427. From August 1991 and into early 1992, forces of the TO and the police of the SAO Krajina
and of the JNA attacked Croat-majority villages and areas, including the villages of Hrvatska Kosta-
jnica, Cerovljani, Hrvatska Dubica, Bac´in, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovacˇa, Sˇkabrnja and Nadin. The
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displacement of the non-Serb population which followed these attacks was not merely the con-
sequence of military action, but the primary objective of it . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
430. With regard to the period from 1992 to 1995, the Trial Chamber has been furnished with
a substantial amount of evidence of massive and widespread acts of violence and intimidation com-
mitted against the non-Serb population, which were pervasive throughout the RSK territory. The
Trial Chamber notes, in particular, that during this time period there was a continuation of incidents
of killings, beatings, robbery and theft, harassment, and extensive destruction of houses and Cath-
olic churches carried out against the non-Serb population. These acts created a coercive atmosphere
which had the effect of forcing out the non-Serb population from the territory of the RSK. As a
consequence, almost the entire non-Serb population left the RSK . . .
431. Based on the substantial evidence referred to above, the Trial Chamber finds that due
to the coercive atmosphere in the RSK from 1992 through 1995, almost the entire non-Serb pop-
ulation was forcibly removed to territories under the control of Croatia.” (Martic´ Trial Judgment,
paras. 427, 430 and 431.)
427. The ICTY made similar findings in the Stanisˇic and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment (paras. 997, 998, 1050 (repro-
duced at paragraph 375 above) and 1000, not reproduced).
428. The Court therefore concludes that Croatia’s contentions regarding the overall context do not support its
assertion that genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference to be drawn.
429. As regards the events at Vukovar, to which Croatia has given particular attention, the Court notes that in
the Mrksˇic´ et al. case, the ICTY found that the attack on that city constituted a response to the declaration of inde-
pendence by Croatia, and above all an assertion of Serbia’s grip on the SFRY:
“471 . . . The declaration by Croatia of its independence of the Yugoslav Federation and the
associated social unrest within Croatia was met with determined military reaction by Serb forces.
It was in this political scenario that the city and people of Vukovar and those living in its close
proximity in the Vukovar municipality became a means of demonstrating to the Croatian people,
and those of other Yugoslav Republics, the harmful consequences to them of their actions. In the
view of the Chamber the overall effect of the evidence is to demonstrate that the city and civilian
population of and around Vukovar were being punished, and terribly so, as an example to those
who did not accept the Serb controlled Federal government in Belgrade, and its interpretation of
the laws of SFRY, or the role of the JNA for which the maintenance of the Yugoslav Federation
was a fundamental element in the continued existence of the JNA.” (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, para.
471.)
It follows from the above, and from the fact that numerous Croats of Vukovar were evacuated (see paragraph
436 below), that the existence of intent to physically destroy the Croatian population is not the only reasonable
conclusion that can be drawn from the illegal attack on Vukovar.
430. In the same case, the ICTY made findings as to the intent of the perpetrators of the ill-treatment inflicted
on the prisoners of war at Ovcˇara:
“535. The Serb TO and paramilitary harboured quite intense feelings of animosity toward the
Croat forces. The prisoners of war taken from Vukovar hospital and transported to Ovcˇara were
representative of the Croat forces and, therefore, represented their enemy. The brutality of the beat-
ings that took place at Ovcˇara on 20 November 1991 by the Serb TO and paramilitaries, and possibly
by some JNA soldiers acting on their own account, is evidence of the hatred and the desire to punish
the enemy forces. It is clear from this evidence, in the Chamber’s finding, that acts of mistreatment
outside and inside the hangar were intended to punish the prisoners for their involvement, or
believed involvement, in Croat forces before the fall of Vukovar.” (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, para.
535.)
The conclusions of the ICTY indicate that the intent of the perpetrators of the ill-treatment at Ovcˇara was not
to physically destroy the members of the protected group, as such, but to punish them because of their status as
enemies, in a military sense.
870 [VOL. 54:INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
(b) Opportunity
431. Croatia contends that the JNA and Serb forces systematically committed acts that constitute the actus reus
of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) to (d) of the Convention once the opportunity to do so was presented
to them, i.e., when they attacked and occupied various Croat localities. According to Croatia, this factor demonstrates
that their intention was to destroy the Croat group in whole or in part.
432. Serbia contests Croatia’s approach. It refers to several instances of the JNA and Serb forces sparing Croats
by not killing them. Moreover, it argues that the criterion of opportunity must be weighed against that of substan-
tiality. For Serbia, the limited number of Croat victims, seen in the light of the opportunities for killing supposedly
available to the JNA and Serb forces, cannot give rise to an inference that an intent to destroy was present.
433. The Court will not seek to determine whether or not, in each of the localities it has previously considered,
the JNA and Serb forces made systematic use of the opportunities to physically destroy Croats.
434. The Court considers, on the other hand, that the mass forced displacement of Croats is a significant factor
in assessing whether there was an intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part. The Court has previously found
that Croatia has not demonstrated that such forced displacement constituted the actus reus of genocide within the
meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention (see paragraph 377 above). Nonetheless, the Court recalls that the fact
of forced displacement occurring in parallel to acts falling under Article II of the Convention may be “indicative
of the presence of a specific intent (dolus specialis) inspiring those acts” (see paragraph 162 above quoting I.C.J.
Reports 2007 (I), p. 123, para. 190).
435. In the present case, as emerges in particular from the findings of the ICTY, forced displacement was the
instrument of a policy aimed at establishing an ethnically homogeneous Serb State. In that context, the expulsion
of the Croats was brought about by the creation of a coercive atmosphere, generated by the commission of acts
including some that constitute the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Con-
vention. Those acts had an objective, namely the forced displacement of the Croats, which did not entail their phys-
ical destruction. The ICTY has estimated that between April 1991 and April 1992, between 80,000 and 100,000
persons fled the SAO Krajina (and then the RSK) (Stanisˇic´ and Simatovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 997). The Court
finds that the acts committed by the JNA and Serb forces essentially had the effect of making the Croat population
flee the territories concerned. It was not a question of systematically destroying that population, but of forcing it
to leave the areas controlled by these armed forces.
436. Regarding the events at Vukovar, to which Croatia has given particular attention, the Court notes that, in the
Mrksˇic´ et al. case, the ICTY established several instances of the JNA and Serb forces evacuating civilians, particularly
Croats (Mrksˇic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 157-160, 168, 204 and 207). The ICTY further found that Croat combatants cap-
tured by the JNA and Serb forces had not all been executed. Thus, following their surrender to the JNA, an initial group
of Croat combatants was transferred on 18 November 1991 to Ovcˇara, and then to Sremska Mitrovica in Serbia, where
they were held as prisoners of war (ibid., paras. 145-155). Similarly, a group of Croat combatants held at Velepromet
was transferred to Sremska Mitrovica on 19-20 November 1991, while civilians not suspected of having fought alongside
Croat forces were evacuated to destinations in Croatia or Serbia (ibid., para. 168). This shows that, in many cases, the
JNA and Serb forces did not kill those Croats who had fallen into their hands.
437. The Court considers that it is also relevant to compare the size of the targeted part of the protected group
with the number of Croat victims, in order to determine whether the JNA and Serb forces availed themselves of
opportunities to destroy that part of the group. In this connection, Croatia put forward a figure of 12,500 Croat deaths,
which is contested by Serbia. The Court notes that, even assuming that this figure is correct — an issue on which
it will make no ruling — the number of victims alleged by Croatia is small in relation to the size of the targeted
part of the group.
The Court concludes from the foregoing that Croatia has failed to show that the perpetrators of the acts which
form the subject of the principal claim availed themselves of opportunities to destroy a substantial part of the pro-
tected group.
*
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438. Croatia points to activities of Serb paramilitaries as evidence of the dolus specialis. In particular, it relies
upon a videotape of Zˇ eljko Razˇnatovic´ or “Arkan”, leader of a Serb paramilitary group known as the “Serbian
Volunteer Guard” or “Arkan’s Tigers”, made during the siege of Vukovar on 1 November 1991, showing him
instructing his forces to take care not to kill Serbs and saying that since Serbs were in the basements of buildings
and the Croats were upstairs, rocket launchers should be used to “neutralize the first floor”. Even if Arkan’s actions
were attributable to Serbia, this speech appears to be but one isolated phase in the very lengthy siege of Vukovar,
a siege in which, as the Court has already found (see paragraphs 218-219, 301 and 305 above), the degree of violence
used by attacking forces was excessive, and during which grave suffering was undoubtedly caused to the civilian
population as Serbia acknowledged at least to some extent. It is difficult to infer anything from one isolated instance.
Croatia also relies upon the report of a JNA security officer, dated 13 October 1991, which stated that Arkan’s
troops were “committing uncontrolled genocide and various acts of terrorism” in the greater area of Vukovar. The
Serbian Assistant Minister of Defence was informed of the report. Yet taking the report as a whole, no justification
or examples are given to support the use of the word “genocide”.
439. Finally, the Court considers that the series of 17 factors invoked by Croatia do not lead to the conclusion
that there was an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Croats in the regions concerned.
Conclusion on the dolus specialis
440. Thus, in the opinion of the Court, Croatia has not established that the only reasonable inference that can
be drawn from the pattern of conduct it relied upon was the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Croat group.
The acts constituting the actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention were
not committed with the specific intent required for them to be characterized as acts of genocide.
The Court further notes that the ICTY prosecutor has never charged any individual on account of genocide against
the Croat population in the context of the armed conflict which took place in the territory of Croatia in the period
1991–1995 (see paragraph 187 above).
C. General conclusion on Croatia’s claim
441. It follows from the foregoing that Croatia has failed to substantiate its allegation that genocide was com-
mitted. Accordingly, no issue of responsibility under the Convention for the commission of genocide can arise in
the present case. Nor can there be any question of responsibility for a failure to prevent genocide, a failure to punish
genocide, or complicity in genocide.
In view of the fact that dolus specialis has not been established by Croatia, its claims of conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and attempt to commit genocide also necessarily fail.
Accordingly, Croatia’s claim must be dismissed in its entirety.
442. Consequently, the Court is not required to pronounce on the inadmissibility of the principal claim as argued
by Serbia in respect of acts prior to 8 October 1991. Nor does it need to consider whether acts alleged to have taken
place before 27 April 1992 are attributable to the SFRY, or, if so, whether Serbia succeeded to the SFRY’s respon-
sibility on account of those acts.
*
* *
VI. CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS OF THE COUNTER-CLAIM
443. In its Counter-Memorial Serbia made a counter-claim containing a number of submissions. In its final ver-
sion, as presented by the Agent of Serbia at the close of the public hearings, that counter-claim is reproduced in
extenso in paragraph 51 of the present Judgment. It constitutes Section II of Serbia’s final submissions, and contains
four paragraphs numbered 6 to 9.
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444. In substance, Serbia asks the Court to declare that Croatia has violated the Genocide Convention by com-
mitting against the Serb national and ethnical group living in Croatia, during and after Operation “Storm” in 1995,
acts prohibited by Article II of the Convention, with intent to destroy that group as such, in whole or in part (para-
graph 6 of the final submissions).
Alternatively, Serbia claims — and asks the Court to declare — that Croatia has committed acts amounting to
conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement and attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide, within the
meaning of Article III of the Convention (paragraph 7).
Additionally, Serbia asks the Court to declare that Croatia has violated its obligations under the Convention to
punish the perpetrators of the acts referred to in the preceding paragraphs (paragraph 8).
Finally, Serbia asks the Court, having found that Croatia’s international responsibility has been engaged, to order
the latter to take a number of measures in order to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Convention
and to redress the injurious consequences of the internationally wrongful acts attributable to it (paragraph 9).
445. The Court will begin by examining the submissions set out in paragraph 6 of Serbia’s final submissions.
The result of this examination will largely condition the way in which it approaches the submissions set out in the
subsequent paragraphs.
A. Examination of the principal submissions in the counter-claim: whether acts of genocide attributable
to Croatia were committed against the national and ethnical group of Serbs living in Croatia during
and after Operation “Storm”
446. Serbia claims that Croatia committed the following acts defined in Article II of the Convention as con-
stituting genocide: killings of members of the national and ethnical group of Serbs living in Croatia (II (a)); causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the same group (II (b)); deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (II (c)), all of these acts having been
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as such.
447. Two points were not disputed between the Parties, and may be regarded by the Court as settled.
448. First, the Serbs living in Croatia at the time of the events in question — who represented a minority of
the population — did indeed constitute a “national [or] ethnical” “group” within the meaning of Article II of the
Genocide Convention, and the Serbs living in the Krajina region, who were directly affected by Operation “Storm”,
constituted a “substantial part” of that national or ethnical group, in the sense in which that expression is used in
paragraph 198 of the Judgment rendered by the Court in 2007 in the case between Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia and Montenegro (see paragraph 142 above).
The Court therefore concludes that, if acts falling within the terms of Article II of the Convention were committed
against the Krajina Serbs, and if they were perpetrated with intent to destroy that group of persons, it should accord-
ingly find that the constituent elements of genocide were present, since the requirement of “intent to destroy at least
a substantial part of the [national or ethnical] group” would be met (see Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 126, para. 198).
449. Secondly, the acts alleged by Serbia — or at least the vast majority of them — assuming them to be proved,
were committed by the regular armed forces or police of Croatia.
It follows that these acts would be such as to engage Croatia’s international responsibility if they were unlawful,
simply because they were carried out by one or more of its organs. That would remain true, under the law governing
the international responsibility of States, even if the author of the acts had acted contrary to the instructions given
or exceeded his or her authority (see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 242, para. 214). Thus the Court’s consideration of the counter-
claim presents no difficulty in terms of the attributability of the alleged unlawful acts to the State whose international
responsibility is in issue (namely the Applicant).
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450. On the other hand, the Parties completely disagree on two key questions.
First, Croatia denies that the greater part of the acts alleged by Serbia even took place; and secondly, it denies
that those acts, even if some of them were proved, were carried out with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the
national or ethnical group of the Croatian Serbs as such.
451. It is these two questions that the Court will now examine. It will first seek to ascertain whether acts con-
stituting the physical element of genocide — that is to say, acts falling within the categories defined in Article II
of the Convention — were in fact committed (the issue of the actus reus). It will then proceed, if any of the acts
in question have been established, to rule on the question of whether they were committed with genocidal intent
(the issue of the dolus specialis).
1. The actus reus of genocide
452. Serbia contends that Croatia committed various acts falling within the scope of subparagraphs (a), (b) and
(c) of Article II of the Genocide Convention, namely:
— indiscriminate shelling of Krajina towns, in particular Knin, allegedly resulting in the killing of Serb civilians
within the meaning of subparagraph (a) of Article II;
— forced displacement of the Serb population of the Krajina, falling within the scope of subparagraph (c) of
Article II;
— the killing of Serbs fleeing in columns the towns under attack, within the scope of subparagraph (a) of Article
II;
— the killing of Serbs who remained, after Operation “Storm”, within UN-protected areas of the Krajina (UNPAs),
acts which are also covered by subparagraph (a) of Article II;
— infliction of ill-treatment on Serbs during and after Operation “Storm”, within the scope of subparagraphs (b)
and (c) of Article II;
— large-scale destruction and looting of Serb property during and after Operation “Storm”, within the scope of
subparagraph (c) of Article II.
453. Serbia further cites administrative and other measures allegedly taken by Croatia to prevent Serbs having
fled the Krajina during Operation “Storm” from subsequently returning home.
However, in the Court’s view, this matter was not relied on by Serbia as evidence of the actus reus of genocide,
but rather as evidence of specific intent to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part, in other words, to prove
the dolus specialis. It will accordingly be discussed later, under point 2.
(a) The evidence presented by Serbia in support of the facts alleged
454. In support of its factual allegations, Serbia relies on a range of evidence from various sources, the bulk
of which has been challenged by Croatia in terms of its relevance and credibility.
455. First, Serbia relies on publications by two non-governmental organizations, one Croatian, the other Serbian:
the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (hereinafter CHC), and the Veritas organization.
The first of these published a report in 2001 in Zagreb, entitled Military Operation “Storm” and its Aftermath;
the second has published a list of the victims of Operation “Storm”, which is regularly updated.
456. Croatia challenges the credibility of these two publications. It notes that they contain numerous errors,
inaccuracies and inconsistencies, and that, moreover, the Veritas organization is neither independent nor impartial,
in particular because its director held high office under several Governments of the RSK.
457. The Court agrees that neither the CHC report nor that of Veritas possesses such evidential weight as to
enable the Court to consider a fact proved solely on the basis of those documents; indeed, Serbia itself has admitted
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that the reports contain factual errors. However, the Court does not consider those documents as so lacking in infor-
mational value that they should be wholly disregarded. The Court may take account of the information they contain
whenever it appears to corroborate evidence from other sources. This approach is similar to that taken by the ICTY
Trial Chamber in relation to the CHC report in the Gotovina case (Gotovina Trial Judgment, para. 50), to which
the Court will return later in the present Judgment.
458. Serbia further bases its allegations on a number of other documents or testimonies, in particular: the Report
on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia of 7 November 1995, presented to the
United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council by Mrs. Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to resolution 1995/89 of the said Commission and decision 1995/920 of
the Economic and Social Council; a report from the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch, entitled
“Impunity for Abuses Committed during ‘Operation Storm’, and the Denial of the Right of Refugees to Return to
the Krajina”, dating from August 1996; the expert report of Mr. Reynaud Theunens, entitled “Croatian Armed Forces
and Operation Storm”, submitted by the Prosecutor’s Office of the ICTY in the Gotovina case; the statements of
witnesses before national courts in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the events at issue in the present
case; the testimony of individuals heard by the ICTY in the Gotovina case; and finally, the written statements of
seven witnesses and a witness-expert presented by Serbia in the present case, in respect of whom Croatia waived
its right of cross-examination.
459. The Court considers that it must give evidential weight to the first of the above-mentioned documents, by
reason both of the independent status of its author, and of the fact that it was prepared at the request of organs of
the United Nations, for purposes of the exercise of their functions. The Court notes that Croatia has not disputed
the objective nature of that report, even though it does not agree with certain of its factual findings.
The Court will accord evidential weight to the statements by the eight individuals called by Serbia to testify before
it. However, it should be emphasized that the fact that Croatia declined to cross-examine those witnesses in no sense
implies an obligation on the Court to accept all of their testimony as accurate. Moreover, Croatia clearly stated that
its decision not to cross-examine the witnesses did not mean that it accepted their testimonies as accurate; on the
contrary, it expressed significant reservations in relation to some of them.
The other documents and testimony referred to in the preceding paragraph will be duly considered by the Court,
without, however, being regarded as conclusive proof of the facts alleged.
460. Finally, the Parties cited extensively from the Trial and Appeals Chamber Judgments of the ICTY in the
Gotovina case, while largely disagreeing on the conclusions to be drawn from them.
The Parties’ disagreement actually relates to the first of Serbia’s claims, namely that Croatia carried out indis-
criminate shelling of the Krajina towns at the start of Operation “Storm”, thus causing numerous deaths among the
civilian population.
The scope of the ICTY decisions in the Gotovina case will thus be examined below, in relation to the issue of
whether that claim has been effectively established.
461. It suffices, at this stage, to recall that the fact that no high-ranking Croatian civilian or military officer has
been found guilty of genocide by the ICTY — or indeed of any other charge — in relation to the events which
took place during and after Operation “Storm” does not in itself preclude the Court from finding that Croatia’s
international responsibility is engaged for violation of the Genocide Convention (see in this regard Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 119–120, paras. 180-182). Likewise, the fact that the ICTY
Prosecutor has never included a count of genocide in the indictments in cases relating to Operation “Storm” does
not automatically mean that Serbia’s counter-claim must be dismissed.
Indeed, the Parties do not appear to disagree on these two propositions. Croatia, however, emphasizes that the
absence of any conviction by the ICTY and, moreover, the absence of any prosecution for genocide in relation to
Operation “Storm” greatly weakens the thesis underlying Serbia’s counter-claim, namely that genocide was com-
mitted by the organs of Croatia.
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(b) Whether the acts alleged by Serbia have been effectively proved
462. The Court will now examine the various categories of acts alleged by Serbia in support of its counter-claim,
in order to ascertain whether, in each case, they have been proved on the basis of the evidence presented to the
Court. It will do so following the order indicated in paragraph 452 above, namely: (i) killing of civilians as a result
of the indiscriminate shelling of Krajina towns; (ii) forced displacement of the Serb population from the Krajina;
(iii) killing of Serbs fleeing in columns from the towns under attack; (iv) killing of Serbs having remained in the
areas of the Krajina protected by the United Nations; (v) infliction of ill-treatment on Serbs during and after Oper-
ation “Storm”.
(i) Killing of civilians as a result of the allegedly indiscriminate shelling of Krajina towns
463. According to Serbia, from the start of the military actions in connection with Operation “Storm”, Croatian
armed forces indiscriminately shelled several towns and villages in the Krajina, an area with a majority Serb pop-
ulation, namely Knin, the most important town in the region, but also Bekovac, Obrovac, Gracˇac, Bosansko, Gra-
hovo, Kijani, Kistanje, Uzdolje, Kovacˇic, Plavno, Polacˇa and Bukovic´.
The shelling was allegedly aimed both at military targets — where these existed — and the civilian population,
causing a large number of deaths among civilians. According to the Respondent, in the municipality of Knin alone
there were 357 deaths, including 237 civilians, many of them as a result of indiscriminate shelling. Moreover, accord-
ing to Serbia the shelling was ordered with the intention of forcing the Serb population to flee the Krajina. This
aspect, which relates to the second category of acts alleged by Serbia, namely the forced displacement of the Serb
population, will be discussed in the following section.
According to Croatia, on the contrary, the shelling of Krajina towns was directed exclusively at military targets,
and if it caused civilian casualties — the number of which, in any event, was far lower than that alleged by Serbia
— that was not the consequence of any deliberate intent to target the civilian population, but solely of the proximity
of military objectives to areas inhabited by that population. In support of its position, Croatia relies on the findings
of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Gotovina case.
464. Since the Parties draw essentially contrary conclusions from the decisions of the ICTY in the Gotovina
case, and since those decisions are highly relevant for purposes of the present case, the Court will briefly discuss
the proceedings before the ICTY in that case, and summarize the decisions rendered at first instance, and then on
appeal.
465. The proceedings which resulted in those decisions were initiated by the ICTY Prosecutor in 2001 and 2006
against Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cˇ ermak and Mladen Markacˇ, three Croat generals who had played various leading roles
in August 1995 in connection with Operation “Storm”, the declared aim of which was to enable the Government
of Croatia to regain control over the Krajina, then controlled by the authorities of the RSK.
The main charges against all three accused were persecution, killing and murder, deportation and forcible transfer
of the population, cruel and inhumane acts and the wanton destruction of towns and villages.
In substance, the Prosecutor argued that Croatian armed forces had carried out indiscriminate artillery attacks
on a large number of towns and villages in the Krajina, deliberately targeting civilian areas as well as military objec-
tives. Those attacks had caused the deaths of large numbers of civilians, and the destruction of property unconnected
with any military target, as well as the departure of the majority of the population, which had fled the shelled areas.
466. By its Judgment of 15 April 2011, the Trial Chamber acquitted General Cˇ ermak, but convicted Generals
Gotovina and Markacˇ, sentencing them to terms of imprisonment of 24 and 18 years respectively.
The Chamber held that these two defendants had taken part in a joint criminal enterprise aimed at the expulsion
of the Serb civilian population from the Krajina, through indiscriminate shelling of the four towns of Knin, Ben-
kovac, Obrovac and Gracˇac, the purpose of which — alongside any strictly military objectives — was to terrorize
and demoralize the population so as to force it to flee.
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The Trial Chamber accordingly found the two accused guilty of, inter alia, murder, deportation, persecution,
destruction and inhumane acts (Gotovina Trial Judgment, paras. 2619, 2622).
467. In order to reach this conclusion, the Trial Chamber relied, first, on certain documents, including the tran-
script of a meeting held at Brioni on 31 July 1995, just a few days before the launch of the operation, under the
chairmanship of President Tudjman (that transcript will be discussed later in the present Judgment) and secondly,
and above all, on the so-called “200 Metre Standard” (ibid., paras. 1970–1995, 2305, 2311), under which only shells
impacting less than 200 metres from an identifiable military target could be regarded as having been aimed at that
target, whilst those impacting more than 200 metres from a military target should be regarded as evidence that the
attack was deliberately aimed at both civilian and military targets, and was therefore indiscriminate (ibid., para.
1898).
Applying that standard to the case before it, the Trial Chamber found that the artillery attacks on the four towns
mentioned above (but not on the other Krajina towns and villages) had been indiscriminate, since a large proportion
of shells had fallen over 200 metres from any identifiable military target (ibid., paras. 1899–1906, 1917–1921, 1927–
1933, 1939–1941).
468. In its Judgment of 16 November 2012 in the Gotovina case, the Appeals Chamber disagreed with the Trial
Chamber’s analysis and reversed the latter’s decision.
The Appeals Chamber held that the “200 Metre Standard” had no basis in law and lacked any convincing jus-
tification. The Chamber accordingly concluded that the Trial Chamber could not reasonably find, simply by applying
that standard, that the four towns in question had been shelled indiscriminately. It further held that the Trial Cham-
ber’s reasoning was essentially based on the application of the standard in question, and that none of the evidence
before the Court — particularly the Brioni Transcript — showed convincingly that the Croatian armed forces had
deliberately targeted the civilian population (Gotovina Appeals Judgment, paras. 61, 64–65, 77–83, 93). The
Appeals Chamber accordingly found that the prosecution had failed to prove a “joint criminal enterprise”, and
acquitted the two accused on all of the counts in the indictment (including murder and deportation) (ibid., para.
158).
469. The Court recalls, as it stated in 2007, that it “should in principle accept as highly persuasive relevant
findings of facts made by the Tribunal at trial, unless of course they have been upset on appeal” (see paragraph
182 above).
That should lead the Court, in the present case, to give the greatest weight to factual findings by the Trial Chamber
which were not reversed by the Appeals Chamber, and to give due weight to the findings and determinations of
the Appeals Chamber on the issue of whether or not the shelling of the Krajina towns during Operation “Storm”
was indiscriminate.
470. Against this approach, Serbia argued that the findings of an ICTY Appeals Chamber should not necessarily
be accorded more weight than those of a Trial Chamber. Indeed, according to Serbia, the members of the Appeals
Chamber are appointed at random and vary from one case to another, so that they have no greater experience or
authority than those of the Trial Chamber having ruled on the same case. Serbia argues that the main difference
between the two benches appears to be that the former consists of five judges, whilst the latter is composed of three
judges. Moreover, the decision of the Trial Chamber was unanimous when it convicted Gotovina and Markacˇ,
whereas the Appeals Chamber reached its decision to acquit them by a majority of three against two. Serbia points
out that, overall, the majority of the judges having sat in the Gotovina case were of the view that the Croatian forces
did engage in indiscriminate shelling of the four above-mentioned Krajina towns.
It would follow, according to Serbia, that in the particular circumstances of the present case the Court should
not attach any greater importance to the findings of the Appeals Chamber than to those of the Trial Chamber, and
should form its own view of the persuasiveness of the arguments accepted by each of the two benches.
471. Irrespective of the manner in which the members of the Appeals Chamber are chosen — a matter on which
it is not for the Court to pronounce — the latter’s decisions represent the last word of the ICTY on the cases before
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it when one of the parties has chosen to appeal from the Trial Chamber’s Judgment. Accordingly, the Court cannot
treat the findings and determinations of the Trial Chamber as being on an equal footing with those of the Appeals
Chamber. In cases of disagreement, it is bound to accord greater weight to what the Appeals Chamber Judgment
says, while ultimately retaining the power to decide the issues before it on the facts and the law.
472. The Court concludes from the foregoing that it is unable to find that there was any indiscriminate shelling
of the Krajina towns deliberately intended to cause civilian casualties. It would only be in exceptional circumstances
that it would depart from the findings reached by the ICTY on an issue of this kind. Serbia has indeed drawn the
Court’s attention to the controversy aroused by the Appeals Chamber’s Judgment. However, no evidence, whether
prior or subsequent to that Judgment, has been put before the Court which would incontrovertibly show that the
Croatian authorities deliberately intended to shell the civilian areas of towns inhabited by Serbs. In particular, no
such intent is apparent from the Brioni Transcript, which will be subjected to a more detailed analysis below in
relation to the existence of the dolus specialis. Nor can such intent be regarded as incontrovertibly established on
the basis of the statements by persons having testified before the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Gotovina case, and
cited as witnesses by Serbia in the present case.
473. Serbia further argues that, even if the Court were unwilling to reject the finding of the Appeals Chamber
that the artillery attacks on the Krajina towns were not indiscriminate, and thus lawful under international human-
itarian law, that would not prevent it from holding that those attacks, conducted in the course of an armed conflict,
were unlawful under the Genocide Convention, if they were motivated by an intent to destroy the Serb population
of the Krajina, in whole or in part.
474. There can be no doubt that, as a general rule, a particular act may be perfectly lawful under one body of
legal rules and unlawful under another. Thus it cannot be excluded in principle that an act carried out during an
armed conflict and lawful under international humanitarian law can at the same time constitute a violation by the
State in question of some other international obligation incumbent upon it.
However, it is not the task of the Court in the context of the counter-claim to rule on the relationship between
international humanitarian law and the Genocide Convention. The question to which it must respond is whether
the artillery attacks on the Krajina towns in August 1995, in so far as they resulted in civilian casualties, constituted
“killing [of] members of the [Krajina Serb] group”, within the meaning of Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention,
so that they may accordingly be regarded as constituting the actus reus of genocide.
“Killing” within the meaning of Article II (a) of the Convention always presupposes the existence of an intentional
element (which is altogether distinct from the “specific intent” necessary to establish genocide), namely the intent
to cause death (see paragraph 186 of the 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro Judgment, which
states that “‘[k]illing’ must be intentional”, cited in the present Judgment at paragraph 156 above). It follows that,
if one takes the view that the attacks were exclusively directed at military targets, and that the civilian casualties
were not caused deliberately, one cannot consider those attacks, inasmuch as they caused civilian deaths, as falling
within the scope of Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention.
475. The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that it has not been shown that “killing[s] [of] members
of the [protected] group”, within the meaning of Article II of the Convention, were committed as a result of the
artillery attacks on towns in that region during Operation “Storm” in August 1995.
(ii) Forced displacement of the Krajina Serb population
476. Serbia contends that the mass exodus of Serbs from the Krajina, whose numbers it estimates at a total of
between 180,000 and 220,000 persons, was a forcible one, resulting from a political plan deliberately designed by
the Croatian authorities to force the population of Serb origin living in Croatia to leave and to be replaced by a
population of Croat origin.
Croatia disputes this claim, arguing that the Serbs who left the Krajina during and immediately after Operation
“Storm” did so because of the risk of violence commonly associated with an armed conflict, or of the fear generally
instilled in them by the Croatian forces, but without being forced to do so by the latter. It further contends that “the
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‘exodus’ of a majority of the Serb population was pursuant to a decision to evacuate taken by the ‘RSK’s’ ‘Supreme
Defence Council’”. Croatia cites the Judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Gotovina, in which the Chamber
overturned the findings of the Trial Chamber that the Serb exodus had been provoked by unlawful attacks on the
towns of Knin, Benkovac, Gracˇac and Obrovac.
477. The only question facing the Court is whether genocide was committed during Operation “Storm”. The
forced displacement of a population, even if proved, would not in itself constitute the actus reus of genocide.
As the Court stated in its 2007 Judgment in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case,
“[ethnic cleansing] can only be a form of genocide within the meaning of the Convention, if it
corresponds to or falls within one of the categories of acts prohibited by Article II of the Convention.
Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ‘ethnically homogeneous’, nor the
operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as
genocide . . . [the] deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by
force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group . . . This is not to say that acts
described as ‘ethnic cleansing’ may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be characterized
as, for example, ‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part’, contrary to Article II, paragraph (c), of the Convention,
provided such action is carried out with the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to
say with a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from its removal from the region.” (Appli-
cation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 123, para. 190;
emphasis in the original.)
478. Combined with other elements, in particular with the commission of acts prohibited by Article II, the
forced displacement of a population may contribute to the proof of genocidal intent (see paragraphs 162–163
above).
479. In the present case, the Court notes that it is not disputed that a substantial part of the Serb population of
the Krajina fled that region as a direct consequence of the military actions carried out by Croatian forces during
Operation “Storm”, in particular the shelling of the four towns referred to above. It further notes that the transcript
of the Brioni meeting, to which it will return later (see paragraphs 501–507 below), makes it clear that the highest
Croatian political and military authorities were well aware that Operation “Storm” would provoke a mass exodus
of the Serb population; they even to some extent predicated their military planning on such an exodus, which they
considered not only probable, but desirable (see paragraph 504 below).
480. In any event, even if it were proved that it was the intention of the Croatian authorities to bring about the
forced displacement of the Serb population of the Krajina, such displacement would only be capable of constituting
the actus reus of genocide if it was calculated to bring about the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of the
targeted group, thus bringing it within the scope of subparagraph (c) of Article II of the Convention.
The Court finds that the evidence before it does not support such a conclusion. Even if there was a deliberate
policy to expel the Serbs from the Krajina, it has in any event not been shown that such a policy was aimed at causing
the physical destruction of the population in question.
(iii) Killing of Serbs fleeing in columns from the towns under attack
481. According to Serbia, the columns of Serbs fleeing their homes were targeted by artillery shelling and aerial
bombardment, gunfire by infantry, and even attacks by Croatian civilians. It was in areas of Sector North that the
majority of the attacks are alleged to have taken place. Serbia relies on testimony that, in the morning of 4 August
1995, that is to say, at the start of the attack on Knin, long convoys of refugees fleeing neighbouring municipalities
were shelled as they passed through Knin. Serbia alleges that the roads followed by those convoys were deliberately
shelled by Croatian forces, as were convoys of civilians fleeing Knin on 5 August. Serbia further cites reports by
Human Rights Watch and the CHC. According to the latter, on 6 August Serbs had already formed a column fleeing
the Croatian forces which had taken the towns of Knin, Obrovac and Benkovac in Sector South. Convoys of Serb
refugees on other roads were allegedly also attacked, and there were likewise attacks on civilians near the towns
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of Glina and Živorac (on the road between Glina and Dvor), Maja and Cetingrad (in Sector North), as well as on
Vrhovine and Petrovac (in Sector South). In support of its allegations, Serbia has also produced statements by 12
witnesses who testified before the courts of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Croatia denies these accusations. It asserts that civilians fleeing the towns and villages targeted by the military
operation were passing through combat zones, so that they could have been victims of gunfire not specifically
directed at them, and that the columns that were fired on also included both civilians and soldiers.
Croatia further asserts that almost all of the Respondent’s allegations on this issue are based on the CHC report,
whose reliability it challenges.
482. The Court notes that the ICTY did not address the question of attacks on columns of fleeing Serbs. It must
rule in this regard on the basis of the evidence presented to it by the Parties.
483. The Court finds that the evidence produced by Serbia is not entirely conclusive. As it has indicated, the
Court cannot consider a fact proved solely on the basis of the reports of CHC and Human Rights Watch (see para-
graphs 457–459 above). The statements of witnesses before courts in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina do not
always demonstrate direct knowledge of the facts. In any event, this evidence leaves a substantial degree of doubt,
in particular regarding the scale and origin of the attacks suffered by the columns of Serb refugees.
484. However, the Court considers that there is sufficient evidence to establish that such attacks did take place,
and that they were in part carried out by Croatian forces, or with their acquiescence.
In this regard, the Court attaches some weight to the following passage from the Report of Mrs. Elisabeth Rehn,
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in which she stated the following concerning Operation
“Storm”:
“Fleeing civilians were subject to various forms of harassment, including military assaults and
acts by Croatian civilians. On 8 August, a refugee column was shelled between Glina and Dvor,
resulting in at least 4 dead and 10 wounded. A serious incident occurred in Sisak on 9 August, when
a Croatian mob attacked a refugee column with stones, resulting in the injury of many persons. One
woman subsequently died of her wounds. Croatian police watched passively until United Nations
civilian police monitors showed up and prompted them to intervene. The Special Rapporteur met
some Krajina refugees in Belgrade. They informed her of the tragic circumstances of their flight,
which was particularly traumatic for children, the elderly, the sick and wounded.” (United Nations,
doc. S/1995/933, p. 7, para. 18.)
The Court furthermore gives evidential weight to certain statements cited by Serbia from persons who directly
witnessed such attacks and gave evidence before courts in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the years
following Operation “Storm”. In particular, Mr. Boris Martinovic´ described how, having fled Glina following the
shelling of that town between 4 and 7 August 1995, his refugee column joined another column fleeing Knin and
the region of Kordun, and how the entire convoy was then shelled by the Croatian army near Brezovo Polje, and
again near Gornji Zirovac. Similarly, Mr. Mirko Mrkobrad, who appeared as a witness in the present case, stated
that he had been in a refugee column, which was shelled by Croat forces near a place called Ravno Rasce on 8
August 1995.
485. The Court’s conclusion is that killings were in fact committed during the flight of the refugee columns,
even if it is unable to determine their number, and even though there is significant doubt as to whether they were
carried out systematically. These killings, which fall within the scope of subparagraph (a) of Article II of the Geno-
cide Convention, constitute the actus reus of genocide.
(iv) Killing of Serbs having remained in the areas of the Krajina protected by the United Nations
486. Serbia contends that during Operation “Storm”, and after it had been officially terminated, Croatian units
in the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) within the RSK systematically carried out executions of Serb civil-
ians and of soldiers who had laid down their arms. It alleges that, while the majority of the killings were committed
in August 1995, they continued until the end of the year, during which time Croatian forces systematically massacred
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Serbs who had not fled the captured villages. The Respondent admits that, while the majority of killings which took
place in Sector South are, in its view, now well established and recorded, the information available regarding those
perpetrated in Sector North is more fragmentary. It maintains, however, that Croatian forces carried out systematic
executions of Serb civilians having remained in the UNPAs both in the southern and in the northern sectors. It refers
in particular to the findings of the Trial Chamber in the Gotovina case, which it says confirm that Croatian military
units and special police continued to target the Serb civilian population of the Krajina after Operation “Storm” and
committed more than 40 specified murders in August and September 1995.
Croatia disputes these allegations. It admits that crimes were committed against Serbs during Operation “Storm”
and in its immediate aftermath, but contends that these were isolated acts, whose perpetrators have been convicted
by the Croatian courts; on the contrary, there were no systematic killings of Serbs who had remained in the UNPAs.
Croatia further challenges the reliability of the CHC report, on which Serbia’s allegations are largely founded.
487. The Court finds that the occurrence of summary executions of Serbs in the UNPAs during Operation
“Storm” and the following weeks has been established by the testimony of a number of witnesses heard by the ICTY
in the Gotovina case.
488. The Trial Chamber was sufficiently convinced by that evidence to accept it as proof that Croatian military
units and special police carried out killings of Serbs in at least seven towns of the Krajina.
Thus, the Chamber considered it established that four Serbs were killed by one or more members of the
Croatian special police on 7 August 1995 in Oraovac, Donji Lapac municipality (see Gotovina Trial Judgment,
paras. 217–218), and that three people were killed by members of the Croatian army in Evernik municipality
(two on 7 August 1995 in the village of Mokro Polje and one on or about 18 August in the village of Oton
Polje) (ibid., paras. 226 –227, 231–232). It also regarded as proved the killing by members of the Croatian
army of three people in the village of Zrmanja, Gracˇac municipality, in August and September 1995 (ibid.,
paras. 246, 254 –256), of one person in the village of Rudele, Kistanje municipality, at the start of August 1995
(ibid., para. 312), and of one person in Kolarina, in the Benkovac municipality, on 28 September 1995 (ibid.,
paras. 207, 1848). Lastly, it considered it established that a certain number of killings were committed in the
municipalities of Knin and Orlicˇ by Croatian military units and special police, with a total of 23 victims in
Knin between 5 and 25 August 1995 (ibid., paras. 313– 481) and nine in Orlicˇ on 6 August of the same year
(ibid., paras. 489 –526). The Trial Chamber found that the victims were all civilians or people who had been
detained or otherwise placed hors de combat (ibid., paras. 1733, 1849).
489. While the reports of the non-governmental organizations CHC and Veritas cannot be regarded as suffi-
ciently credible to establish the numbers of Serb civilian victims in the UNPAs, their findings nonetheless cor-
roborate other evidence that summary executions occurred. Moreover, Croatia itself has admitted that some killings
did take place.
490. The Court notes that, although the Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber’s Judgment, it did not
reverse the latter’s factual findings regarding the killings and ill-treatment of Serbs by members of the Croatian army
and police. Its reasoning, which is summarized above, was based on the fact that the Trial Chamber had erred in
finding that the shelling of the “four towns” had been indiscriminate; that the shelling could not have been found
to have been indiscriminate on the basis of the evidence before the Appeals Chamber; and that accordingly the
existence of a joint criminal enterprise to expel the Krajina Serbs had not been established. In so ruling, the Appeals
Chamber made no finding, because it had no need to do so, on the various individual acts of killing and ill-treatment
noted — and regarded as proved — by the Trial Chamber. It should be emphasized in this regard that the task of
the Appeals Chamber was to rule on the individual criminal responsibility of two high-ranking Croatian officials,
and not on that of other members of the Croatian armed forces and police having committed crimes during Operation
“Storm”, and — obviously — still less on the international responsibility of Croatia, which is the task incumbent
upon this Court.
491. The Court accordingly considers that the factual findings in the Trial Chamber Judgment on the killing
of Serbs during and after Operation “Storm” within the UNPAs must be accepted as “highly persuasive”, since they
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were not “upset on appeal” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 134, para. 223).
492. In addition, the Court also notes that the Report presented by Mrs. Elisabeth Rehn to the General Assembly
and the Security Council, which it has already cited, states the following:
“Evidence gathered so far indicates that violations of human rights and humanitarian law which
were committed during and after operation ‘Storm’ include the following:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) killing of remaining Serb civilians . . .” (United Nations, doc. S/1995/933, p. 8, para. 23.)
493. The Court finds that acts falling within subparagraph (a) of Article II of the Genocide Convention were
committed by members of the Croatian armed forces against a number of Serb civilians, and soldiers who had sur-
rendered, who remained in the areas of which the Croatian army had taken control during Operation “Storm”. Those
acts are “killings” constituting the actus reus of genocide.
(v) Ill-treatment of Serbs during and after Operation “Storm”
494. Serbia alleges that, during and immediately after Operation “Storm”, a number of Serbs were ill-treated
and tortured by Croatian forces. It relies on statements by several individuals having testified before courts in Serbia,
as well as on the various available reports on Operation “Storm”. It also cites the findings of the Trial Chamber
in the Gotovina case, which purportedly confirm that Croatian military units and special police carried out a large
number of inhumane acts and acts of cruel treatment against Serbs throughout August and September 1995.
Croatia denies these charges. It contests both the probative value of the evidence produced by Serbia and the
scale of the acts invoked. It insists that, in any event, it was never the intention of the Croatian leadership, and of
President Tudjman in particular, to destroy the Krajina Serbs.
495. The same considerations as those set out in the previous section regarding the allegations of killings of
Serbs in the UNPAs lead the Court to the view that there is sufficient evidence of ill-treatment of Serbs. The ICTY
Trial Chamber in the Gotovina case found that such acts had in fact taken place, and considered it as established
that Serb civilians and soldiers who had laid down their arms were ill-treated by Croatian military units and special
police in at least four towns in the Krajina; it describes these acts in detail in Section 4 of its Judgment.
Thus, the Trial Chamber considered it established that a Serb civilian by the name of Konstantin Drcˇa was arrested
outside his home at around 4.30 p.m. on 11 August 1995 by people in uniform armed with automatic rifles, and
transported to a house in Benkovac, where he was held until 15 March 1996. During his detention, members of
the Croatian military police (VP) beat him several times and threatened to slit his throat (Gotovina Trial Judgment,
para. 1111). The Chamber also found that, in Gracˇac, a civilian by the name of Bogdan Brkic´ was the victim of
ill-treatment by members of the Croatian army (HV), who tied him to a tree, put some textiles underneath him, and
set them alight, causing him pain (ibid., para. 1120). In Knin, on 5 August 1995 and in the days that followed, ten
Serbs were — often severely — beaten, threatened, injured and ill-treated by members of the Croatian military police
and army (ibid., paras. 316, 322, 476, 1136, 1138, 1141, 1146). The victims were civilians or soldiers who had laid
down their arms. In Orlic´, on 16 August 1995, members of Croatian military units or special police attempted to
burn an elderly Serb woman (ibid., para. 1158).
The Trial Chamber described these actions as “inhumane acts” and “cruel treatment” (ibid., para. 1800). For the
reasons given above, the Appeals Chamber did not upset those findings.
In her Report, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights included among the “violations of
human rights and humanitarian law which were committed during and after Operation Storm”, “[t]hreats and ill-
treatment against the Serb minority population by Croatian soldiers and policemen and also by Croatian civilians”
(United Nations, doc. S/1995/993, p. 8, para. 23).
496. It is clear from the detailed description in the ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment in the Gotovina case that
many of the acts in question were at least of a degree of gravity such as would enable them to be characterized
as falling within subparagraph (b) of Article II of the Genocide Convention.
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In light of the preceding conclusion, the Court does not consider it necessary, at this stage of its reasoning, to
determine whether those acts, or certain of them, also amounted to “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” within the meaning of subparagraph
(c) of Article II of the Convention.
(vi) Large-scale destruction and looting of Serb property during and after Operation “Storm”
497. Serbia contends that, during and immediately after operation “Storm”, Croatian forces systematically
looted and destroyed Serb houses. They are also alleged to have killed and burned livestock, polluted and destroyed
wells and stolen stocks of firewood in Serb villages. Croatia disputes the scale of the acts alleged by Serbia and
argues that, in any event, the Respondent has failed to show that the Croatian Government in any way planned,
ordered, committed or encouraged such acts. Moreover, according to Croatia, such acts cannot constitute the actus
reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention.
498. The Court recalls that, in order to come within the scope of Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention,
the acts alleged by Serbia must have been such as to have inflicted on the protected group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. The Court finds that the evidence before it does not enable
it to reach such a conclusion in the present case. Even if Serb property was looted and destroyed, it has in any event
not been established that this was aimed at bringing about the physical destruction of the Serb population of the
Krajina.
Conclusion as to the existence of the actus reus of genocide
499. In light of the above, the Court is fully convinced that, during and after Operation “Storm”, Croatian armed
forces and police perpetrated acts against the Serb population falling within subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article
II of the Genocide Convention, and that these acts constituted the actus reus of genocide.
The Court must accordingly now determine whether the existence of the specific intent (dolus specialis) which
characterizes genocide has been established in the present case.
2. The genocidal intent (dolus specialis)
500. Serbia contends that the acts perpetrated by Croatia against the Serb population of the Krajina and allegedly
falling within subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article II of the Genocide Convention were committed with the intent
of destroying the Krajina Serbs, a substantial part of the national and ethnical group of the Serbs in Croatia.
According to Serbia, the existence of that genocidal intent can be inferred, first, from the actual language of the
transcript of the meeting held at Brioni on 31 July 1995, and secondly, and in any event, from the pattern of conduct
that is apparent from the totality of the actions decided upon and implemented by the Croatian authorities during
and immediately after Operation “Storm” — a pattern of conduct such that it can only denote the existence of geno-
cidal intent.
(a) The Brioni Transcript
501. On 31 July 1995 a meeting of Croatia’s top military leaders was held on the island of Brioni under the
chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, in order to prepare Operation “Storm”,
which was indeed launched a few days later.
The full transcript of the discussions at that meeting, which were recorded, was produced before the ICTY during
the Gotovina proceedings, then produced by Serbia before the Court for purposes of the present case. With a few
isolated exceptions, the actual words of the participants are reproduced in that transcript.
502. According to Serbia, several passages from the transcript demonstrate the intention of the Croatian author-
ities, at the highest level, physically to eliminate the Krajina Serbs.
Serbia relies on the following passages.
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At the start of the meeting President Tudjman is quoted as follows:
“Therefore, we should leave the east totally alone, and resolve the question of the south and north.
In which way do we resolve it? This is the subject of our discussion today. We have to inflict
such blows that the Serbs will to all practical purposes disappear, that is to say, the areas we do
not take at once must capitulate within a few days.”
Later on in the discussion the Croatian President further stated:
“And, particularly, gentlemen, please remember how many Croatian villages and town have been
destroyed, but that’s still not the situation in Knin today. . .”
At a later point, he continued:
“[b]ut I said, and we’ve said it here, that they should be given a way out here . . . Because it
is important that those civilians set out, and then the army will follow them, and when the columns
set out, they will have a psychological impact on each other.”
To which General Gotovina replied:
“A large number of civilians are already evacuating Knin and heading towards Banja Luka and
Belgrade. That means that if we continue this pressure, probably for some time to come, there won’t
be so many civilians just those who have to stay, who have no possibility of leaving.”
A little later, the President’s son, Miroslav Tudjman, stated:
“It is realistic to expect that when this is cleared and their forces [Serb armed forces] pulled out
[from the Krajina] then they can prepare after ten days. In that time we will clear the entire area.”
Finally, President Tudjman said:
“If we had enough [ammunition], then I too would be in favour of destroying everything by shell-
ing prior to advancing.”
503. Croatia disputes Serbia’s interpretation of the Brioni Transcript. According to the Applicant, the Brioni
discussions related exclusively to military and strategic issues: it was a matter of planning Operation “Storm” in
the most effective way, rather than settling the fate of the Serb population living in Krajina. Only a biased reading
of certain passages taken out of context could suggest — wrongly in Croatia’s view — the existence of a plan aimed
at destroying the civilian population. Croatia further contends that this was the conclusion of both the ICTY Trial
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in the Gotovina case in regard to the meaning and scope of the Brioni Transcript.
504. The Court is not persuaded by the arguments that Serbia seeks to derive from the Brioni Transcript.
In the Court’s view, the passages quoted above, which are taken from the transcript of a meeting which lasted
almost two hours, are far from demonstrating an intention on the part of the Croatian leaders physically to destroy
the group of Croatian Serbs, or the substantial part of that group constituted by the Serbs living in Krajina.
President Tudjman’s reference — on which Serbia places so much emphasis — to the aim of the Croatian forces
being “to inflict such blows that the Serbs will to all practical purposes disappear” must be read in context, and
specifically in light of what immediately follows: “that is to say, the areas we do not take at once must capitulate
within a few days”. Taken as a whole, that sentence is clearly more indicative of the designation of a military objec-
tive, rather than of the intention to secure the physical destruction of a human group.
The fact that the President subsequently asked the meeting to “remember how many Croatian villages and towns
[had] been destroyed”, while pointing out that this was “still not the situation in Knin”, does not establish an intent
on his part to destroy the Serb population of the Krajina.
Similarly, the concern expressed by the Croatian Head of State that the Serb civilians should be left with accessible
escape routes, “[b]ecause it is important that those civilians set out, and then the army will follow them”, in no way
suggests any intent to destroy the Serb group as such, but is better understood as an aspect of military strategy. And
it is clarified in particular by the final part of the same sentence: “and when the columns [of civilians and soldiers]
set out, they will have a psychological impact on each other”.
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The same applies to General Gotovina’s reply, where he foresees that there would not be many Serb civilians
left in the area once the Croatian military offensive has begun, except for “those who have to stay, who have no
possibility of leaving”. Although not directly linked to any strategic considerations, that remark in no way suggests
an intention physically to eliminate the Serb population.
Furthermore, the remark by Miroslav Tudjman (“When . . . their forces [have] pulled out, then they can prepare
after ten days. In that time we will clear the entire area”), while containing a certain ambiguity, which the context
cannot dispel, does not represent sufficiently persuasive evidence of a genocidal intent.
Finally, President Tudjman’s statement that he would be “in favour of destroying everything by shelling prior
to advancing” — if the Croat forces “had enough” ammunition — was made in the context of a discussion on the
need to use the military resources available to those forces with restraint. It cannot be interpreted as reflecting an
intent on the President’s part to destroy the Krajina Serbs as such.
505. At most, the view might be taken that the Brioni Transcript shows that the leaders of Croatia envisaged
that the military offensive they were preparing would have the effect of causing the flight of the great majority of
the Serb population of the Krajina, that they were satisfied with that consequence and that, in any case, they would
do nothing to prevent it because, on the contrary, they wished to encourage the departure of the Serb civilians.
However, even that interpretation, assuming it to be correct, would be far from providing a sufficient basis for
the Court to make a finding of the existence of the specific intent which characterizes genocide.
506. The Court further notes that this conclusion is confirmed by the way the Brioni Transcript was dealt with
by the ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers in their decisions in the Gotovina case.
The Trial Chamber found that certain items in the transcript constituted evidence, together with other elements,
of the existence of a concerted plan by the Croatian leaders to expel the Serb civilian population of the Krajina (the
“joint criminal enterprise”). However, the Chamber found no evidence of an intention physically to destroy the group
of the Krajina Serbs. In particular, with regard to the first remark of President Tudjman quoted above (“We have
to inflict such blows that the Serbs will to all practical purposes disappear”), the Trial Chamber found that “when
read in its context this particular statement focuses mainly on the Serb military forces, rather than the Serb civilian
population” (Gotovina Trial Judgment, para. 1990).
As for the Appeals Chamber, it did not go nearly as far as the Trial Chamber, expressing itself as follows:
“[O]utside th[e] context [of unlawful attacks], it was not reasonable to find that the only possible
interpretation of the Brioni Transcript involved a [joint criminal enterprise] to forcibly deport Serb
civilians. Portions of the Brioni Transcript deemed incriminating by the Trial Chamber can be inter-
preted, absent the context of unlawful artillery attacks, as inconclusive with respect to the existence
of a [joint criminal enterprise], reflecting, for example, a lawful consensus on helping civilians tem-
porarily depart from an area of conflict for reasons including legitimate military advantage and
casualty reduction. Thus discussion of pretexts for artillery attacks, of potential civilian departures,
and of provision of exit corridors could be reasonably interpreted as referring to lawful combat
operations and public relations efforts. Other parts of the Brioni Transcript, such as Gotovina’s
claim that his troops could destroy the town of Knin, could be reasonably construed as using short-
hand to describe the military forces stationed in an area, or intending to demonstrate potential mil-
itary power in the context of planning a military operation.” (Gotovina Appeals Judgment, para.
93.)
507. In conclusion, the Court considers that, even taken together and interpreted in light of the contemporaneous
overall political and military context, the passages from the Brioni Transcript quoted by Serbia, like the rest of the
document, do not establish the existence of the specific intent (dolus specialis) which characterizes genocide.
(b) Existence of a pattern of conduct indicating genocidal intent
508. Serbia contends that, even if the Court were to find that the Brioni Transcript does not constitute evidence
of Croatia’s genocidal intent, and even if none of the acts alleged by the Respondent is in itself evidence of the
existence of such intent, the acts and statements of the Croatian authorities taken as a whole, before, during and
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immediately after Operation “Storm” manifest a consistent pattern of conduct which can only show that those author-
ities were animated by a desire to destroy, in whole or in part, the group of Serbs living in Croatia. This is said
to emerge, in particular, from the series of military operations conducted by Croatia from 1992 to 1995, during which
Croatian forces allegedly committed war crimes and serious human rights violations against Serbs in Croatia.
According to Serbia, this period was characterized by a policy of systematic discrimination against the Serbs, cul-
minating in Operation “Storm”, which marked the point at which the campaign turned into one aimed at the actual
destruction of the group.
509. Croatia vigorously disputes that assertion. It maintains that the purpose of all the acts and statements of
the Croatian authorities cited by Serbia was strictly confined to regaining possession of areas under Serb control.
It had first sought to achieve that aim by peaceful means, but eventually had no other choice but recourse to force.
It considers that the evidence presented by Serbia is far from establishing a pattern of conduct such that it can only
show an intention to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part.
510. In this regard, the Court recalls two findings from its Judgment rendered in the Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia and Montenegro case, which it has already referred to earlier in the present Judgment, and which must
now be regarded as solidly rooted in its jurisprudence.
First, what is generally called “ethnic cleansing” does not in itself constitute a form of genocide. Genocide pre-
supposes the intent physically to destroy, in whole or in part, a human group as such, and not merely a desire to
expel it from a specific territory. Acts of “ethnic cleansing” can indeed be elements in the implementation of a
genocidal plan, but on condition that there exists an intention physically to destroy the targeted group and not merely
to secure its forced displacement (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 122, para.
190).
Secondly, for a pattern of conduct, that is to say, a consistent series of acts carried out over a specific period of
time, to be accepted as evidence of genocidal intent, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence
of such intent, that is to say, that it can only reasonably be understood as reflecting that intent (see paragraphs 145–
148 above).
511. In light of the two preceding propositions, Serbia’s “pattern of conduct” argument cannot succeed.
The Court cannot see in the pattern of conduct on the part of the Croatian authorities immediately before, during
and after Operation “Storm” a series of acts which could only reasonably be understood as reflecting the inten-
tion, on the part of those authorities, physically to destroy, in whole or in part, the group of Serbs living in
Croatia.
512. As has already been stated above, not all of the acts alleged by Serbia as constituting the physical element
of genocide have been factually proved. Those which have been proved — in particular the killing of civilians and
the ill-treatment of defenceless individuals — were not committed on a scale such that they could only point to
the existence of a genocidal intent.
513. It is true that Serbia also cited, in its argument on Croatia’s “pattern of conduct”, the administrative mea-
sures imposed to prevent the Krajina Serbs from returning home. According to Serbia, these confirm the conclusion
— which it asks the Court to draw — that the real target of peration “Storm” was the Serb population.
514. In the Court’s view, even if Serbia’s allegations in regard to the refusal to allow the Serb refuges to return
home — allegations disputed by Croatia — were true, that would still not prove the existence of the dolus specialis:
genocide presupposes the intent to destroy a group as such, and not to inflict damage upon it or to remove it from
a territory, irrespective of how such actions might be characterized in law.
Conclusion regarding the existence of the dolus specialis, and general conclusion on the commission of
genocide
515. The Court concludes from the foregoing that the existence of the dolus specialis has not been established.
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Accordingly, the Court finds that it has not been proved that genocide was committed during and after Operation
“Storm” against the Serb population of Croatia.
B. Discussion of the other submissions in the counter-claim
1. Alternative submissions
516. In the alternative, in the event that the Court does not uphold the principal submissions asking it to find
that Croatia is internationally responsible for acts of genocide attributable to it, Serbia requests the Court to find
that Croatia has violated its obligations under subparagraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Article III of the Genocide
Convention, namely its obligations not to commit acts constituting: “(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct
and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; and (e) Complicity in genocide”.
517. Since the Court has not found any acts capable of being characterized as genocide in connection with the
events during and after Operation “Storm”, it is bound to conclude that Croatia did not breach its obligations under
subparagraph (e) of Article III. Moreover, in the absence of the necessary specific intent which characterizes geno-
cide, Croatia cannot be considered to have engaged in “conspiracy to commit genocide” or “direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide”, or in an attempt to commit genocide, all of which presuppose the existence of such an
intent.
It follows that the alternative submissions must be rejected.
2. Subsidiary submissions
518. On a subsidiary basis, irrespective of whether the Court upholds its principal and alternative submissions,
Serbia requests the Court to find that Croatia has violated its obligation to punish acts of genocide committed against
the Serb ethnical and national group living in Croatia, an obligation incumbent upon it under Article VI of the
Genocide Convention, which provides:
“Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which
shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”
519. Since Serbia has failed to prove the existence of an act of genocide, or of any of the other acts mentioned
in Article III of the Convention, committed against the Serb population living in Croatia, its subsidiary submissions
must also necessarily be rejected.
3. Submissions requesting the cessation of the internationally wrongful acts attributable to Croatia and
reparation in respect of their injurious consequences
520. Serbia asks the Court to order Croatia immediately to take effective steps to comply with its obligation
to punish the authors of the acts of genocide committed on its territory during and after Operation “Storm”, and
to take various measures to make good the damage and loss caused by its violations of the Genocide Convention,
in particular by compensating the victims.
521. Since the present Judgment has found that no internationally wrongful act in relation to the Genocide Con-
vention has been committed by Croatia, these submissions must also be rejected.
General conclusion on the counter-claim
522. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the counter-claim must be dismissed in its entirety.
*
* *
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523. The Court has already referred to the issue of missing persons (see paragraphs 357-359 above), in the
context of its examination of the principal claim. It notes that individuals also disappeared during Operation “Storm”
and its immediate aftermath. It can only reiterate its request to both Parties to continue their co-operation with a
view to settling as soon as possible the issue of the fate of missing persons.
The Court recalls, furthermore, that its jurisdiction in this case is based on Article IX of the Genocide Convention,
and that it can therefore only rule within the limits imposed by that instrument. Its findings are therefore without
prejudice to any question regarding the Parties’ possible responsibility in respect of any violation of international
obligations other than those arising under the Convention itself. In so far as such violations may have taken place,
the Parties remain liable for their consequences. The Court encourages the Parties to continue their co-operation
with a view to offering appropriate reparation to the victims of such violations, thus consolidating peace and stability
in the region.
*
* *
VII. OPERATIVE CLAUSE
524. For these reasons,
The Court,
(1) By eleven votes to six,
Rejects the second jurisdictional objection raised by Serbia and finds that its jurisdiction to entertain Croatia’s
claim extends to acts prior to 27 April 1992;
In favour: Vice-President Sepu´lveda-Amor; Judges Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Canc¸ado Trindade,
Yusuf, Greenwood, Donoghue, Gaja, Bhandari; Judge ad hoc Vukas;
Against: President Tomka; Judges Owada, Skotnikov, Xue, Sebutinde; Judge ad hoc Krec´a;
(2) By fifteen votes to two,
Rejects Croatia’s claim;
In favour: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepu´lveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Ben-
nouna, Skotnikov, Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari; Judge ad
hoc Krec´a;
Against: Judge Canc¸ado Trindade; Judge ad hoc Vukas;
(3) Unanimously,
Rejects Serbia’s counter-claim.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this third
day of February, two thousand and fifteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court
and the others transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of
Serbia, respectively.
(Signed) Peter Tomka,
President.
(Signed) Philippe Couvreur
Registrar.
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President Tomka appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges Owada, Keith and Skot-
nikov append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Canc¸ado Trindade appends a dissenting
opinion to the Judgment of the Court; JudgesXue andDonoghue append declarations to the Judgment of the Court;
Judges Gaja, Sebutinde and Bhandari append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hoc
Vukas appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hoc hoc Krec´a appends a separate
opinion to the Judgment of the Court.
(Initialled) P. T.
(Initialled) Ph. C.
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